Mendoza v. Gen. Motors LLC

• Decision Date: 26 April 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00967-LJO-JLT
• Citation: Mendoza v. Gen. Motors LLC, CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00967-LJO-JLT (E.D. Cal. Apr 26, 2018)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: MIRIAM MICHELLE MENDOZA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION OF GENERAL MOTORS, MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, AND DOES 1 TO 15, Defendants.

MIRIAM MICHELLE MENDOZA, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,CHEVROLET DIVISION OF GENERAL MOTORS,MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, AND DOES 1 TO 15, Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00967-LJO-JLT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

April 26, 2018

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE DEFENDANT GM LLC'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES AND MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF KENT JAYNE

ECF Nos. 59, 66

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Miriam Michelle Mendoza ("Mendoza" or "Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendants General Motors ("GM") LLC, GM Corporation, Chevrolet Division of General Motors, Motors Liquidation Company, and Does 1 through 50 (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging a cause of action for products liability. Complaint ("Compl."), ECF No. 1-2. Now before the Court is Defendant GM LLC's motion for a determination of choice of law issues and motion to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's expert Kent Jayne. This matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(g).

II. BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2014, Plaintiff Miriam Michelle Mendoza's father was driving her family's 2002 Chevrolet Astro southbound on SR-99 near Bakersfield, California when the vehicle was rear-ended by another vehicle. The family was on their way home to Des Moines, Iowa, having spent a family vacation in California visiting Plaintiff's aunt. Plaintiff, who was sixteen years old at the time, was seated in the third row seat on the passenger side. Plaintiff was extricated from the vehicle and taken to Kern Medical Center, where it was discovered that her cervical spine had been fractured and that she was paralyzed from the neck down. Plaintiff spent three weeks receiving emergency medical treatment in California before returning to Iowa on August 19, 2014. Thereafter, she received additional medical treatment, inpatient rehabilitation, and outpatient therapy and rehabilitation in Iowa. Specifically, Plaintiff was an inpatient at the ChildServe rehabilitation facility for seven months following her return to Iowa. She has been diagnosed with a spinal cord injury resulting in permanent, complete quadriplegia. Plaintiff lives at home with her parents in Iowa and continues to receive medical care in Iowa. Plaintiff alleges that the Astro's rear structural crashworthiness was defective due to the Astro's trailer hitch assembly and the assembly's interaction with the floor pan in the area of the third row seat.

Plaintiff is, and has always been, an Iowa resident. She currently resides with her family in Des Moines, Iowa.

Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan. The Astro van was designed, engineered, and tested in Michigan, primarily at General Motors Corporation's Technology Center in Warren, Michigan and its Proving Grounds in Milford, Michigan.

III. CHOICE OF LAW

Defendant GM LLC argues that California law should not apply to the issues of liability and damages because California's interest in this Plaintiff is minimal. Plaintiff has always been, and continues to be, a resident of Iowa. She was injured while on vacation with her family in California and, according to Defendant, that California's interest in the dispute is insufficient to justify application of California law. Defendant instead posits that Michigan law should apply to Plaintiff's products liability claim and that Iowa law should apply to the measure of damages. Plaintiff counters that Defendant has not met its burden of showing that the interests of either jurisdiction outweigh the interests of Californiasuch that Michigan or Iowa law should apply here.¹

A. Legal Standard

In a diversity action, a federal court sitting in California must apply California choice of law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Abogados v. AT & T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000). California courts decide choice of law questions by means of the "governmental interests" analysis. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 1986). This choice of law analysis embodies the presumption that California law applies unless the proponent of foreign law can show otherwise. Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 514, 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980).

California's governmental interest analysis of choice of law conflicts involves a three-step process. See Abogados, 223 F.3d at 934; McGhee v. Arabian American Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574 (1974); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551 (1967). First, the Court must determine whether the substantive law of the two states differs. Id. The foreign law proponent carries the burden of proving that the states' laws differ materially. Id. Second, if the laws are "materially different," the Court must "determine what interest, if any, each state has in having its own law applied to the case." Id. at 920. Third, if each state has an interest in having its law applied, the Court must "select the law of the state whose interests would be 'more impaired' if its law were not applied." Id.; see also Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Products Inc., 268 F.R.D. 330, 341 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2010) (party advocating application of foreign law bears the burden of showing that that foreign law should apply). In weighing the interests of each state in applying its own law, the Court does not "'weigh' the conflicting interests in the sense of determining which law manifests the 'better' or 'worthier' social policy on the issue." Chen v. L.A. Truck Ctrs., LLC, 7 Cal. App. 5th 757, 768 (2017)."Instead, we are determining the proper allocation of law-making power in a multi-state context - we determine the appropriate limitations of the reach of state policies." Id.

"A party advocating application of foreign law 'must demonstrate that the [foreign] rule of decision will further the interest of that foreign state and therefore that it is an appropriate one for the forum to apply to the case before it." Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 89 Cal. App. 4th 180, 188-89 (2001). "If California law can be applied without violating the policy of the foreign state, there is a false conflict, and California law should be applied." Keilholtz, 268 F.R.D. at 341 (citing id.).

B. Application

1. Plaintiff's Products Liability Claim

Applying the three part governmental interest analysis here, the parties agree that there is a conflict between California law and Michigan law as it applies to Plaintiff's products liability claim. While California allows a plaintiff seeking to recover damages for injuries sustained as the result of a defective product to sue under a strict liability theory, Michigan does not recognize the strict products liability theory asserted in this case. ECF No. 66 at 8 (citing Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. Walter Kidde Co., 328 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Mich. 1982)); ECF No. 71 at 6. To prevail under Michigan law, Plaintiff would have to prove that there is a reasonable alternative design that would reduce the foreseeable risk of harm posed by the product. See Peck v. Bridgeport Machines, 237 F.3d 614, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2001). No such showing is required under California's strict products liability scheme. See generally Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379 (1971). Therefore, the first prong of the governmental interest test is satisfied.

Next, the Court turns to the question of what interest each state has in having its own law apply. California has an interest in "applying its products liability rule to conduct occurring within its borders." Browne, 504 F. Supp. at 518-19. California is the place where Plaintiff's injury occurred, and the state has an interest in promoting the safety of guests and tourists within its borders. Therefore, it has an interest in providing remedies for injuries caused by defective products that make their way to Californiathrough the flow of commerce and tourism. California also has an interest in deterring the introduction of defective vehicles into the state. Chen, 7 Cal. App. 5th at 771 ("The primary purpose of California's strict products liability law is to insure that the cost of injuries of defective products is borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves."). Unsafe highway conditions tax California's resources, such as the California State Highway Patrol and emergency medical services. For example, Plaintiff's injury resulted in the response of two California fire departments and at least ten emergency medical services technicians and paramedics.

By contrast, Defendant argues that the tortious conduct - the design, engineering, and testing - of the allegedly defective Astro occurred in Michigan. They further point out that Michigan has an interest in protecting Michigan businesses from excessive financial liability and promoting a legal climate favorable to protecting and attracting business. Defendant argues that California has no interest in applying its own law here, explaining its position that in this case California is merely "the fortuitous location of an injury that could have occurred anywhere." See ECF No. 66. at 9 (citing Browne, 504 F. Supp. at 517). Defendant points out that none of California's potential interests in a personal injury case - compensation of resident plaintiffs, deterrence of wrongful conduct by resident defendants, and limitation of damages recoverable against resident defendants - would be satisfied here by the application of California law.

With respect to Defendant's argument that the conduct at issue here actually occurred in Michigan, as opposed to California, the Court disagrees. Generally speaking, the location of the tort is the site of the injury. Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 802 (1980) (noting that the jurisdiction of the "situs of the injury" is generally assumed to have the "predominant interest" in ...