Menge v. Simon's Trucking, Inc.

Decision Date01 September 2021
Docket NumberC20-1016-LTS
PartiesKEVIN MENGE, Plaintiff, v. SIMON'S TRUCKING, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on cross motions for partial summary judgment. Simon's Trucking seeks summary judgment on Counts I and II, in part, and on Counts III, IV and V in their entirety (Doc. 23). Menge has filed a resistance (Docs 39, 44) and Simon's Trucking has filed a reply (Doc. 57).

Menge seeks summary judgment on part of Count I (Doc. 32). Simon's Trucking has filed a resistance (Doc. 47) and Menge has filed a reply (Doc. 51). Menge has requested oral argument, but I find it to be unnecessary. See Local Rule 7(c).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2020, Menge filed a complaint (Doc. 1) asserting claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (Count I) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (Count II) against Simon's Trucking. On August 24, 2020, he filed an amended complaint (Doc. 15) to add claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under both the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) (Count III) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (Count IV) and age discrimination under the ICRA (Count V).[1]

Simon's Trucking then filed a motion (Doc. 16) to dismiss all claims in Counts III, IV and V on grounds that they are untimely, as they arose more than 300 days before Menge filed his administrative complaint with the ICRC and EEOC. In an order (Doc. 21) filed on December 8, 2020, I granted Simon's Trucking's motion and limited the scope of Counts III, IV and V to events that occurred after July 5, 2019. This case is set for a jury trial beginning October 18, 2021.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Any party may move for summary judgment regarding all or any part of the claims asserted in a case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

A material fact is one that ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. Facts that are “critical” under the substantive law are material, while facts that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not. Id.

An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question.” Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Evidence that only provides “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, or evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative, ” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, does not make an issue of material fact genuine.

As such, a genuine issue of material fact requires “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute” so as to “require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. The party moving for entry of summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue.” Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005). The nonmovant must show an alleged issue of fact is genuine and material as it relates to the substantive law. If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim or defense with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

In determining if a genuine issue of material fact is present, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88. Further, I must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Id. However, “because we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we do not weigh the evidence or attempt to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 2004). Instead, “the court's function is to determine whether a dispute about a material fact is genuine.” Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996). On cross motions for summary judgment, the court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998).

No unique summary judgment standards apply to employment discrimination cases. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting prior decisions that applied a “discrimination case exception” to the analysis of summary judgment motions). Thus, “the focus of inquiry at the summary judgment stage ‘always remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected characteristic].' Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996)).

IV. RELEVANT FACTS

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Menge began working for Simon's Trucking as a maintenance coordinator in 2009.[2] Doc. 47-1 at 1. His main responsibilities were coordinating truck repairs and body shop work, ensuring that replacement parts were in stock and supervising the truck wash bay. Docs. 39-1 at 6-10; 47-1 at 6-7. He typically worked from 5:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., approximately 55 to 60 hours per week, at a rate of $16.00 per hour for the first 50 hours of work and time-and-a-half for all additional hours. Doc. 39-1 at 13-14.

In October 2018, Menge sought and received leave under the FMLA to undergo coronary artery bypass surgery. Id. at 14. While he was on leave, Menge's work duties were performed primarily by Mike Schute, who began helping Menge perform some of his duties after being hired in 2016 and was also named as a maintenance coordinator in March 2018. Docs. 39-1 at 8-9; 47-1 at 2, 4. After continuing to receive treatment in the months following his surgery, Menge's doctors cleared him to return to work, without restrictions, on January 7, 2019. Doc. 47-1 at 2-3.

Menge spoke by telephone with his supervisor, Justin Philipp, a few days before he returned to work on January 7, 2019. Doc 47-1 at 10. Menge informed Philipp that he had received a job offer from another company that would pay him more and require fewer hours, but he wanted to remain with Simon's Trucking. Id.; Doc. 34 at 60. Menge told Philipp that it would be nice to work fewer hours and Philipp responded that he could accommodate that request if Menge chose to return. Doc. 47-1 at 10-11. The parties disagree, however, as to whether Menge and Philipp discussed how accommodating the request might affect Menge's work responsibilities and pay going forward.

When Menge returned to work on January 7, 2019, Philipp assigned him to work on an inventory maintenance and organization project. Doc. 39-1 at 15. This project included physically inspecting the inventory and repair tools, cleaning and reorganizing the inventory shelves, and updating the inventory report in Simon's Trucking's computer system. Id. Philipp expected Menge to focus on the inventory project for the entirety of each day. Doc. 52 at 13. Consequently, Menge rarely, or no longer, performed many of the duties he performed before his FMLA leave, such as maintaining the company's preventative maintenance program, coordinating repairs and body shop work, supervising and assigning projects to six to fifteen employees, and performing “lot checks” to see which trucks needed service. Docs. 47-1 at 6-7; 52 at 11-13. Schute continued to perform most of these tasks, as he did while Menge was on FMLA leave. Docs. 47-1 at 6-7; 52 at 11-13. Philipp also reduced Menge's workweek to 45 to 50 hours, though at a higher rate of $16.50 per hour and time-and-a-half for hours worked over 40 in a given week. Docs. 39-1 at 15; 47-1 at 11-12.

Shortly after returning to work, Menge realized that his new work schedule was not financially viable, as his reduction in hours lowered his pay by approximately $300 per week. Doc. 52 at 15. That reduction in hours also affected other benefits such as decreasing the number of paid vacation days he accrued each month from ten to eight. Doc. 47-1 at 14. Menge asked Philipp if he could return to his pre-FMLA work schedule of 55 to 60 hours per week, but Philipp denied his request and told him that he would not be allowed to work the same number of overtime hours as he did before taking FMLA leave. Docs....

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