Menzie v. Kalmonowitz
| Decision Date | 06 January 1928 |
| Citation | 107 Conn. 197,139 A. 698 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | MENZIE v. KALMONOWITZ. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Allyn L. Brown Judge.
Action by Louise Menzie, P. P. A., against Samuel Kalmonowitz, to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the superior court in New London county and tried to the jury before Brown, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000, of which she remitted the sum of $1,500 upon order of the trial court, and, from the judgment for the balance, the defendant appealed. No error.
Charles Hadlai Hull, of New London, for appellant.
S Victor Prince, of New London, for appellee.
Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.
From the evidence offered upon the trial, the jury might have reached the following conclusions:
The plaintiff, a girl between 15 and 16 years of age, was struck by an automobile truck operated by the defendant just after she had alighted from a trolley car in which she had been a passenger. As the car approached the street corner where she desired to get off, she signaled the operator to stop by pressing a button, arose from her seat, and proceeded to the door, which was at the front end of the car. The car was of the so-called " safety" type; the mechanism being so arranged that the door could not open until the car had come to a stop. The plaintiff stepped to the street and proceeded at a hurried walk or trot toward the curb, taking a diagonal course and facing somewhat in the direction in which the car had been going. When she had taken two or three steps and was some five or six feet away from the car, she was struck by the truck driven by the defendant.
The truck had been following the car for a distance of more than a block. No witness except the defendant was so situated as to be able to definitely place its position when the car came to a stop; but one of the plaintiff's witnesses placed it as opposite the rear end of the trolley car when the plaintiff was getting off the step, and another, who sat in the third seat from the rear, testified that it went by him just as she was getting off; and, from this testimony and the other facts in evidence, it would be a reasonable inference that the truck was behind the car when it stopped, certainly that it was behind it when it began to slow down for the stop. The point where the trolley car stopped was a regular stopping place, and this the defendant well knew. He did not blow his horn to signal his approach. He drove by the trolley at a high rate of speed; he passed it so closely that the side of his truck was only about two feet away, although there was some seventeen feet of open roadway between the trolley track and the curb; and he made no attempt to stop until after he had struck the plaintiff.
The defendant stated after the accident that his brakes had not been working well, and an examination disclosed that they were in a very defective condition. His explanation of the accident was that the trolley car came to a very sudden stop; that his truck was then beside it, almost at the door; that there was no opportunity to stop, and he did not attempt to do so; and that he thought he could pass the door before any one could get out. He testified: The jury were entitled to disregard so much of his testimony as related to the sudden stopping of the trolley and the position of the truck at that time, and to apply to the facts which, as already pointed out, they might have found from the other testimony in the case, his statement as to his failure to attempt to stop, his belief that he could get by, and his admission that he " took a chance."
The complaint stated a cause of action, not merely for negligence, but also one for wanton misconduct. Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. It is such conduct as...
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Siesseger v. Puth
...It is conduct which indicates an indifference to the consequences of action and constitutes wanton misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698;Bordonaro v. Senk [109 Conn. 428, 147 A. 136] supra. Conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or from an ......
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Wolf v. Holton
...It is conduct which indicates an indifference to the consequences of action and constitutes wanton misconduct. Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698; Bordonaro v. Senk, supra. Conduct arising from momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or from an error of judgment, does no......
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Williamson v. McKenna
...786; Fowler v. Franklin, 1954, 58 N.M. 254, 270 P.2d 389; Smith v. Meadows, 1952, 56 N.M. 242, 242 P.2d 1006. In Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 1927, 107 Conn. 197, 139 A. 698, 699, it was said that 'Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence,' but since the statute did n......
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State v. Bunkley
...or gross negligence of one party is not a defense to a claim of recklessness against another party. See, e.g., Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 200, 139 A. 698 (1928). The trial court's ruling was well within its discretionary The court also did not commit error by taking judicial noti......