Mendoza v. Detail Solutions, LLC

• Decision Date: 27 November 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–2436–G.
• Citation: 911 F.Supp.2d 433
• Parties: Esau Torres MENDOZA and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(b), Plaintiff, v. DETAIL SOLUTIONS, LLC f/k/a Uptown Detail and SPA and Carole Austein, Independent Executrix of the Estate of Charles Austein, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

911 F.Supp.2d 433

Esau Torres MENDOZA and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(b), Plaintiff,

v.DETAIL SOLUTIONS, LLC f/k/a Uptown Detail and SPA and Carole Austein, Independent Executrix of the Estate of Charles Austein, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–2436–G.

United States District Court,

N.D. Texas,

Dallas Division.

Nov. 27, 2012.

Jamie Harrison Zidell, Jack Siegel, K. David Kelly, Robert Lee Manteuffel, JH Zidell PC, Dallas, TX, Christopher R. Hutson, The Neal Law Firm, Bedford, TX, for Plaintiff.

K. Todd Phillips, Andrew M. Gould, Joseph Reed Callister, Wick Phillips Gould & Martin LLP, Jennifer N. Lewis, Jennifer Gadd Snow, Farrow–Gillespie & Heath LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A. JOE FISH, Senior District Judge.

Before the court are the following motions: (1) the defendant Detail Solutions' motion for summary judgment (“Detail Motion”) (docket entry 74); (2) the plaintiff's objection and motion to strike portions of defendant Detail Solutions' reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment (“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike”) (docket entry 86); (3) the executrix's objection to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and brief in support (“Executrix's Motion to Strike”) (docket entry 92); and (4) the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment (“Mendoza Motion”) (docket entry 87). For the reasons stated below, the Detail Motion is granted, the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is granted, the Executrix's Motion to Strike is granted, and the Mendoza Motion is stricken in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This is a dispute over alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), including failure to pay minimum wage, unpaid overtime wages, and retaliation. See Complaint Under 29 U.S.C. 201–216 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 13–21 (docket entry 1). The plaintiff, Esau Torres Mendoza (“Mendoza”), was employed by the defendant, Detail Solutions, LLC (“Detail Solutions”), at least from April 2010 through November 2010.¹See Defendant Detail Solutions' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Detail Brief”) at 3 ¶ 6 (docket entry 75). Detail Solutions provides car washing and detailing services to local automobile dealership clients, operating one office in Dallas, Texas. See Detail Brief at 2 ¶¶ 1–2. During the relevant time period, Detail Solutions was owned and operated by Charles Austein. See Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Mendoza Brief”) at 4 (docket entry 88); see also Plaintiff's Appendix to Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Mendoza Appendix 2”) at 6–8 (docket entry 89). All of Detail Solutions' customers and suppliers are located in the state of Texas, and it contends that it has never conducted work outside of Texas. See Detail Brief at 2. It does not order goods or materials from out of state, nor does it communicate with customers or suppliers across state lines. Id. It asserts that it has never advertised or secured financing outside of Texas. Id. In 2009, it generated $498,602.46 in annual sales. Id.

Mendoza's duties with Detail Solutions included washing and detailing cars at certain automobile dealerships in the Dallas area. Id. at 3. He did not apparently interact with customers or use the telephone or computer as part of his responsibilities. Id. Mendoza also apparently never worked outside of the state for Detail Solutions and only worked for its Dallas-based customers. Id. Mendoza is an undocumented worker who does not possess a social security card, a U.S. citizenship card, or a U.S. or foreign passport. Id.; see also Appendix in Support of Defendant Detail Solutions' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Detail Appendix”) at 8–9, 14 (docket entry 76). Mendoza avers that for the duration of his employment, he worked an average of 66 hours per week and was paid at the same $5.38 hourly rate for all hours worked. See Complaint ¶¶ 13, 16. In addition, he alleges that, in November 2010, within two weeks of lodging a complaint with his supervisor about not being paid overtime wages, he was fired. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. He maintains that his complaint to his supervisor about unpaid overtime wages was the motivating factor in his firing. Id. ¶ 20.

B. Procedural Background

Mendoza filed a complaint against Detail Solutions and Charles Austein on December 1, 2010. See generally Complaint. After Mr. Austein passed away, the plaintiff's motion to substitute the executrix of Mr. Austein's estate, Carole Austein (“Austein”), as a defendant was granted. See Order of April 20, 2012 (docket entry 71). Detail Solutions filed an answer on January 12, 2011. See Defendants' Original Answer (“Answer”) (docket entry 8). On June 20, 2012 Detail Solutions moved for summary judgment on the issue of the FLSA's coverage of Detail Solutions.²See Detail Motion at 4–7. It also moved for summary judgment on Mendoza's retaliation claim, to the extent this claim is used to support the requested relief of back pay damages. Id. at 7–9. Mendoza responded to the motion on July 10, 2012. See Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Detail Solutions, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mendoza Response”) (docket entry 80). Detail Solutions filed a reply on July 30, 2012. See Defendant Detail Solutions' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Detail Reply”) (docket entry 85). Mendoza objected and moved to strike portions of this reply on August 13, 2012. See Plaintiff's Objection and Motion to Strike Portions of Defendant Detail Solutions' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff's Motion to Strike”) (docket entry 86). On August 31, 2012, Mendoza moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of FLSA coverage, Charles Austein's status as an employer under the FLSA, and the availability of back pay damages to Mendoza. See Mendoza Motion. Detail Solutions responded to this motion on September 21, 2012. See Defendant Detail Solutions' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Detail Response”) (docket entry 90). Austein filed an objection to Mendoza's partial summary judgment motion on September 21, 2012. See Executrix's Motion to Strike. This case is set for trial on the court's four-week docket beginning January 7, 2013.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits, if any, “show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1).³ A fact is material if the governing substantive law identifies it as having the potential to affectthe outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue as to a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (“An issue is ‘ genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”). To demonstrate a genuine issue as to the material facts, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party must show that the evidence is sufficient to support the resolution of the material factual issues in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company, 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). However, it is not incumbent upon the court to comb the record in search of evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.2003). The nonmoving party has a duty to designate the evidence in the record that establishes the existence of genuine issues as to the material facts. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court.” Malacara, 353 F.3d at 405.

B. FLSA: Covered Employers

1. Legal Standard

The FLSA mandates that covered employers pay wages of at least $7.25 an hour to their employees. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). It also mandates that covered employers not utilize employees “for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

Consistent with Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, these provisions only apply (1) to an employer that has “employees who in any workweek [are] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” (“individual coverage”), or (2) to an employer that has employees “employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” (“enterprise coverage”). See29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); for the terms “individual coverage” and “enterprise coverage,” see, e.g., Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 915, 113 S.Ct. 323, 121 L.Ed.2d 243 (1992). “Commerce” is defined as “trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between...