Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States

Decision Date25 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14–510.,14–510.
Parties MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES et al.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Geoffrey D. Strommer, Portland, OR, for Petitioner.

Ilana H. Eisenstein, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, Geoffrey D. Strommer, Jerry C. Straus, Stephen D. Osborne, Caroline P. Mayhew, Adam P. Bailey, Hobbs, Straus, Dean, & Walker, LLP, Portland, OR, for Petitioner.

William B. Schultz, General Counsel, Alan S. Dorn, Chief Counsel, Douglas Ferguson, Marian Nealon, Assistant Regional Counsels, Julia B. Pierce, Deputy Associate General, Counsel, Melissa Jamison, Senior Attorney, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant, Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Ilana Eisenstein, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Donald E. Kinner, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondents.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Tribe) seeks equitable tolling to preserve contract claims not timely presented to a federal contracting officer. Because the Tribe cannot establish extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of timely filing, we hold that equitable tolling does not apply.

I

Congress enacted the Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), Pub. L. 93–638, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq., in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members. Under the ISDA, tribes may enter into "self-determination contracts" with federal agencies to take control of a variety of federally funded programs. § 450f. A contracting tribe is eligible to receive the amount of money that the Government would have otherwise spent on the program, see § 450j–1(a)(1), as well as reimbursement for reasonable " contract support costs," which include administrative and overhead costs associated with carrying out the contracted programs, §§ 450j–1(a)(2), (3), (5).

In 1988, Congress amended the ISDA to apply the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., to disputes arising under the ISDA. See 25 U.S.C. § 450m–1(d) ; Indian Self–Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, § 206(2), 102 Stat. 2295. As part of its mandatory administrative process for resolving contract disputes, the CDA requires contractors to present "[e]ach claim" they may have to a contracting officer for decision.

41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1). Congress later amended the CDA to include a 6–year statute of limitations for presentment of each claim. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).

Under the CDA, the contracting officer's decision is generally final, unless challenged through one of the statutorily authorized routes. § 7103(g). A contractor dissatisfied with the officer's decision may either take an administrative appeal to a board of contract appeals or file an action for breach of contract in the United States Court of Federal Claims. §§ 7104(a), (b)(1), 7105(b). Both routes then lead to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for any further review. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) ; 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1) ; see 25 U.S.C. § 450m–1(d). Under the ISDA, tribal contractors have a third option. They may file a claim for money damages in federal district court, §§ 450m–1(a), (d), and if they lose, they may pursue an appeal in one of the regional courts of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Tribal contractors have repeatedly complained that the Federal Government has not fully honored its obligations to pay contract support costs. Three lawsuits making such claims are relevant here.

The first was a class action filed by the Ramah Navajo Chapter alleging that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) systematically underpaid certain contract support costs. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, No. 1:90–cv–0957 (DNM) (filed Oct. 4, 1990). In 1993, Ramah successfully moved for certification of a nationwide class of all tribes that had contracted with the BIA under the ISDA. See Order and Memorandum Opinion in Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, No. 1:90–cv–0957 (D NM, Oct. 1, 1993), App. 35–40. The Government argued that each tribe needed to present its claims to a contracting officer before it could participate in the class. Id., at 37–38. But the trial court held that tribal contractors could participate in the class without presentment, because the suit alleged systemwide flaws in the BIA's contracting scheme, not merely breaches of individual contracts. Id., at 39. The Government did not appeal the certification order, and the Ramah class action proceeded to further litigation and settlement.

The second relevant ISDA suit raised similar claims about contract support costs but arose from contracts with the Indian Health Service (IHS). Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, No. 6:99–cv–0092 (E.D.Okla.) (filed Mar. 5, 1999). In Cherokee Nation, two tribes filed a putative class action against IHS. On February 9, 2001, the District Court denied class certification without addressing whether tribes would need to present claims to join the class. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 357, 363–366 (E.D.Okla.). The two plaintiff tribes did not appeal the denial of class certification but proceeded to the merits on their own, eventually prevailing before this Court in a parallel suit. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 125 S.Ct. 1172, 161 L.Ed.2d 66 (2005).

The third relevant case is the one now before us. In this case, the Tribe presented its contract support claims (for contract years 1995 through 2004) to IHS on September 7, 2005, shortly after our Cherokee Nation ruling. As relevant here, the contracting officer denied the Tribe's claims based on its 1996, 1997, and 1998 contracts because, inter alia, those claims were barred by the CDA's 6–year statute of limitations.1 The Tribe challenged the denials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing, based on theories of class-action and equitable tolling, that the limitations period should be tolled for the 707 days that the putative Cherokee Nation class had been pending. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974) (class-action tolling); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (equitable tolling).

Initially, the District Court held that the limitations period was jurisdictional and thus forbade tolling of any sort. 539 F.Supp.2d 152, 154, and n. 2 (D.D.C.2008). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the limitations period was not jurisdictional and thus did not necessarily bar tolling. 614 F.3d 519, 526 (2010). But the court held that the Tribe was ineligible for class-action tolling during the pendency of the putative Cherokee Nation class, because the Tribe's failure to present its claims to IHS made it "ineligible to participate in the class action at the time class certification [was] denied."

614 F.3d, at 527 (applying American Pipe ). The court then remanded the case to the District Court to determine the Tribe's eligibility for equitable tolling.

On remand, the District Court concluded that the Tribe's asserted reasons for failing to present its claims within the specified time "do not, individually or collectively, amount to an extraordinary circumstance" that could warrant equitable tolling. 841 F.Supp.2d 99, 107 (DC 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 764 F.3d 51 (C.A.D.C.2014). It explained that, "[t]o count as sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ to support equitable tolling, the circumstances that caused a litigant's delay must have been beyond its control," and "cannot be a product of that litigant's own misunderstanding of the law or tactical mistakes in litigation." Id., at 58. Because none of the Tribe's proffered circumstances was beyond its control, the court held, there were no extraordinary circumstances that could merit equitable tolling.

The Court of Appeals' decision created a split with the Federal Circuit, which granted another tribal entity equitable tolling under similar circumstances. See Arctic Slope Native Assn., Ltd. v. Sebelius, 699 F.3d 1289 (C.A.Fed.2012). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2927, 192 L.Ed.2d 975 (2015).

II

The Court of Appeals denied the Tribe's request for equitable tolling by applying the test that we articulated in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130. Under Holland, a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Id., at 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Tribe calls this formulation of the equitable tolling test overly rigid, given the doctrine's equitable nature. First, it argues that diligence and extraordinary circumstances should be considered together as two factors in a unitary test, and it faults the Court of Appeals for declining to consider the Tribe's diligence in connection with its finding that no extraordinary circumstances existed. But we have expressly characterized equitable tolling's two components as "elements," not merely factors of indeterminate or commensurable weight. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) ("Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements"). And we have treated the two requirements as distinct elements in practice, too, rejecting...

To continue reading

Request your trial
248 cases
  • Chae v. Sec'y of the Treasury
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of International Trade
    • May 7, 2021
    ...Plaintiff must meet both elements to meet the standard for equitable tolling. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States , 577 U.S. 250, 257, 136 S.Ct. 750, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016) (characterizing "equitable tolling's two components as ‘elements,’ not merely factors of indeterm......
  • Eller v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Sch.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • January 14, 2022
    ...extraordinary circumstance stood in h[er] way and prevented timely filing." Id. at 548 (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States , 577 U.S. 250, 136 S.Ct. 750, 755, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016) ). The doctrine is to be used infrequently, so that "individualized hardship" and "subjective no......
  • Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Khouri
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • July 13, 2021
    ...with federal agencies to take control of a variety of federally funded programs." Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States , 577 U.S. 250, 252, 136 S.Ct. 750, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016) ; see Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter , 567 U.S. 182, 186, 132 S.Ct. 2181, 183 L.Ed.2d 186 (2012)......
  • Williams v. Garland
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • November 16, 2022
    ...DiGuglielmo , 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) ); see also, e.g., Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States , 577 U.S. 250, 255, 136 S.Ct. 750, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016). That simply does not look like a determination left to agency discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 123......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at "the Far End of the Trail of Tears"?
    • United States
    • Georgia State University College of Law Georgia State Law Reviews No. 37-3, March 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...Dots, supra note 14, at 689-91.168. Berger, supra note 15, at 1931-33.169. See generally Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250 (2016).170. See generally Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally di......
  • No Fault/technical Reasons
    • United States
    • Full Court Press AILA Law Journal No. 5-2, October 2023
    • Invalid date
    ...(quoting Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001)).57. See, e.g., Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 257 (2016) ("[T]he diligence prong already covers those affairs within the litigant's control; the extraordinary circumstances prong, by co......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT