Mercado v. Commissioner of Income Maintenance, 14388

Citation607 A.2d 1142,222 Conn. 69
Decision Date12 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 14388,14388
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesCecilia MERCADO v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME MAINTENANCE.

Judith Merrill Earl, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Joanne Gibau, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and BORDEN, JJ.

COVELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from an eligibility determination made by the defendant, the commissioner of income maintenance. The issue presented is whether in determining eligibility for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602 et seq., the applicable federal statute mandates the inclusion of children's savings accounts in determining the family's total resources. We agree with the fair hearing officer's determination that such savings accounts are required to be considered in determining the family's resources and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court that held to the contrary.

The procedural facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff is a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). On August 15, 1990, the defendant notified her that during the period between August 1, 1988, and August 31, 1989, two of the plaintiff's minor children had had savings account balances that totaled more than the $1000 statutory limit on family resources. The defendant concluded, therefore, that the family had been ineligible for assistance during that period and sought the return of $9342.75 paid to the plaintiff on the mistaken assumption that the family had been eligible for AFDC benefits.

The plaintiff made a timely request for a fair hearing. 1 The hearing officer determined that during the period in question, two of the plaintiff's children, Angel and Sandra, who were both under the age of eighteen and full-time students, had savings accounts from accumulated earnings of $989.51 and $4964.11, respectively. The hearing officer found that these savings accounts were includable in calculating whether the family unit had resources in excess of $1000. The hearing officer, therefore, determined that "the assets of the appellant's assistance unit were in excess of the agency AFDC asset limit of $1000.00 during the period of August 1, 1988 through August 31, 1989. Therefore, the District properly determined that all the AFDC assistance [payment] rendered during that period represents an overpayment. The total amount of $9,342.75 is therefore subject to recoupment action." The plaintiff took a timely appeal to the Superior Court. 2

The trial court, relying upon Rebman v. Welfare Commissioner, 31 Conn.Sup. 515, 324 A.2d 273 (1973), a decision of the Appellate Division of the Court of Common Pleas, concluded "[t]hat earned income and accumulated income as represented by a savings [account] held more than one month for the purposes of determining the extent of benefits should not be distinguished. To do so 'is to do violence to the entire federal system of public welfare. A disregarding of the child's accumulated earnings instills the incentive to work, whereas reimbursement of this accumulated earned income to the welfare commissioner perpetuates a disincentive to work.' [Rebman v. Welfare Commissioner, supra, at] 520" The trial court concluded "that the District Office and the Fair Hearing Officer incorrectly and improperly applied the law to the claim of the appellant" and sustained the appeal. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court. We thereafter transferred the matter to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

As succinctly set forth in the defendant's brief, the statutory and regulatory background to this issue is as follows: "The AFDC program is a joint federal state program. The federal statutes relating to AFDC are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. Federal regulations relating to eligibility for AFDC appear at 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 et seq. The defendant, Commissioner of Income Maintenance, is the state official charged with the administration of the AFDC program. See General Statutes § 17-2.

"The AFDC program, as enacted by Congress, and, in which the state participates, is designed to provide for needy dependent children. The Congress has set up, and the state has implemented, a complex system for determining whether a given child is needy. In order to provide an incentive to work, the Congress requires a participating state, in determining eligibility, to disregard certain earned income of various types of people who may make up a household. Among them are minor children who are students, minor children who are not students, parents and stepparents. That income which must be disregarded is not counted by the states in making eligibility determinations. The Congress has also imposed a $1,000.00 limitation on the resources that an AFDC household may have and still be eligible for the AFDC program. 3

"In the case at bar, the plaintiff's minor children earned wages from jobs. Those wages were disregarded by the state in the month in which they were received. The children placed some portion of their wages in savings accounts. It is the defendant's contention that once the wages were retained beyond the month in which they were received, they became resources, subject to the $1,000.00 limitation on resources; and that, therefore, the plaintiff's family was ineligible for AFDC for the entire period in which the combined balances in the savings accounts exceeded $1,000.00."

The plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that once disregarded, the children's wages were to be thereafter disregarded for all purposes and that the earned income should have been categorized simply as retained income and was not to be included in determining the $1,000 resource limitation for AFDC eligibility purposes. We disagree.

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) provides that a state plan for AFDC benefits must "provide that the State agency--(A) shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children ... (B) shall determine ineligible for aid any family the combined value of whose resources (reduced by any obligation or debts with respect to such resources) exceeds $1,000...."

42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A) provides that a state plan for AFDC must "provide that, with respect to any month, in making the determination under paragraph (7), the State agency--(i) shall disregard all of the earned income of each dependent child receiving aid to families with dependent children who is ... a full-time student or a part-time student who is not a full-time employee attending a school, college, or university, or a course of vocation or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment...." (Emphasis added.) This language does not expressly restrict the time period for disregarding a full-time dependent student's income to the month in which it is earned. 4

It is well settled that "[w]hen [statutory] language is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by construction." Thibeault v. White, 168 Conn. 112, 115, 358 A.2d 358 (1975). When the language of a statute is reasonably subject to diverse interpretations, however, we look to the statute's legislative history and the policy it was designed to implement "to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) does not specifically address whether Congress intended to exempt permanently the earnings of a dependent child who is a full-time student in determining a family's eligibility for AFDC. It does indicate, however, that until 1981, a state agency could, subject to limitations imposed by federal regulations, permit a family to set aside earned or other income for the "future identifiable needs" of a dependent child. In 1967, Congress amended § 402(a) of the Social Security Act to add various provisions for the disregarding of certain types of income of AFDC recipients and applicants, including the provision requiring that a state agency disregard all earned income of a dependent child receiving AFDC who is a full-time student. 5 Pub.L. No. 90-248, § 202(b) (1967). The amended law incorporated existing language, which provided that "the State agency ... '(B)(i) may, subject to the limitations prescribed by the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare], 6 permit all or any portion of the earned or other income to be set aside for future identifiable needs of a dependent child....' " 7 If a state agency chose to exercise this option, it considered such retained income "as not available for meeting current subsistence needs" of the family unit. Pub.L. No. 87-543, Senate Report No. 1589, reprinted in 1962 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1943, 1970.

The provision allowing for the setting aside of income for the future identifiable needs of dependent children was deleted, however, from the statute by Public Law No. 97-35, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981. At that time, Congress also enacted the $1000 statutory limitation on the resources of a family receiving AFDC. 8 As a result of these amendments, a state agency may no longer permit AFDC recipients to retain income in excess of $1000, even if it is intended for the future identifiable needs of dependent children. Thus, the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) discloses the deliberate excision of statutory language that could have served as the basis for excluding children's savings from the $1000 monthly resource limitation.

The plaintiff's suggested construction of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) is also contrary to the relevant federal regulations. Although it is not controlling, the interpretation of a federal agency is entitled...

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  • State v. Courchesne
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 11, 2003
    ...clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744-45, 613 A.2d 804 (1992); Mercado v. Commissioner of Income Maintenance, 222 Conn. 69, 74, 607 A.2d 1142 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 225, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Co......
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    ...clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744-45, 613 A.2d 804 (1992); Mercado v. Commissioner of Income Maintenance, 222 Conn. 69, 74, 607 A.2d 1142 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 225, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Co......
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