Mendoza v. Rio Rico Med.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. CV-18-00479-TUC-CKJ,CV-18-00479-TUC-CKJ
• Parties: Rene Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rio Rico Medical & Fire District, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Rene Mendoza, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rio Rico Medical & Fire District, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-18-00479-TUC-CKJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

March 17, 2021

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Preclude Testimony Regarding Causation from Plaintiffs' Expert Treating Physicians (Doc. 90) and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salalzar[sic]; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages (Doc. 91).For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Preclude is GRANTED and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.Defendant Mendoza's Title VII retaliation and IIED claims are DISMISSED.Plaintiffs' remaining claims will proceed to trial.

JURISDICTION

The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as some of Plaintiffs' claims arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).Venue in this Court is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), as a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Santa Cruz County, Arizona.

BACKGROUND¹

In 2016 and 2017, there was a fair amount of questionable activity unrelated to firefighting happening at the Rio Rico Medical & Fire District("District").That activity involved two of the Plaintiffs in this case, Rene Mendoza("Mendoza") and Lani Salazar("Salazar"), and two of the Defendants, Albert Ibarra("Ibarra") and Al Flores("Flores").At the time, Mendoza was a newly hired full-time firefighter and emergency medical technician and Salazar was a recently promoted Fire Captain. Flores was the Battalion Chief, and Salazar's immediate supervisor, and Ibarra was a Fire Captain, and Mendoza's immediate supervisor.

Beginning in July 2016, Flores began sexually harassing Salazar, whose promotion he had recently recommended.What started out as unwelcomed sexual advances soon escalated to alleged incidents of rape, the last of which occurred around the 2017 holiday season.A month earlier, Ibarra had struck rookie firefighter Mendoza in the testicles with a radio antenna, laughed, and ran away.Mendoza was also inundated with countless sexually suggestive images sent to him by a fellow firefighter, who frequently referred to Mendoza using sexually offensive slang terms.Two other firefighters exposed themselves to Mendoza, and when he complained of the harassing behavior to a superior, he was half-heartedly instructed to "write an email about it."

In November 2017, Mendoza was released from the District for failing to successfully complete his probationary period.In January 2018, Salazar came forward with complaints that Flores had raped her while she was on duty.The District Board placed Flores and Salazar on administrative leave and hired an outside investigator to investigate Salazar's allegations.In April 2018, facing termination, Flores submitted his letter of resignation.One month later, Salazar was fired.In September 2018, Plaintiffs brought the suit at hand.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 21, 2020, Defendants filed their Motion to Preclude TestimonyRegarding Causation from Plaintiffs' Expert Treating Physicians (Doc. 90), Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salalzar[sic]; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages (Doc. 91), and Statement of Facts to Support Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salalzar[sic]; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages (Doc. 92).

On September 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Response to Defendants' Motion to Preclude Testimony Regarding Causation from Plaintiffs' Expert Treating Physicians.(Doc. 93)On October 5, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Response to Defendants' Partial [sic]Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salazar; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages (Doc. 96) and PlaintiffsRene Mendoza's and Lionell Salazar's Response to Defendants' Statement of Facts to Support Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salazar; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages (Doc. 97).

On August 9, 2020, Defendants filed their Reply to Support Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding: (i) Count Two as to Mendoza; (ii) Count Five as to Mendoza; (iii) Count Six as to Lionel Salalzar[sic]; and (iv) Request for Punitive Damages.(Doc. 100)This Order follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]"Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986).The non-moving party may not merely rest on its pleadings but it must identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324(1986);Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawnin his favor."Anderson, 477at 255.

"Summary judgment is not precluded simply because there is a dispute of some facts in a case."Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264(9th Cir.1993)."To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the resisting party must present facts in support of the issues on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, there must be probative evidence of those facts, and the facts must be uncontroverted or at least create a genuine issue of material fact."Spratt v. N. Auto. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 456, 460(D. Ariz.1996)(citingAnderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)."The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the resisting party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof."Id.(citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 325).When "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986)(quotation marks and citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds there are eleven outstanding claims remaining in this case.Those claims include: (i) Mendoza's Title VII hostile work environment claim against the District; (ii) Salazar's Title VII hostile work environment claim against the District; (iii) Mendoza's Title VII retaliation claim against the District; (iv) Salazar's Title VII retaliation claim against the District; (v) Mendoza's common law battery claim against Ibarra and the District; (vi) Salazar's common law battery claim against Flores and the District; (vii) Mendoza's common law assault claim against Ibarra and the District; (viii) Salazar's common law assault claim against Flores and the District; (ix) Mendoza's intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim against Ibarra and the District; (x) Salazar's intentional inflection of emotional distress claim against Flores and the District; and (xi) Mr. Salazar's² loss of consortium claim against Flores and the District.Salazar's Arizona Employment Protection Act claim was dismissed in anOrder dated March 1, 2019.(Doc. 27)

I.Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

In their motion for partial summary judgment, Defendants argue that the Court should rule in their favor on three of Plaintiffs' claims and on the issue of punitive damages.(Doc. 91)Defendants also request oral argument on the matter.Id.Because Plaintiffs concede Mendoza's Title VII retaliation claim in response to Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment,³the Court is left to resolve Defendants' motion only as to Mendoza's IIED claim, Mr. Salazar's claim for loss of consortium, and Plaintiffs' request for punitive damages.The Court finds oral argument on Defendants' motion unnecessary, as the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court in its decision.⁴The Court addresses each of Defendants' arguments seriatim.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Mendoza's IIED claim involves two District employees and one startling incident.Ibarra was Mendoza's immediate supervisor and was responsible for evaluating Mendoza's performance as a firefighter and a probationary employee of the District.On or around November 7, 2017, Ibarra saw Mendoza standing outside by a tree and hit Mendoza in the testicles with a radio antenna.(Doc. 96at 3)After striking Mendoza in the testicles with the antenna, Ibarra laughed and ran away.Id.Mendoza testified that the contact caused him physical pain for minutes thereafter.(Doc. 92-3, tr.p. 119 at 12)

Defendants argue they should be granted judgment as a matter of law on Mendoza's IIED claim because his evidence fails to meet the heightened threshold for such a claim.(Doc. 91at 9-10)In support of their argument, Defendants contend that "[w]hile hitting another employee in the testicles with a flexible antennae is certainly inappropriate, it is not so outrageous 'as to go beyond all possible bound of decency' or 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' "Id. at 9.Defendants also argue that "a few minutes of pain"does not meet the requisite threshold of "severe emotional distress" necessary to establish an IIED claim.Id. at 10.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the nature of the incident between Mendoza and Ibarra should be left to the determination of a jury, as Ibarra's actions...