Menke v. Crawford & Co.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-cv-02777-RBJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
| Parties | PATRICK MENKE, Plaintiff, v. CRAWFORD & COMPANY, a Global Corporation headquartered in Georgia and JON J. EGUROLLA, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President and Managing Director, Defendants. |
ORDER ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 33). The motion to for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On March 21, 2017 plaintiff Patrick Menke was hired by defendant Crawford & Company (Crawford) as an executive general adjuster (EGA) in its Denver office. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's offer letter contained information on his salary and automobile allowance, but it did not reference the Quarterly Incentive Compensation Program (ICP), under which employees could earn quarterly bonuses based on their performance. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was defendant Jon Egurolla, Crawford's vice president and managing director for the western region. Id. In October 2017, following Hurricane Maria, plaintiff volunteered for deployment in Puerto Rico. Id. He was to remain in Puerto Rico on an “as needed” basis. ECF No. 33-2 at 98. In Puerto Rico he oversaw adjustments in complex insurance claims valued over $500, 000. Id. at 27. He was Crawford's primary point of contact with customers and was in frequent communication with customers. Id. at 38. He exercised independent judgment and discretion to further Crawford's interests. Id. at 47.
Crawford billed customers based on hours reported by adjusters on each claim. Id. at 39. Plaintiff, like all Crawford adjusters, was responsible for entering his own billable hours, and it was essential to the job. Id. at 44. Shortly after he arrived in Puerto Rico, he fell behind on reporting his hours-at times he was months behind on billing. Id. at 112. He also failed to timely correspond with clients, and clients complained. See e.g., id. at 35. Mr. Egurolla counseled plaintiff about these issues first in August 2017 and then again in writing on October 25, shortly after his arrival in Puerto Rico. Id. at Ex. 16. Plaintiff does not contest that he was behind on his billing. See Id. Mr. Egurolla gave plaintiff a written performance evaluation on February 21, 2018 that documented similar issues. Id. at Ex. 18. Plaintiff says that at his performance review, Mr. Egurolla told him that he would raise plaintiff's ranking to a 3.0, which made him eligible to receive a bonus under the ICP. Id. at 100. Plaintiff also contends that Mr. Egurolla told him that he would be getting his bonus. Id. Mr. Egurolla contends that he never made such a promise. ECF No. 33-1 at ¶9.
In early March Mr. Egurolla sent plaintiff an email about problems with his billing on his open claims. ECF No. 33-2 at Ex. 20. Mr. Egurolla demanded that he bring his billings up to date by March 26, 2018. Id. Plaintiff did not object to this demand at the time. Id. at 152.
Plaintiff did not update his files by the twenty-sixth. Id. at Ex. 22. As a result of this, and the complaints from clients, Mr. Egurolla issued plaintiff a Personal Improvement Plan (PIP) on March 30. Id. at Ex. 24. This made plaintiff ineligible for a bonus under the terms of the ICP program. Id. at Ex. 11. Plaintiff contends that the reason he was placed on the PIP was solely so that the company and Mr. Egurolla could deprive him of his bonus.
During plaintiff's tenure at Crawford he also had issues with reimbursement of expenses incurred while in Puerto Rico. Initially, he received a per diem in Puerto Rico, as authorized by Mr. Egurolla. ECF No. 33-1 at ¶11. However, in January of 2018, Mr. Egurolla rescinded his authorization for Mr. Menke to receive a per diem because he was uncomfortable billing clients for the per diem when plaintiff had not submitted the hours billed on cases. Id. After that, if plaintiff wanted his expenses reimbursed, he needed to submit expense requests in compliance with Crawford's travel policies and guidelines. See ECF No. 33-2 at Ex. 12. These policies require that employees seeking reimbursement provide documentation, like receipts, of all expenses more than twenty-five dollars, and that all reimbursement requests be submitted within ninety days of when the expense was incurred. Id. Plaintiff testified that he did not know about the reimbursement system. ECF No. 33-2 at 212. Plaintiff was told by a peer on March 26, 2018 that expenses needed to be entered with documentation into the Crawford system in order to be reimbursed. Plaintiff did not submit any requests for reimbursement with supporting documentation while employed at Crawford. See ECF No. 33-3 at ¶14.
On May 4, 2018, Crawford fired Mr. Menke due to his performance problems. Id. at ¶15. He was told that he needed to submit documentation of his expenses to be reimbursed. Id. at ¶14. On May 15, plaintiff emailed Crawford to ask for reimbursement for expenses, although that email did not specify what expenses or provide any documentation of those expenses. See ECF No. 33-2 at Ex. 47. Several months later, plaintiff again asked for $15, 000 in expense reimbursement without providing documentation. Id. at Ex. 48. Crawford asked for documentation and reminded plaintiff of the usual ninety-day limit for reimbursement requests, but said that he could have ten additional days to provide the documentation for his request. Id.
Plaintiff responded on the last day of the ten-day period with a summary of his expenses in the form of a spreadsheet, seeking roughly $52, 000 in reimbursement. Id. at Ex. 49. Plaintiff claims that the spreadsheet had the documentation “embedded, ” but Crawford was unable to find any such data. Id. Crawford informed Mr. Menke that it still did not have the documentation. Id. Plaintiff did not respond until April 3, 2019, nearly six months later, when he again requested $15, 000, and again failed to provide documentation for those expenses. Id. Crawford rejected the claim as untimely and invalid. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute if there is “sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998). An issue is material if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party bears the burden of showing a lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Allegations that are unsupported by probative evidence or conclusory allegations that factual issues exist are insufficient to prevent the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. In applying this standard, this Court must view the record and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler, 144 F.3d at 670.
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to forestall a finding of summary judgment on his entitlement to minimum wage. Plaintiff contends that defendants violated the Colorado Wage Claim Act[1] by failing to provide him a salary that exceeded the minimum wage required by that act. He alleges that the expenses he incurred in his employment while in Puerto Rico exceeded his salary, meaning that he lost money by working for Crawford in Puerto Rico. Defendants counter that Mr. Menke's employment fell within an exemption to the minimum wage requirement for “administrative employees.” An administrative employee, as outlined in Colorado Minimum Wage Order 34, issued pursuant to the Colorado Wage Claim Act, is defined as “a salaried individual who directly serves the executive, and regularly performs duties important to the decision-making process of the executive.” 7 CCR 1103-1, 5(a). An administrative employee “regularly exercises independent judgment and discretion in matters of significance and their primary duty is non-manual in nature and directly related to management policies or general business operations.” Id.
The administrative exemption in the Minimum Wage Order issued pursuant to the Colorado Wage Claim Act is modeled on the same exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Allsopp v. Akiyama, Inc., 2010 WL 1258006, at *4 (D. Colo. 2010). The administrative exemption under the FLSA examines “whether the employee performs work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished from manufacturing or selling a product.” Ott v. Chacha in Art LLC, 506 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1139 (D. Colo., 2020)
Plaintiff claims that his position does not fit within the definition of administrative employee because he “was simply an adjuster who handled claims, did not manage any professional staff or even have an office or support person.” ECF No. 34. However, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he answered directly to Mr. Egurrola, a Crawford executive and that he was salaried. ECF No. 33-2 at 37, 57. He testified that he exercised independent judgment and discretion to further Crawford's business interests by aiding its clients. Id. at 47- 8. He handled matters of significance: plaintiff managed over one hundred million dollars in claims for Crawford while he was deployed to Puerto Rico. Id. at 112. The fact that plaintiff did not have an assigned office, manage other...
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