Mental Health Dist. Bd., II B v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, II-

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JOANOS
• Citation: Mental Health Dist. Bd., II B v. Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 425 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1983)
• Decision Date: 07 January 1983
• Docket Number: II-,A,No. AK-336,AK-336
• Parties: MENTAL HEALTH DISTRICT BOARD,ppellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES; and Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., Appellees.

Page 160

425 So.2d 160

MENTAL HEALTH DISTRICT BOARD, II-B, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES; and Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., Appellees.

No. AK-336.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Jan. 7, 1983.

Kenneth F. Hoffman of Oertel & Laramore, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Eric J. Haugdahl, Asst. Gen. Counsel, for Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Tallahassee, appellee.

Ronald W. Brooks of Brooks, Callahan & Phillips, Tallahassee, for Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., appellee.

JOANOS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a declaratory statement issued pursuant to Section 120.565, Florida Statutes, by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS").

Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. ("Apalachee") petitioned HRS for a declaratory statement interpreting Sections 394.457 and 394.71-.81, Florida Statutes. Apalachee alleged it had been providing and continued to provide mental health, alcohol, and Baker Act services, for which it received state financial aid, to a specific area since before 1976 and that there had been no decrease in local funds or local participations in the programs it provided. Further, Apalachee alleged that on September 21, 1981, the Mental Health Board District II-B ("Board") requested proposals from other providers for some of the services which Apalachee had been providing. Apalachee also alleged the Board questioned the authority of counties to enter into contracts to provide services directly with providers such as Apalachee rather than proceeding through the Board. Finally, Apalachee alleged it was in doubt as to how HRS interprets Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, with reference to these matters. The specific questions posed by Apalachee in its petition were whether the Board is authorized to request proposals for alternative programs and providers for services provided by Apalachee since 1976, and whether contracts for services could be made directly between providers and counties, or whether the applicable statutory provisions require such contracts to be made solely through the Board.

The petition for a declaratory statement named both HRS and the Board as respondents and the Board moved to dismiss the petition. The primary ground for dismissal alleged was that Apalachee had not alleged a controversy between itself and HRS, but instead alleged a controversy between itself and the Board, seeking to make HRS an arbiter. The Board asserted that the purpose of declaratory statements is to resolve agency controversies or answer questions or doubts concerning the applicability of any statutory provision or rule as it does or may apply to the petitioner in his particular circumstances, and as petitioner sought a determination of the validity of the actions of a third party, the Board, proceedings for a declaratory statement were not authorized.

HRS denied the Board's motion to dismiss and went on to issue a declaratory statement on the two questions set forth above. In the final declaratory statement, HRS stated that Section 394.81 does not prohibit a mental health board from requesting proposals from alternative programs and providers, however, HRS also noted:

if an existing service provider is providing quality services based on service priorities in the approved district plan and conforms to existing contracts, rules and statutes, there is no need to request proposals from other providers. In fact, to do so would be disruptive to the continuity of service delivery. However, in the event an existing provider is not in compliance with the contract, rules or statutes and if monitoring and evaluation data indicate poor quality or inappropriate service, it may be desirable for a district mental health board to request proposals to improve the quality of the services.

In answer to the question as to direct contracting between providers and counties, HRS stated:

The ... question ... appears to request an impermissible statement of general applicability. However, a review of the petition indicates that Apalachee provides certain ... services by contract directly with Franklin and Gadsden counties and not by an award or contract through the Board. With this particular set of circumstances, an HRS response ... is appropriate.

Sections 394.71-394.81, Florida Statutes (1981), do not prohibit a contract for providing mental health, alcohol or Baker Act services made directly between the provider and a particular county. Further, these sections do not require that such a contract be made solely by and through a district mental health...