Mendez v. Stephens

Decision Date05 May 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. SA-11-CA-895-XR
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
PartiesJESSE MENDEZ, TDCJ No. 1560882, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING RELIEF

On October 26, 2011, Petitioner Jesse Mendez filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his September 2008 state conviction for aggravated robbery and fifty-five year sentence of imprisonment. Doc. No. 2. For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner is entitled to neither federal habeas corpus relief nor a Certificate of Appealability from this Court.

I. BACKGROUND

A Bexar County grand jury indicted Petitioner on April 18, 2006, on a single count of robbery.1 Petitioner's trial commenced on September 3, 2008. The complainant, cab driver Ezequiel Lomas, testified that he was robbed by two assailants after picking them up during the early morning hours of October 31, 2005. Lomas repeatedly emphasized throughout his trial testimony that he did not get a good look at either of his two assailants, and that he had been unable to definitively pick either a male or a female suspect from the photo arrays shown to him severalmonths after the robbery.2 Lomas nevertheless acknowledged he had signed the Petitioner's photograph from the photo array of male suspects. He explained that he did so only because that photograph looked more like his male assailant than the other males depicted in the photo array.3

The prosecution then called Roxanne Herrera, who testified that she and Petitioner robbed Lomas on October 31, 2005. In addition, a San Antonio Police ("SAPD") officer testified about his arrest of Roxanne Herrera and her voluntary post-arrest statement that she had been involved in Lomas' robbery the night before.4 A SAPD detective further testified that during an interview Herrera voluntarily indicated that Petitioner was also involved in the robbery.5

Petitioner presented no evidence at his trial. The jury began and ended its deliberations on September 4, 2008, finding Petitioner guilty of robbery.6 During sentencing, Petitioner announced that he wished to take the stand.7 Both sides immediately rested and closed without further comment.8 The jury heard closing arguments and returned its punishment phase verdict on September 5, 2008, sentencing Petitioner to serve a 55-year term of incarceration.9

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. In an unpublished opinion issued on December 30, 2009, the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction. On March 31, 2010, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Petitioner's petition for discretionary review. Petitioner next filed a state habeas corpus application on January 18, 2013. On June 23, 2011, the state habeas trial court recommended denial of Petitioner's state habeas corpus application. On October 12, 2011, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner's state habeas corpus application without written order. Ex parte Jesse Mendez, WR 68,885-01 (Tex. Crim. App. October 12, 2011).

Petitioner filed his original federal habeas corpus petition and a memorandum in support in this Court on October 26, 2011. Doc. Nos. 2 & 3. Petitioner asserts several theories of how he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that counsel was deficient for: (a) refusing to allow Petitioner to testify at trial regarding his alibi, (b) failing to move to suppress Lomas' in-court identification testimony, (c) failing to object to the trial court's suggestion that Petitioner stipulate that he was the male subject shown in the taxicab camera photographs, (d) failing to question witnesses regarding the identify of the male shown in the taxicab camera photographs, and (e) failing to request a lesser-included-offense instruction regarding the offense of theft. In addition to his ineffective of assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner raises additional claims that: (1) he was denied his right to testify at trial, (2) Lomas' in-court identification was impermissibly suggestive, and (3) the admission of his probation officer's testimony violated Petitioner's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") standard of review, this Court cannot grant Petitioner federal habeas corpus relief in this cause in connection with any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438, 161 l.Ed.2d 334 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

The Supreme Court has concluded the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) have independent meanings. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief if: (1) the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or (2) the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003)("A state court's decision is 'contrary to' our clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases' or it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.'"). A state court's failure to cite governing Supreme Court authority does not, per se, establish the state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly establishedfederal law: "the state court need not even be aware of our precedents, 'so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decisions contradicts them.'" Id.

Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. at 141, 125 S. Ct. at 1439; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534-35, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). A federal court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132-33, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 (2010). Legal principles are "clearly established" for purposes of AEDPA review when the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision establish those principles. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2147, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004).

The AEDPA also significantly restricts the scope of federal habeas review of state court findings of fact. Section 2254(d)(2) provides federal habeas relief may not be granted on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the state courts unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)("[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.").

In addition, § 2254(e)(1) provides a petitioner challenging state court factual findings must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's findings were erroneous. Schrirov. Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74, 127 S. Ct. at 1939-40 ("AEDPA also requires federal habeas courts to presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence."). However, the deference to which state-court factual findings are entitled under the AEDPA does not imply an abandonment or abdication of federal judicial review. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)("Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does not by definition preclude relief.").

Finally, in the Fifth Circuit, a federal habeas court reviewing a state court's rejection on the merits of a claim for relief pursuant to the AEDPA must focus exclusively on the propriety of the ultimate decision reached by the state court, and not evaluate the overall quality of the state court's written opinion supporting its decision. See Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 239 (5th Cir. 2010)(federal habeas review of a state court's adjudication involves review only of a state court's decision, not the written opinion explaining the decision), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 124, 181 L.Ed.2d 46 (2011); St. Aubin v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 2006)(holding Section 2254(d) permits a federal habeas court to review only a state court's decision and not the written opinion explaining that decision), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 921 (2007);

ANALYSIS
A. DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY

Petitioner argues he was denied his constitutional right to testify when his...

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