Mental Health Ass'n of Minn. v. Schweiker, 4-82-Civ. 83.

Decision Date22 December 1982
Docket NumberNo. 4-82-Civ. 83.,4-82-Civ. 83.
Citation554 F. Supp. 157
PartiesMENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF MINNESOTA, and H.C., K.F., J.M., and C.A., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Martha A. Eaves and Mark A. Bohnhorst, St. Paul, Minn., for Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.

Leonard Rubenstein and Jane Bloom Yohalem, Washington, D.C., Mental Health Law Project.

Messinger, Cooper & Norton, William Messinger, Minneapolis, Minn., for Mental Health Ass'n of Minn.

Mary L. Egan, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services.

Gabriel L. Imperato, Baltimore, Md., for Social Sec. Admin.

Elisa Vela, Washington, D.C., for Dept. of Justice, Civil Div.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

LARSON, Senior District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The above matter came on for trial on plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on November 10, 1982. The Court heard evidence over seven days. Sixteen witnesses presented oral testimony in the Courtroom, and the testimony of one of these witnesses was also presented by deposition transcript. Seven additional witnesses testified solely through deposition transcript. The Court received in evidence in excess of 90 exhibits, many with multiple subparts.

The plaintiff class consists of severely mentally ill individuals suffering from psychotic or functional non-psychotic disorders, whom defendant has determined to be not disabled under the Social Security Act, Titles II and/or XVI, on the basis that such individuals are capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity. The class consists of both those whose applications for benefits have been denied and those whose benefits have been terminated.

Defendant Richard A. Schweiker is the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. He is responsible for the administration of the Social Security Act, including the disability programs under the Act. Defendant administers these programs through a central office in Baltimore, Maryland, through various regional offices, and through state Disability Determination Service (DDS) offices within each state. Initial determinations of disability or non-disability (both on initial applications and on review for possible terminations) are performed by the DDSs.

The plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on May 12, 1982, seeking preliminary injunctive relief on a class-wide basis and adding several parties as class representatives. The Amended Complaint was allowed and a class was preliminarily certified on August 16, 1982.

The Court's understanding of the issue to be tried was as follows:

(1). Plaintiffs claim that the disability evaluation standard being applied to them conflicts with the SSA statute and regulations, has never been properly promulgated in accordance with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and is violative of due process of law. Plaintiffs claim that the disputed standard imposes a presumption that where an individual does not meet or equal the Appendix Listing, that individual is assumed to have a residual functional capacity (RFC) for at least unskilled work. When the presumed RFC is then considered in conjunction with the sequential evaluation process for disability, the result is denial for younger workers (age 18-49).

(2). Defendant claims that no such RFC presumption exists, and that defendant is processing all of the class members' claims in accordance with the mandate of the sequential evaluation process. Defendant further claims that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. On December 6, 1982, after the conclusion of trial, the Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

The trial afforded the Court an extensive view of the SSA disability program, including the five-step sequential evaluation process, the nature of chronic mental illness, and the existence, nature and effects of the disputed presumption upon an individual's claim for benefits.

The Court was aided by exhibits produced by both plaintiffs and defendant, expert testimony by leading psychiatrists and a psychologist in the field of care and treatment of the chronic mentally ill in the community, as well as testimony by DDS directors and employees, social workers, employees of the Chicago regional and central SSA offices, and others.

The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are set forth in six numbered topics (I-VI) hereafter.

FINDINGS OF FACT
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

1. The federal Social Security Disability Insurance program (Title II of the Social Security Act) provides insurance benefits for those persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability, defined by statute as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The statute provides that a mental or physical impairment is considered disabling if it is "of such severity that the applicant is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In order to be found disabled, a person must suffer from a medical impairment and be unable to work because of that impairment.

2. In addition to the Social Security Disability Insurance program, the federal government provides benefits for indigent, disabled individuals pursuant to a program known as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the aged, blind and disabled (Title XVI of the Social Security Act). The statutory standards for disability determinations under SSI are identical to those for Social Security Disability Insurance determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

3. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) has promulgated regulations governing determination of eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance and for SSI disability payments. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P; 20 C.F.R. Part 416, Subpart I. The standards for disability determinations under both programs are substantially identical.

4. The regulations require that a five-part sequential evaluation process be used to evaluate disability claims. The first step requires the Secretary to disqualify from benefits an individual who is working at substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). The second step requires a demonstration of the severity of the impairment. If the impairment is found "not severe," the Secretary must disqualify the individual from benefits. Id. 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). At step three, an individual whose impairment meets or equals the severity level described in the Listing of Impairments is presumed disabled on the basis of that severity level alone. Id. 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d).

5. The Listing of Impairments is a list of conditions, signs and symptoms which are deemed by the Secretary to be so severe that their presence alone, without further evidence of inability to work, justifies a finding that the individual is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); § 404.1525(a). This list of conditions, signs and symptoms is at 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix I. Conditions, signs and symptoms which equal the severity level of those included in the Listing will also justify a presumption of disability without further evidence of inability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); § 404.1526. In the category of Mental Disorders, § 12.00, a finding is rarely made that a condition equals the Listing.

6. None of the first three steps of the sequential evaluation process involves assessment of residual functional capacity (RFC) or consideration of the vocational factors of age, education and work experience.

7. The fourth step of the process involves two sub-steps: (1) a determination of the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), and (2) a determination whether the claimant has sufficient RFC to return to the physical or mental demands of his past relevant work. Id. 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). The determination of residual functional capacity requires a practical examination of what the individual can do despite the limitations resulting from his impairment. For individuals whose disability is based on a mental impairment, the evaluation of RFC must include consideration of "ability to understand, to carry out and remember instructions, and to respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work pressures in a work setting." Id. § 404.1545(c) and 416.945(c).

8. The evaluation of RFC is a medical assessment, but it is not limited to formal medical findings. The RFC assessment may encompass other pertinent evidence that will assist in determining the extent to which the impairment will prevent the claimant from functioning in the world of work. Id. 404.1545 and 416.945. For claimants whose impairments do not meet or equal the severity level of the Listing, the assessment of RFC is often the most important aspect of the sequential evaluation process.

9. If the individual cannot do his past work the fifth step of the process is employed. Five factors are assessed in the fifth step: the individual's RFC, age, education, and work experience, and the demands of other jobs in the national economy. If the individual is found unable to do other work which exists in substantial numbers in the economy, a finding of disability is made. Id. 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f).

10. Consideration of the vocational criteria of age, education and work experience is required by statute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B). "Age"...

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