Mendoza v. Strickler
| Docket Number | 19-35506 |
| Decision Date | 12 October 2022 |
| Citation | 51 F.4th 346 |
| Parties | Cindy MENDOZA; Gloria Bermudez; Rebecca Heath ; Karl Wade Roberts; Cekais Toni Ganuelas; Lori Spano, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kris STRICKLER, in his official capacity as Director of the Oregon Department of Transportation ; Amy Joyce, in her official capacity as Administrator of the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division, Oregon Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Kelsey M. Heilman (argued) and Emily Teplin Fox (argued), Oregon Law Center, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Peenesh H. Shah (argued), Assistant Attorney General; Denise G. Fjordbeck, Staff Attorney; Beth Andrews, Assistant Attorney General; Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F. Rosenbaum, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General of Oregon, Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.
Lisa Foster, Fines and Fees Justice Center, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae Fees Justice Center.
William R. Maurer, Institute for Justice, Seattle, Washington, for Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice.
Nicole S. Thompson and Sonja Good Stefani; Aliza B. Kaplan, Certified Law Student; Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon, for Amici Curiae Metropolitan Public Defender Services Inc and Lewis & Clark Law School's Criminal Justice Reform Clinic.
Claudia Wilner and Edward P. Krugman, National Center for Law and Economic Justice, New York, New York; Tara Mikkilineni, Civil Rights Corps, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Members of the Free to Drive Coalition.
Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges, and Jennifer Choe-Groves,* Judge.
Opinion by Judge Collins ;
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their claims challenging the constitutionality of Oregon's since-repealed system of suspending, without an inquiry into ability to pay, the driver's licenses of persons who fail to pay the fines imposed on them in connection with traffic violations. The district court dismissed the operative complaint for failure to state a claim, and we affirm.
Plaintiff Cindy Mendoza and others filed this putative class action in September 2018, alleging that Oregon's practice of automatically suspending the driver's licenses of individuals who fail to pay their traffic debts, without any inquiry into ability to pay, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties agree that the claims of many of the Plaintiffs below are now moot and that the only claims currently before this court on appeal are certain individual claims asserted by Plaintiff Cindy Mendoza in the operative Second Amended Complaint.1 Before discussing the facts concerning Mendoza's license suspension and the procedural history concerning her claims, we first summarize the relevant provisions of Oregon law concerning the non-payment of traffic fines.
The Oregon Vehicle Code defines a "traffic violation" as "a traffic offense that is designated as a traffic violation in the statute defining the offense, or any other offense defined in the Oregon Vehicle Code that is punishable by a fine but that is not punishable by a term of imprisonment." OR. REV. STAT. § 801.557. Proceedings concerning a traffic violation are typically initiated by the issuance of a citation by a law enforcement officer. Id. §§ 153.042, 153.045, 810.410; see also id. § 810.340(1) (). The citation must include, inter alia , the violation alleged; the date, time, and court at which the person cited must appear; the "amount of the presumptive fine, if any, fixed for the violation"; and a statement that, in the event of a conviction, the court must impose the applicable minimum fine. Id. § 153.051; see also id. §§ 153.045, 153.048.
The defendant who receives such a citation generally has the option, in lieu of appearing personally in court, to plead no contest by submitting payment of the presumptive fine. Id. § 153.061(1), (3). If the defendant elects to plead no contest, he or she may submit an explanation to the court, and the court may consider the statement in setting the actual fine, so long as the fine does not fall below the applicable statutory minimum. Id. § 153.051(7); see also id. §§ 153.099(2), 153.021. If the defendant does not either appear in court or plead no contest without a personal appearance, his or her driving privileges may be suspended and the court may enter a default judgment and impose any fine within the applicable statutory range. Id. §§ 153.061(7), 153.090(3), 153.102. If the defendant elects a trial and is convicted, then the fine may likewise be fixed at any amount up to the statutory maximum. Id. § 153.090(3). A judgment in a case involving a traffic violation may be appealed. Id. §§ 138.057, 153.121.
Once a judgment imposing a fine has been entered, a judge may suspend the judgment in part "upon condition that the defendant pay the nonsuspended portion of a fine within a specified period of time." Id. § 153.090(4). However, "[i]f the defendant fails to pay the nonsuspended portion of the fine within the specified period of time, the suspended portion of the judgment becomes operative without further proceedings by the court and the suspended portion of the fine becomes immediately due and payable." Id. Except as otherwise provided by Oregon law, a court generally "may not defer, waive, suspend or otherwise reduce the fine ... to an amount that is less than" the minimum fine specified for the particular class of the violation. Id. § 153.021(1).
At the time of the district court's decision, the Oregon Vehicle Code provided that, in the event that a defendant convicted of a traffic offense "fails or refuses to pay a fine imposed by the court," the court could choose to "[i]ssue a notice of suspension" to the Oregon Department of Transportation ("DOT") directing it, through its Driver and Motor Vehicles Services Division ("DMV"), "to implement procedures under ORS 809.416" to suspend the person's driver's license. See OR. REV. STAT. § 809.210(1)(a) (2019 ed.).2 The statute does not specify a time frame for issuing such a notice of suspension, but Plaintiffs allege that the courts typically provided about five weeks to pay a fine contained in a judgment and that some courts allowed payment plans. In addition, the courts may also send the unpaid fine to a private collection agency, and it may add an appropriate fee for such collection costs to the judgment. Id. § 1.202(2).
Once the DMV received a suspension notice from a court under § 809.210, the DMV was required to send a first-class letter "advising the person that the suspension will commence 60 days from the date of the letter unless the person presents" the DMV with a notice of reinstatement from the court. Id. § 809.416(3) (2019 ed.). In the absence of such a notice of reinstatement, the DMV "shall suspend" the person's driving privileges after the 60 days elapses. Id. § 809.415(4)(a) (2019 ed.) (emphasis added). Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, once the suspension is triggered, it lasts for up to 20 years unless and until the court issues a notice of reinstatement showing that the person "[i]s making payments, has paid the fine or has obeyed the order of the court." Id. § 809.416(2) (2019 ed.). A driver whose license is suspended under § 809.416 may seek administrative review of the suspension, see id. § 809.415(4)(b), and in such review may "raise any defense to the [DMV's] action that is capable of being proved through a careful review of the documents upon which that action is based, or any other evidence of a type that the pertinent statutes contemplate the [DMV] will consider." Richardson v. Oregon Dep't of Transp., D.M.V. , 253 Or.App. 456, 292 P.3d 557, 563 (2012) (simplified).
During the period of the suspension, the person generally may not operate a motor vehicle in Oregon, but at least since 2019, he or she nevertheless may apply for a "hardship driver permit." Id. § 809.380(2); see also id. § 807.250(4) (2018 ed.) (repealed, effective Jan. 1, 2019) (previously prohibiting hardship permits for persons whose driving privileges were suspended under § 809.416 ). Such permits are available for capable drivers who show, for example, that they must drive "as a requisite of the person's occupation or employment," "to seek employment or to get to or from a place of employment," or to obtain "medical treatment on a regular basis" for themselves or a family member. Id. § 807.240(3)(b), (d).
Because this action was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we take the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). At the time the operative complaint was filed, Mendoza was a 28-year-old who lived with her three children (ages two, seven, and nine) in subsidized housing in Portland. She received a speeding ticket in Wasco County, Oregon in June 2010, with a presumptive fine of $400. The amount of the ensuing court judgment, with court costs and fees added, was ultimately $812. After she failed to pay, the debt was referred to a collection agency and her license was suspended. After five years, she was able to pay off that debt and her license was reinstated in April 2015. However, during the period that her license was suspended, Mendoza received a ticket for driving with a suspended license in August 2013, and that ultimately led to a $2,020.40 judgment from the Beaverton Municipal Court for fines and associated fees. After Mendoza failed to pay that judgment, her license was again suspended in July 2015.
Mendoza was also charged with various traffic violations in the Milwaukie Municipal Court,...
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