Mendoza v. Blum, 74 Civ. 4994 (KTD).
| Decision Date | 14 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 74 Civ. 4994 (KTD).,74 Civ. 4994 (KTD). |
| Parties | Gloria MENDOZA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Barbara B. BLUM, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Jorge L. Batista, Robert L. Becker, Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., Louise Gans, Community Action for Legal Services, New York City, John C. Gray, Jr., Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B, Brooklyn, N.Y., Norman Siegel, MFY Legal Services Inc., New York City, for plaintiffs.
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, New York City, for city defendant; Norma Kerlin, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., New York City, for state defendant; Robert A. Forte, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel.
Plaintiffs, Mendoza et al., move pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), for an order entitling plaintiffs to attorneys' fees in the amount of $156,375.00. Since the filing of plaintiffs' motion, the federal government and plaintiffs have agreed, by Stipulation and Order dated November 20, 1984, to settle plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees in the amount of $11,000.00. Plaintiffs' motion as to the State and City defendants, however, must still be decided.
This is a class action that was commenced in 1974 against Federal, State, and City defendants to prevent the alleged deprivation of certain constitutional rights to welfare recipients and applicants. In their complaint, plaintiffs, who are individuals of Hispanic origin, alleged that the failure to provide sufficient bilingual personnel and forms violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Social Security Act, and the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. For the factual and procedural background of this case, see Mendoza v. Lavine, 412 F.Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); Mendoza v. Blum, 91 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (); Mendoza v. Blum, 560 F.Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (). Familiarity with the above is presumed.
In granting plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, I stated that "because this lawsuit encouraged the federal government to comply with the statutory directives requiring enforcement of Title VI, I find that the plaintiffs prevailed in their action against the federal government." Mendoza v. Blum, 560 F.Supp. at 288. With respect to the City and State defendants, I found that they are also liable for attorneys' fees reasoning that "should the City and State have prevailed in the federal administrative proceedings, they still faced a lawsuit that presented a strong claim for relief." Id.
The City of New York objects to plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees on several grounds in which the State of New York joins. The City argues first that the efforts of plaintiffs' attorneys did not produce beneficial results and, therefore, plaintiffs are not "prevailing parties." Any suggestion that plaintiffs are not "prevailing parties" is rejected as frivolous. In the 1983 decision, I held specifically that plaintiffs are prevailing parties.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees should be disallowed on the ground of laches. They assert that the delay in applying for attorneys' fees — whether the delay is four years from the settlement agreement or fifteen months from my March 1983 decision allowing such attorneys' fees — is unreasonable. Furthermore, defendants argue that the delay was prejudicial due to the unavailability of witnesses and the fading of the memories of relevant individuals. I find no merit to defendants' contentions. First, if plaintiffs are guilty of any delay, it would be the delay since my March 1983 decision. Any objection to the passage of an earlier period of time should have been raised in connection with the original motion for attorneys' fees. With respect to the fifteen-month delay, I do not find it unreasonable. The documentation submitted by plaintiffs in connection with the instant motion is voluminous and encompasses a case history of about a decade.
The remaining objections raised by defendants principally concern the reasonableness of the claimed hourly rates and the amount of hours expended. Reasonable attorneys' fees are determined by multiplying the number of reasonably expended hours by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 432, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 50 (1983); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1974). Furthermore, awards of reasonable attorneys' fees under section 1988 are to be "calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or non-profit counsel." Blum v. Stenson, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891, 899-900 (1984).
Plaintiffs have divided their attorneys' fees claim into two periods of time — 1973 through 1977 and 1978 through the present. The hourly rate claimed for each attorney during the two periods is as follows:
1973—1977
John C. Gray, Jr. $125.00
Michael A. O'Connor $125.00
Richard Hiller $125.00
Joan E. Bertin $ 80.00
Paul McAloon $ 80.00
1978—1984
John C. Gray, Jr. $150.00
Michael A. O'Connor $150.00
Robert L. Becker $150.00
Anne Hayes $ 95.00
Idelisse Malave $ 95.00
As plaintiffs correctly note, because public interest attorneys cannot use the fees they charge generally as evidence of the market value of their services, they must utilize other comparisons. See National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1329 (D.C.Cir.1982) (). After a thorough review of the affidavits of Robert L. Becker, Michael A. O'Connor and John C. Gray, Jr., as well as the resumes of the attorneys for whom attorneys' fees are claimed, I conclude that the hourly rates are reasonable. At the time that this action was commenced, Gray, O'Connor, Hiller, and Becker had several years experience in the civil rights litigation field.
As support for the suggested hourly rates plaintiffs note that in Blum v. Stenson, hourly rates of between $95.00 and $105.00 were found reasonable for work performed between 1978 and 1980 by attorneys who at the commencement of the action had approximately one and one-half years of experience. See ___ U.S. at ___ n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 1544 n. 4. 79 L.Ed.2d at 897 n. 4. In addition to various affidavits and citations to other cases in which comparable rates were utilized, plai...
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...see also White v. New Hampshire, etc., 455 U.S. 445, 454, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 1167, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982); but see Mendoza v. Blum, 602 F.Supp. 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y.1985), they have not raised or addressed the issue. See Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1238 (5th Cir.1985); cf. Fulps v. City of Sprin......
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Berry v. School Dist. of City of Benton Harbor
...against each defendant is a factor. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 960 (1st Cir.1984). But see Mendoza v. Blum, 602 F.Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N. Y.1985). Third, the relative ability of each defendant to pay may affect the apportionment of a fee award. See Grendel's Den, Inc., ......
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