Mendoza v. Garrett

Decision Date12 December 2018
Docket NumberNo. 3:18-cv-01634-HZ,3:18-cv-01634-HZ
Citation358 F.Supp.3d 1145
Parties Cindy MENDOZA; Gloria Bermudez; Jeremy Chase ; Cekais Toni Ganuelas; Rebecca Heath ; and Karl Wade Roberts, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. Matthew GARRETT, in His Official Capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation; Tammy Baney, in Her Official Capacity as Chair of the Oregon Transportation Commission; Sean O'Hollaren, in His Official Capacity as Member of the Oregon Transportation Commission; Bob Van Brocklin, in His Official Capacity as Member of the Oregon Transportation Commission; Martin Callery, in His Official Capacity as Member of the Oregon Transportation Commission; and Tom McClellan, in His Official Capacity as Administrator of Driver and Motor Vehicles Division, Oregon Department of Transportation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon
OPINION & ORDER

HERNANDEZ, District Judge:

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenging Oregon's practice of suspending an individual's driver's license for failure to pay "traffic debt."1 More specifically, the six named Plaintiffs, each of whom lives on an extremely limited income and has had a driver's license suspended because of the inability to pay one or more traffic violation fines, contend that suspending a driver's license for failure to pay traffic debt absent an assessment of an individual's ability to pay violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendants are the Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), members of the Oregon Transportation Commission, and the Administrator of ODOT's Driver and Motor Vehicles Division. Collectively, they are "the DMV." Simultaneously with filing the Complaint, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify the class. This Opinion addresses the preliminary injunction motion only. At oral argument on that motion, I deferred any further briefing on the class certification motion, and any other activity in the case, until resolution of the preliminary injunction motion.

Plaintiffs bring three claims, each alleging a violation of either due process, equal protection, or both. Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to any of their claims, I deny the motion.

BACKGROUND

Oregon, like other states, has a statutory scheme in which the failure to pay a court-adjudicated traffic violation fine can result in the suspension of a driver's license. Recently, some states have addressed the practice through legislation. In California, for example, according to a Los Angeles Times article cited by Plaintiffs, the California Legislature passed a bill, signed by the Governor in June 2017, preventing the suspension of driver's licenses because of unpaid fines.2 Other states are in litigation over the practice. E.g., Fowler v. Johnson , No. 17-11441, 2017 WL 6379676 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2017) (challenge to Michigan statutes allowing suspension of driver's licenses of individuals who fail to pay court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments resulting from traffic violations) (" Fowler I ")3 ; Robinson v. Purkey , No. 3:17-cv-1263, 2017 WL 4418134 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017) (challenge to Tennessee statutes allowing suspension of driver's licenses for nonpayment of fines or costs imposed for conviction of driving offenses) (" Robinson I ").4 This case, however, involves Oregon's statutory scheme. Thus, I begin there before turning to other evidence in the record submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the motion.

I. Oregon's Statutory Scheme

The Oregon Vehicle Code defines "traffic violation" as "a traffic offense that is designated as a traffic violation in the statute defining the offense, or any other offense defined in the Oregon Vehicle Code that is punishable by a fine but that is not punishable by a term of imprisonment." Or. Rev. Stat. § (O.R.S). 801.557 ; see also O.R.S. 153.008(1)(a), (b) (providing generally that an "offense" is a "violation" if it is "designated as a violation by the statute defining the offense," or the "statute prescribing the penalty for the offense provides that the offense is punishable by a fine but does not provide that the offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment.").

Violations are classified into categories. O.R.S. 153.012 (designating categories as Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D, as well as "unclassified violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015," and "[s]pecific fine violations as described in O.R.S. 153.015."). "The penalty for committing a violation is a fine." O.R.S. 153.018(1). There are maximum, presumptive, and minimum fines for each category of violation. O.R.S. 153.018(2) (maximum fines); O.R.S. 153.019 (presumptive fines); O.R.S. 153.020 (increasing presumptive fines for violations committed in a highway work zone, school zone, or safety corridor); O.R.S. 153.021 (minimum fines). The Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court is required to establish a uniform fine schedule for violations prosecuted in circuit courts. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(b). Courts other than circuit courts are required to establish schedules of the amounts of penalties to be imposed for first, second, and subsequent violations, designating each violation specifically or by class. O.R.S. 153.800(4)(a).

When law enforcement officers issue a citation and summons to a driver for a traffic violation, certain information must be included as specified in O.R.S. 153.045 - 153.051. This includes the amount of the presumptive fine, if there is one for the violation. O.R.S. 153.051(4) (requirements of the summons). The summons must notify the person that a monetary judgment may be entered for up to the maximum amount of fines, restitution, and other costs allowed by law if the person fails to make all required appearances at proceedings. O.R.S. 153.051(5). And, the summons must notify the person that if he or she pleads no contest and pays the presumptive fine, the person may submit an explanation of the circumstances of the violation and the court may consider that explanation in establishing the amount of the fine, but the court cannot impose a fine less than the statutory minimum. O.R.S. 153.051(7). The summons must also notify the person that if the person pleads not guilty and requests a trial, the fines still cannot be less than the minimum unless the person is found not guilty. O.R.S. 153.051(8).

A person who has been issued a citation must make an appearance in person at the time indicated in the citation/summons, request a trial, or deliver payment of the presumptive fine to the court. O.R.S. 153.061(1), (3). Circuit courts, municipal courts, and justice courts adjudicate traffic violations. In cases where the defendant pleads no contest by delivering payment of the presumptive fine to the court under O.R.S. 153.061(3), the amount of the fine may not exceed the presumptive fine. Id. Additionally, a judge may suspend operation of any part of a judgment entered under the "Violations and Fines" chapter of the Oregon statutes upon condition that the defendant pay the nonsuspended portion of a fine within a specified period of time. O.R.S. 153.090(4).

When a traffic violation fine remains unpaid, a court may use a private collection agency to seek recoupment of the debt or refer the debt to the Oregon Department of Revenue (ODOR). O.R.S. 1.197(1). In addition to these options, "[a] court may ... (a) issue a notice of suspension to the [DMV] that directs the department to implement procedures under ORS 809.416 [,] or (b) [o]rder a defendant's driving privileges restricted." O.R.S. 809.210(1). This case concerns only (a), the issuance of the notice of suspension. Although an unpaid traffic violation fine allows a court to send a suspension notice to the DMV, a court is prohibited from sending a notice of suspension for those who have failed to pay fines for bicycle, pedestrian, or parking offenses. O.R.S. 809.210(7).

Upon receipt of the notice of suspension from a court, suspension of a driver's license by the DMV is mandatory. A person "is subject to suspension under ORS 809.415(4) if the department receives a notice of suspension from a court under ORS 809.210 indicating that the person has failed or refused to pay a fine[.]" O.R.S. 809.416(2). The "department shall suspend driving privileges when provided under ORS 809.416." O.R.S. 809.415(4) (emphasis added); see also O.R.S. 809.210(4)(b) (providing that if the court issues a notice of suspension that directs the DMV to implement procedures under O.R.S. 809.416, the DMV shall take action on the suspension as provided under O.R.S. 809.416 ).

A person is subject to suspension under O.R.S. 809.416(2) until one of the following occurs: (1) the person presents the department with a notice of reinstatement issued by the court showing that the person (a) is making payments or has paid the fine; or (b) has enrolled in a preapprenticeship program as defined or is a registered apprentice as defined; or (2) twenty years has elapsed from the date of the traffic offense. O.R.S. 809.416(2) ; see also O.R.S. 809.415(4)(a) (the mandatory suspension shall continue until the earlier of (1) the person establishes that she or he has performed all acts necessary under O.R.S. 809.416 to make the person not subject to suspension; or (2) twenty years from the date the traffic offense occurred if...

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18 cases
  • Motley v. Taylor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • 31 mars 2020
    ...imposed on traffic defendants." (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mendoza v. Garrett , 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1174–75 (D. Or. 2018) ("Fines, therefore, are rationally related to enforcement of traffic laws and to the deterrence of continued violations......
  • Wright v. Family Support Div. of Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 1 mai 2020
    ...suspension does not fit within the scope of the Griffin exception and does not warrant heightened scrutiny. See Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1171 (D. Or. 2018) (citing Fowler v. Benson, 2017 WL 6379676 at *7 (E.D. MI. Dec. 14, 2017) (overturned on other grounds)) (holding plainti......
  • People v. Santos
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 15 août 2019
    ...the United States Supreme Court] when either incarceration or access to the courts, or both, is at stake." ( Mendoza v. Garrett (D. Or. 2018) 358 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1171 ( Mendoza ); see Fowler v. Benson (6th Cir. 2019) 924 F.3d 247, 260-261 [finding Griffin and its progeny inapplicable to con......
  • Johnson v. Jessup
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • 31 mars 2019
    ...fundamental fairness doctrine was applied to an alleged harm not involving fundamental rights or interests.11 See Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1171 (D. Or. 2018) ("What all of these cases teach is that the ‘fundamental fairness’ principles of due process and equal protection orig......
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1 books & journal articles
  • WEALTH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 61 No. 2, November 2019
    • 1 novembre 2019
    ...was enacted in Montana ending the practice in May 2019. Mont. Code Ann. [section] 46-18-201(6) (2019). (195.) See Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1150-51 (D. Or. (196.) See Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 480, 484 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (following class certification, finding th......

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