Mensah-Yawson v. Raden

• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 222
• Decision Date: 21 March 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-1948 (RMC)
• Parties: Steven Mensah-Yawson, Plaintiff, v. Michael Raden, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

170 F.Supp.3d 222

Steven Mensah-Yawson, Plaintiff,
v.
Michael Raden, et al., Defendants.¹

Civil Action No. 14-1948 (RMC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Filed March 21, 2016

170 F.Supp.3d 226

Steven Mensah-Yawson, Lords Valley, PA, pro se, Plaintiff.

William Mark Nebeker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Dickie McCamey & Chilcote PC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's “Revised” Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (6) filed on behalf of the Borough of Donora and its police department [ECF No. 23] and the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25]. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In order to put Plaintiff's claims in the proper context, the Court refers to the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (“Compl.”) [ECF No. 1], his Revised Amended Complaint [ECF No. 22] (“Am. Compl.”), exhibits submitted with the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25] (“Fed. Mem.”), and reported cases.

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Ghana, was admitted to the United States in May 2005 as a nonimmigrant F1 student “for a temporary period not to exceed the duration of [his] status,” yet he remained in the United States after completion in December 2007 of his nonimmigrant F1 student program without having obtained authorization from Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Fed. Mem., Ex. R (Notice to Appear) at 3. Plaintiff and three codefendants “were charged on September 15, 2009 by a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, the individuals were charged with conspiring to make, utter, and possess counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a).” United States v. Mensah – Yawson, 489 Fed.Appx. 606, 607 (3d Cir.2012).² A jury found Plaintiff guilty, Fed. Mem., Ex. A (Verdict, United States v. Mensah – Yawson, Crim. No. 09–276–1, 2010 WL 9583749 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 15, 2010) ), and the court sentenced him to time served and ordered him to pay restitution totaling $43,645.98. Id., Ex. A (Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Mensah – Yawson, Crim. No. 09–276, 2011 WL 11004189 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 6, 2011) ) at 2, 5-6.

On January 1, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Plaintiff a Notice to Appear and charged him with removability for having remained in the United States longer than permitted. See id., Ex. D (Memorandum and Order) at 1. On conclusion of the criminal proceedings, Plaintiff was turned over to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

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(“ICE”) pending his removal from the United States. See id., Ex. L (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien) at 3. While conceding to the charge of removability, see id., Ex. D at 1, Plaintiff sought release from custody pending the appeal of his criminal conviction, see generally id., Ex. B (Motion for Bond Redetermination). On April 28, 2011, an Immigration Judge released Plaintiff on bond. Id., Ex. C (Order of the Immigration Judge with Respect to Custody); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 17.

Plaintiff filed an Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Nonpermanent Residents on August 10, 2011, Fed. Mem., Ex. D at 1, and a hearing on the application was set for September 27, 2013. Id., Ex. F at 1. Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Plaintiff's convictions. See Mensah – Yawson, 489 Fed.Appx. at 612 ; see also Fed. Mem., Ex. K (Judgment, United States v. Mensah – Yawson, 11–113(3d Cir. July 12, 2012)).

“On November 15, 2012 ... between the hours of 11:00 and 14:00,” unidentified officers of the Donora Police Department “conducted a traffic stop of [a] Sport Utility Vehicle [on its way] from Coral Township to Donora, [Pennsylvania].” Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff's then-fiancée drove the vehicle, “[P]laintiff was seated in the front passenger seat, [and] one other adult [was seated] in the rear ... with a [child].” Id. The officers demanded that Plaintiff show identification, id. ¶ 19, and “[a]pproximately three [to] five minutes [after he] provid[ed] ... two forms of identification[ ],” the officers informed Plaintiff that “federal officers [were] looking for [him.]” Id. ¶ 20. Shortly thereafter, Michael Radens, “who[ ] identified himself as an attache to the Homeland Security Investigation,” and David Anderchak, a United States Postal Inspector, Compl. at 8 (page numbers designated by ECF), arrived on the scene and arrested Plaintiff, see id.; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20. Plaintiff “was booked into the Allegheny County Jail and was placed into the custody of ICE[.]” Fed. Mem., Ex. L at 2. Since then, Plaintiff apparently has remained in custody pending removal to Ghana. See id. Ex. R at 4.

According to Plaintiff, the federal agents and the Donora police officers conspired to conduct an “unlawful frisk search [and] seizure” of his person and to cause his unlawful detention, Am. Compl. ¶ 21, in violation of his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, see id. ¶¶ 21, 25. In addition, Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Radens involved himself in or interfered with ongoing removal proceedings in ways both contrary to federal law and in violation of rights protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 24, 26-29. As a result, Plaintiff has been injured, in that he has sustained “severe mental, psychological and emotional pain, severe ... emotional distress and continual suffering to date.” Id. ¶ 32. He brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 -80, and the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-11. Among other relief, Plaintiff demands an award of $5 million. See id. ¶¶ 35, 36(i).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Claims Against the Donora Defendants

Plaintiff brings assorted civil rights claims against unidentified Donora Police Department officers, the Donora Police Department, and the Borough of Donora, Pennsylvania (“Donora Defendants”) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.³ See

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Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 8. The Donora Defendants construe the Amended Complaint as raising “both respondeat superior and conspiracy-based federal civil rights claims” against them. Mem. of Law in Support of Rule 12(b)(2) and (6) Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Revised Am. Compl. [ECF No. 24] (“Donora Defs.' Mem.”) at 2. They move to dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, see generally id. at 4-7, and that they cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, see generally id. at 8-9.

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Donora Defendants move to dismiss because, based on “the meager facts contained in [the] Amended Complaint,” Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Donora Defs.' Mem. at 5. Plaintiff maintains that this Court has personal jurisdiction over these defendants for two reasons. First, he relies on the District's long-arm statute. See Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Second, by characterizing this action as “a Conspiracy suit,” Pl.'s Mot. in Opp'n to Defs.' “Borough of Donora and Police Department” “Motioin [sic] to Dismiss” [ECF No. 29] (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 2, Plaintiff asserts that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Donora Defendants because they conspired with the federal defendants, counsel for whom is located in the District of Columbia, to violate his constitutional rights. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 13, 15.

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C.Cir.1990). If Plaintiff is to survive the Donora Defendants' motion, he “must make a prima facie showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co, 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C.Cir.1988). In other words, he must allege specific facts connecting these defendants to this forum. Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C.Cir.2001). The Court is mindful of its obligation to construe a pro se complaint liberally, see, e.g., Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F.Supp.2d 182, 183 (D.D.C.2006), but a pro se plaintiff is not “freed from the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for [his] claims,” Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F.Supp.2d 21, 23 (D.D.C.2010).

The Court determines whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised “by reference to District of Columbia law.” United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C.Cir.1995). “A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for relief.” D.C. Code § 13–422. “Exercise of this so-called...