Mercado v. Columbus Reg'l Hosp.
| Decision Date | 28 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00429-JMS-MJD |
| Parties | Angelito C. Mercado, Plaintiff,, v. Columbus Regional Hospital, Dr. Samuel Locoh-Donou, Emergency Physicians of Indiana, Inc., R.N. Shelby Fluhr, and R.N. Krista Berry, Defendants.. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
On July 15, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Angelito Mercado was arrested and, while in custody, taken to Columbus Regional Hospital ("the Hospital") for medical care. He filed this lawsuit against the Hospital, Dr. Samuel Locoh-Donou, Emergency Physicians of Indiana, Inc. ("EPI"), Nurse Shelby Fluhr, and Nurse Krista Berry, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights and Indiana law by forcibly sedating him, administering a Covid-19 test against his will, and failing to examine or treat him after being informed that he may have swallowed narcotics. [Filing No. 15.] Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Filing No. 33], which is ripe for the Court's review.
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). "'Summary judgment is not a time to be coy.'" King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017)). Rather, at the summary judgment stage, "[t]he parties are required to put their evidentiary cards on the table." Sommerfield, 863 F.3d at 649.
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).
Each fact asserted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be supported by "a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible evidence." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e). And each "citation must refer to a page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence." Id. The Court need only consider the cited materials and need not "scour the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(h). Where a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact, the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Mr. Mercado provided video evidence in response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [See Filing No. 42.] This evidence consists of 13 separate videos captured by body cameras worn by law enforcement officers or cameras located in or on law enforcement vehicles. Because the claims at issue in this lawsuit only concern Mr. Mercado's medical treatment at the Hospital, much of the video evidence- including, for example, several hours of video showing officers' activities at the scene of the traffic stop after Mr. Mercado had already been transported to the Hospital-is irrelevant. To the extent the video evidence is relevant to this case, it is consistent with the affidavits submitted by Defendants and with the police reports submitted by Mr. Mercado, on which the Court primarily relies in setting forth the undisputed facts. Furthermore, to the extent that Mr. Mercado's version of events is blatantly contradicted by the video evidence, the Court may rely on the video evidence and disregard his version of events. See Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016) ().
In addition, Mr. Mercado failed to follow Local Rule 56, which requires a non-movant to include in his response to a motion for summary judgment a section labeled "Statement of Material Facts in Dispute" identifying potentially determinative facts and factual disputes, and dictates that a party support each asserted fact with a citation to admissible evidence. See S.D. Ind. L.R 56-1(b), (e). As a result, the Court may accept each of the properly asserted facts in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as undisputed. Nevertheless, in light of Mr. Mercado's pro se status, the Court has reviewed all of the evidence he submitted to identify any disputes of material fact.
With these caveats in mind, the following factual background is set forth pursuant to the standard detailed above. The facts stated are not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable to "the party against whom the motion under consideration is made," Premcor USA, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir. 2005), except to the extent that Mr. Mercado's version of events is contradicted by video evidence, see Williams, 809 F.3d at 942.
On July 15, 2020, Officer Drake Maddix of the Columbus Police Department ("CPD") and Deputy Dylan Prather of the Bartholomew County Sheriff's Office conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Mr. Mercado. [Filing No. 40-2 at 9; Filing No. 40-2 at 12.] Mr. Mercado refused to comply with the officers' orders to exit the vehicle and to drop the items he was holding in his hands, so the officers placed him in hand restraints. [Filing No. 40-2 at 12.] When he was told that he would be going to jail, Mr. Mercado fell to the ground and stated that he was having a panic attack. [Filing No. 40-2 at 12; see also 1902 Bodycam[1] at 04:20-05:00.] He also complained of back pain and stated that he had Covid-19. [Filing No. 40-2 at 12; see also 1902 Bodycam at 04:20-04:24 (Mr. Mercado stating, "Dude, I got corona, man!").] As a result, the officers immediately called for an ambulance. [Filing No. 40-2 at 12; 1902 Bodycam at 04:20-05:00.] Mr. Mercado was yelling, "making unreasonable noises," and "drawing a crowd due to his conduct," [Filing No. 40-2 at 12], and he refused to cooperate with the officers or emergency medical personnel, [Filing No. 40-2 at 9]. He also complained of a back injury he sustained during a recent car accident. [See 1910 Bodycam[2] at 07:40-09:10.]
CPD Officer Brandon Decker accompanied Mr. Mercado in the ambulance during transport. [Filing No. 40-2 at 9.] Mr. Mercado was restrained in the ambulance due to his erratic behavior. [Filing No. 40-2 at 9-10.] He was yelling, struggling against his restraints, spitting, and complaining of muscle spasms in his back. [1910 Bodycam at 10:15-24:00.] While in the ambulance, Mr. Mercado repeatedly hit and rubbed his face against the hard plastic rail on the side of the stretcher, which eventually caused his nose to bleed. [Filing No. 40-2 at 9-10.] He also was repeatedly "digging at his buttocks and crotch area." [Filing No. 40-2 at 10.] Mr. Mercado threatened to kill himself and stated again that he had Covid-19. [Filing No. 40-2 at 10; see also 1910 Bodycam at 14:05-14:15; 23:50-24:10.]
Mr. Mercado arrived at the Hospital at approximately 7:37 p.m. [Filing No. 34-1 at 3.] Dr. Locoh-Donou, Nurse Fluhr, and Nurse Berry were working in the emergency department at the time of Mr. Mercado's arrival. [Filing No. 34-1 at 3; Filing No. 34-2 at 2; Filing No. 34-3 at 2.] Dr. Locoh-Donou is employed by EPI, which contracts with the Hospital to provide emergency medicine services. [Filing No. 34-1 at 2-3.] Nurse Fluhr and Nurse Berry are employed by the Hospital. [Filing No. 34-2 at 2; Filing No. 34-3 at 2.] The legal name of the Hospital is Bartholomew County Public Hospital d/b/a Columbus Regional Hospital, and it is a county-owned public hospital. [Filing No. 34-4 at 1.]
Because Mr. Mercado was "severely agitated and combative" when he arrived at the Hospital, Dr. Locoh-Donou ordered that Mr. Mercado be chemically sedated and restrained in soft restraints to prevent him from injuring himself or others. [Filing No. 34-1 at 3.] Accordingly, he was administered a shot containing Haldol, Ativan, and Benadryl at 7:58 p.m. [Filing No. 34-1 at 3-4.] Before the shot...
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