Menzies v. Galetka
| Decision Date | 15 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 20040289.,20040289. |
| Citation | 2006 UT 81,150 P.3d 480 |
| Parties | Ralph Leroy MENZIES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Hank GALETKA, Utah State Prison Warden, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., Thomas Brunker, Erin Riley, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
¶1 In this case, Ralph Leroy Menzies, a death row inmate, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Menzies filed a claim for post-conviction relief in 1995, after having previously exhausted his grounds for direct appeal. On March 3, 1998, attorney Edward K. Brass was appointed by the district court to represent Menzies. From that date until his withdrawal on September 9, 2003, Brass willfully disregarded nearly every aspect of Menzies' case. As a result, the court imposed discovery sanctions, granted summary judgment in favor of the State, and ultimately dismissed Menzies' petition for post-conviction relief.
¶2 Following the dismissal of Menzies' case, Brass withdrew and new counsel was appointed. Menzies then moved to set aside the district court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Menzies' 60(b) motion was primarily based on claims that Brass' actions were grossly negligent and amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied Menzies' motion (the 60(b) ruling). Menzies now requests that we reverse the district court's 60(b) ruling. Menzies also challenges a discovery order that the district court entered pursuant to an evidentiary hearing held on Menzies' 60(b) motion, arguing that the district court improperly compelled Menzies to disclose privileged work product. We hold that the district court erred in denying Menzies relief under rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that the discovery order entered by the district court did not comply with the standard for the discovery of attorney work product set forth in Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n v. Uno, 932 P.2d 589 (Utah 1997).
¶3 Before reciting the facts in this case, it is necessary to discuss our review of the district court's factual findings. We have reviewed the factual findings contained in the district court's 60(b) ruling for clear error, as is our practice when reviewing issues of fact. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 1 n. 1, 123 P.3d 416. However, our review of the record in this case indicates that the district court clearly erred in numerous factual findings that were crucial to its decision. We therefore decline to recite the facts in a manner consistent with the district court's ruling and instead recite them in accordance with our review of the record. Id.
¶4 The facts pertinent to this appeal arise from Menzies' lengthy post-conviction litigation, particularly the representation he received from attorney Edward K. Brass between February 1998 and September 2003. We begin our synopsis with some background information on the initial criminal proceedings. On March 8, 1988, Menzies was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Menzies waived his right to a jury for the penalty phase of his trial and was subsequently sentenced to death by the district court. Following his sentencing, Menzies filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Menzies appealed to this court, which affirmed the district court's denial of the motion and directed Menzies to proceed with his direct appeal on the merits. State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 242 (Utah 1992). Menzies did so, arguing that numerous prejudicial errors had occurred at trial. We ultimately denied all of Menzies' claims, affirming the jury's guilty verdict as well as the district court's imposition of the death penalty. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07 (Utah 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995).
¶5 On April 20, 1995, Menzies filed a petition for post-conviction relief; he amended his petition on May 2, 1995.1 In his amended petition, Menzies asserted seventy-three separate claims for relief, including claims that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. On November 13, 1995, the State moved to dismiss the first seventy-one claims, arguing that the Utah Supreme Court had previously rejected them. However, the State's motion did not address Menzies' ineffective assistance claims.
¶6 On December 13, 1995, the State moved the district court for permission to conduct discovery by serving interrogatories on Menzies and deposing him, his original trial counsel, and other witnesses. Menzies opposed the motion, asserting that any discovery should be tailored to avoid breaching attorney-client and constitutional privileges. On February 7, 1996, Menzies moved the district court to direct the State to provide attorney fees as well as funds for both expert witnesses and an investigation of his claims of innocence, including a potential alibi that was allegedly not investigated by trial counsel in Menzies' underlying criminal case. Menzies indicated that the motion would be supported by the affidavit of a private investigator to be filed with the court.
¶7 On April 3, 1996, the district court entered an order deferring ruling on the State's motion to dismiss until after an evidentiary hearing could be held on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court also set a timetable for the State and Menzies to file responsive memoranda to their respective motions. The court held another hearing regarding the State's motion for discovery and Menzies' motion for attorney fees and investigatory funds on May 6, 1996. On June 12, 1996, the district court ordered that the State be allowed to conduct limited discovery and that Menzies be awarded $2,000 to pay for an alibi investigation. In this order, the district court found that Menzies had partially waived his attorney-client privilege as to the records of his defense counsel, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA), by claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his post-conviction petition. The court also found that in order to prevent Menzies' right of habeas corpus from being unlawfully suspended, it was necessary to provide Menzies with funds to investigate his claims, specifically his claims regarding an uninvestigated alibi defense. The court deferred ruling on Menzies' request for attorney fees until an evidentiary hearing could be held. The State filed an interlocutory appeal from this order.
¶8 On May 17, 1996, the State served its first set of interrogatories on Menzies. On June 7, 1996, the State also served the LDA attorneys who had represented Menzies during his criminal trial with subpoenas duces tecum to have their depositions taken and requests to produce all documents relating to their representation of Menzies. On June 19, 1996, LDA intervened and filed a motion for redetermination and clarification of the district court's order granting discovery. LDA argued that Menzies had not waived the attorney-client privilege and that even if he had, the waiver was limited by the subject matter of Menzies' claims and the right against self incrimination. LDA also moved the district court for a protective order preventing the discovery of privileged attorney-client information from current or former LDA attorneys. Finally, LDA requested that the district court stay the depositions and discovery procedures pending the resolution of its motions.
¶9 On July 8, 1996, the State filed a motion requesting that the district court compel Menzies to respond to the interrogatories that the State had served him on May 17. On July 9, 1996, LDA filed a motion requesting that the court either quash the subpoenas duces tecum the State had served on its attorneys or issue a protective order limiting the production of privileged LDA documents relating to Menzies' criminal trial. On July 10, 1996, Menzies also moved for a protective order, asking that the LDA attorneys not be deposed and that he be relieved from having to respond to the State's interrogatories. Menzies argued that there was inadequate time to review the documents requested by the State to determine privilege issues. Menzies also noted that the State had not yet paid the $2,000 in investigative funds ordered by the district court and that he could not fully answer the State's interrogatories until the alibi investigation was completed. In addition, Menzies moved to stay the proceedings pending the State's appeal from the district court's interlocutory order regarding investigative funds to the Utah Supreme Court.
¶10 The district court conducted a hearing regarding LDA's July 8 motion on July 16, 1996. At the hearing, the court stayed all motions pending the State's interlocutory appeal and gave the State until July 19, 1996, to respond to Menzies' motions. The court also stayed the depositions of the LDA attorneys, which had been scheduled for July 18, 1996, and stated that they were to be rescheduled pending a hearing on the various motions on August 6, 1996. During the interim, the court ordered LDA to produce the non-privileged information that the State had requested and to prepare a privilege log as to the rest. Finally, the court ordered the State to pay Menzies the $2,000 in investigative funds as required by its prior order. The State did indeed provide Menzies with a check for $2,000 on July 19, 1996, reserving the right to challenge the district court's order requiring payment and to seek repayment from Menzies if the order was vacated.
¶11 Prior to the July 16 hearing, the State had prepared a proposed order regarding...
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