Mennella v. Office of Court Admin.

• Decision Date: 25 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. CV 95-5281.,CV 95-5281.
• Parties: Thomas A. MENNELLA, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, E. Leo Milonas, individually and as Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, Barry A. Cozier, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York for the New York City Courts, Jonathan Lippman, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrator for Management Support of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" whose names are presently unknown to the plaintiff and who are agents, employees, assistants and persons acting in concert or cooperation with the defendants Milonas, Cozier, and Lippman, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

938 F. Supp. 128

Thomas A. MENNELLA, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, E. Leo Milonas, individually and as Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, Barry A. Cozier, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York for the New York City Courts, Jonathan Lippman, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrator for Management Support of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" whose names are presently unknown to the plaintiff and who are agents, employees, assistants and persons acting in concert or cooperation with the defendants Milonas, Cozier, and Lippman, Defendants.

No. CV 95-5281.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

August 25, 1996.

Thomas L. Menella, Valley Stream, NY, pro se.

Michael Colodner, Office of Court Administration, New York City by Raymond S. Hack, Assistant Deputy Counsel, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff pro se Thomas L. Mennella on December 26, 1995, seeking injunctive relief and money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"). The complaint names the following defendants: Office of Court Administration, E. Leo Milonas, individually and as Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, Barry A. Cozier, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrative Judge of the Unified Court System of the State of New York for the New York City Courts, Jonathan Lippman, individually and as Deputy Chief Administrator for Management Support of the Unified Court System of the State of New York, "John Doe" and "Jane Doe" whose names are presently unknown to the plaintiff and who are agents, employees, assistants and persons acting in concert or cooperation with the defendants Milonas, Cozier, and Lippman.

Presently before the Court is a motion by the defendants for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

I. BACKGROUND

A. A prior related action

The defendants argue that principles of res judicata bar the present action and entitle them to a judgment on the pleadings. The defendants refer to a prior action commenced in the Eastern District of New York by Thomas L. Mennella on June 24, 1994, which was dismissed in an Order dated October 27, 1994 by the Hon. I. Leo Glasser. The plaintiff appealed from Judge Glasser's Order, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit on July 26, 1995. The defendants in this action plead the affirmative defense of res judicata in their answer to the complaint. The defendants annex to their answer in this action, copies of the following documents: (1) the complaint in CV 94-3024 (ILG); (2) the Memorandum and Order dated October 27, 1994 in CV 94-3024 (ILG); and (3) the Second Circuit Summary Order dated July 26, 1995. The defendants here, who were also the named defendants in CV 94-3024 (ILG), contend that principles of res judicata bar the present action.

In the Decision and Order dated October 27, 1994, Judge Glasser stated the following,

For the purpose of this motion to dismiss, the following facts are accepted as true. Mennnella is an employee of the Unified Court System of the State of New York (hereinafter referred to as the Office of Court Administration, or "OCA"). Mennella was assigned to the position of deputy chief clerk of the criminal term of the Supreme Court, Kings County on or about January 1, 1991.

Defendants Milonas, Lippman and Cozier are named individually and in their respective positions as Chief Administrative Judge, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge and Deputy Chief Administrator for Management Support of the OCA. The Complaint also names as defendants "John Doe" and "Jane Doe," persons whose names are otherwise unknown to plaintiff, as "agents, employees, assistants and persons acting in cooperation with" the named defendants.

In June 1993, Mennella filed an application for the promotion to the position of Court Clerk Specialist for the Supreme Court, Second Judicial Department, Kings County. Menella was interviewed for the position by a panel, in accordance with the procedures of the OCA, and was one of the three nominees whose names were submitted for the position. The panel, in making its recommendations, ranked Mennella first. Defendant Milonas was notified of the recommendations of the interview panel on or about July 14, 1993.

Subsequent to July 15, 1993, defendants Milonas and Lippman, "through their agents, assistants and employees" questioned female employees at the Supreme Court Courthouse, Kings County, as to whether they were ever sexually harassed by Mennella. Mennella was interviewed by defendants, Milonas and Lippman on or about April 11, 1994, and by defendant Cozier and Joseph J. Trafficanti, the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for courts outside New York City, on or about March 2, 1994. Mennella alleges that this second interview was contrary to the rules, regulations and procedures of the OCA. The second ranked nominee for the position of Court Clerk Specialist was thereafter chosen for the position. Mennella was transferred from the criminal part of the Supreme Court to the civil part. Mennella states, on information and belief, that the reason given by defendants for their choice was that the plaintiff did not project the right "image."

Mennella brought this action, claiming a due process violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Memorandum and Order of Judge Glasser dated October 27, 1996, at 1-3.

B. The present complaint

As in the prior action, the complaint in this case alleges a due process violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, the present complaint sets forth claims of employment discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII and the ADEA. The present complaint names those defendants who were named in CV 94-3024 (ILG) and also names the Office Of Court Administration, the agency for which the defendants Milonas, Lippman, Cozier serve in their official capacities.

The present complaint alleges that Mennella was assigned as "acting deputy chief clerk" of the criminal term of the Supreme Court, Kings County on January 1, 1991 and received the highest performance ratings from the then Administrative Judge of the Second Department, the Hon. Ronald J. Aiello. The complaint further alleges that on June 2, 1993, OCA posted an employment opportunity for Court Clerk Specialist for the Supreme Court Second Judicial Department, Kings County (JS-30). According to the complaint Mennella applied for the position, was interviewed by a panel in accordance with uniform procedures and was recommended as the first ranked candidate to then Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for the New York City Courts, Milton L. Williams, who in turn recommended Mennella for the position in question to the defendant Milonas.

The complaint alleges that the defendants Milonas and Lippman "orchestrated through the agents, assistants and or employees a witch-hunt investigation concerning sexual harassment charges alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff upon female employees employed at the Supreme Court Courthouse at 360 Adams Street." This is also alleged in the complaint in the plaintiff's prior action, CV 94-3024. The plaintiff also presently alleges that he was not informed about a sexual harassment complaint and states "on information and belief" that the investigation was a pretext for denying him the promotion he sought. It is further alleged that the position of Court Clerk Specialist was given to the person who was the second ranked nominee, a person "much younger than the plaintiff, who at the time was 52 years of age." The complaint states that "the only reason offered by defendant Milonas, Cozier and Lippman for their decision was that the plaintiff failed to project the right image."

The complaint states that the plaintiff submitted a complaint, claiming violations of the ADEA and Title VII, to the EEOC on or about April 29, 1994, and received a right to sue letter on or about September 25, 1995. Annexed to the complaint are copies of the plaintiff's EEOC complaint, claiming violations of the ADEA and Title VII, and the EEOC right to sue notice dated September 25, 1995. The right to sue letter concerns the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim only.

The Court notes that the factual allegations in the present complaint are substantially the same as the factual allegations in the complaint in CV 94-3024 (ILG), except that the present complaint alleges that the person hired for the position that the plaintiff sought was a "much younger" person.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

I. self representation

In addressing the defendants' motion, the Court is mindful that the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that his submissions "must be `liberally construed' in favor of the plaintiff and held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)); Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir.1993). The Court recognizes that it must make reasonable allowances so that a pro se plaintiff does not forfeit his rights by virtue of his lack of legal training. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). But the Court is also aware that pro se status "`does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.'" Id. (quoting Birl v....