Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids

• Decision Date: 19 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. C98-0143-MWB.,C98-0143-MWB.
• Parties: Teresa L. MERCER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS and William J. Byrne, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

104 F.Supp.2d 1130

Teresa L. MERCER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS and William J. Byrne, Defendant.

No. C98-0143-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

July 19, 2000.

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Mark J. Seidl, Seidl & Chicchelly, Marion, IA, for Plaintiff.

Mohammad H. Sheronick, City Attorney, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, Chief Judge.

                                               TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................  1135
                     A. Procedural Background ......................................................  1135
                     B. Factual Background .........................................................  1136
                 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................................  1139
                     A. Standards For Summary Judgment .............................................  1139
                

                B. Constitutional Claims ......................................................  1140
                        1. Mercer's equal protection claim .........................................  1140
                           a. Elements of the claim ................................................  1140
                           b. Were Mercer and Peters "similarly situated"? .........................  1141
                                i. The defendants' difference based on "rank" ......................  1142
                               ii. The plaintiff's "accusation of the same conduct" test ...........  1142
                              iii. The proper test .................................................  1143
                               iv. "Probationary" versus "permanent" status ........................  1144
                                v. The difference in legal status here .............................  1146
                        2. Mercer's due process claim ..............................................  1147
                           a. Waiver of the "procedural" due process claim .........................  1148
                           b. Sufficiency of the "stigma" to sustain a "procedural" due process
                claim ..............................................................  1149
                                i. Nature of the stigma or obloquy .................................  1150
                               ii. Comments on professional competence .............................  1151
                              iii. "Stigma" from Chief Byrne's comments ............................  1152
                           c. The "substantive" due process claim ..................................  1153
                        3. Qualified immunity and municipal liability ..............................  1154
                     C. The Sex Discrimination Claims ..............................................  1155
                        1. The Reeves decision and the burden-shifting analysis ....................  1156
                        2. Application of the burden-shifting analysis .............................  1158
                           a. Mercer's prima facie case ............................................  1158
                           b. The defendants' legitimate, non-discriminatory reason ................  1160
                           c. Proof of "pretext" and "intentional discrimination" ..................  1161
                                i. The third-stage analysis under Reeves ...........................  1162
                               ii. The role of evidence of disparate treatment .....................  1163
                              iii. Mercer's third-stage showing ....................................  1164
                     D. Slander ....................................................................  1166
                        1. The "twin torts" of libel and slander ...................................  1167
                        2. Qualified privilege .....................................................  1167
                           a. Communication to the general public ..................................  1168
                           b. "Actual malice" and qualified privilege ..............................  1169
                        3. Slander and slander "per se" ............................................  1170
                        4. Falsity .................................................................  1172
                     E. Wrongful Discharge .........................................................  1173
                        1. Analytical framework ....................................................  1173
                        2. Determining public policy ...............................................  1175
                           a. Public policy protection for a private, consensual relationship ......  1175
                           b. Public policy protection for contact with Commissioner Evans .........  1176
                        3. Jeopardy to public policy ...............................................  1177
                        4. Summary .................................................................  1180
                III. CONCLUSION ....................................................................  1180
                

Undaunted by denial of their previous motion to dismiss the plaintiff's federal civil rights claims arising from the plaintiff's discharge from her position as a probationary police officer, see generally Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 79 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Iowa 1999), the defendants, a city and it's former police chief, have now moved for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims. Those claims include federal equal protection, due process, and sex discrimination claims, as well as state-law claims of gender discrimination, slander, and wrongful discharge, which were recently consolidated into this action. The probationary officer's claims are premised upon her assertions that the police chief discharged her for having a consensual, extra-marital relationship with a police captain, then made allegedly defamatory comments to a newspaper about her qualifications to be a police officer. Although the court found no "insuperable bar" on the face of the pleadings to the probationary officer's federal civil rights claims, the court must now consider whether summary judgment in the defendants' favor is appropriate on any of the plaintiff's claims state or federal, upon a more complete record.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Teresa A. Mercer filed her original complaint in this action on December 2, 1998, following her termination on March 13, 1998, from her position as a probationary police officer with the Police Department of the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Mercer named as defendants the City of Cedar Rapids (the City), and William J. Byrne (Chief Byrne), who was the Chief of Police for the City at the time Mercer was terminated. The defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint, but Senior Judge McManus determined that the motion to dismiss was mooted when Mercer filed a First Amended Complaint, which articulated somewhat more clearly Mercer's claims of sexual discrimination, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and claims of denial of constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants renewed their motion to dismiss as to Mercer's First Amended Complaint on April 12, 1999, but this court denied the renewed motion on the merits on December 6, 1999.

Thereafter, on January 27, 2000, Mercer sought leave to amend her complaint to consolidate in a single action her federal claims and three state-law claims previously asserted in a parallel action in state court. Such leave was granted, and Mercer's Second Amended Complaint was filed, on February 1, 2000. In her Second Amended Complaint, Mercer once again alleges that Chief Byrne made the decision to terminate her, and in so doing, was acting as an agent with the full authorization of the City. See Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 6. Mercer's Complaint now alleges the following five claims arising from Mercer's termination or the circumstances surrounding it: Count I, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges a violation of Mercer's civil rights in the form of denial of her federal constitutional rights to equal protection and due process; Count II alleges "a violation" of Title VII, presumably sex discrimination;¹ Count III alleges slander based on statements Chief Byrne purportedly made to a reporter for a local newspaper at the time of Mercer's termination; Count IV alleges wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy; and Count V alleges Mercer's termination was "on account of Plaintiff's gender" in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), IOWA CODE CH. 216.

On April 14, 2000, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Mercer's claims on various grounds. Mercer resisted the defendants' motion on May 9, 2000, and subsequently filed an amendment and addendum to her Statement of Additional Facts in resistance to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on May 30, 2000. The defendants filed a reply to the amended statement of facts on June 5, 2000. No party has requested oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment; therefore, the court finds that the motion for summary judgment is now fully submitted on the record and written arguments. The court will consider the defendants' grounds for summary judgment seriatim below. However, the court will first provide a brief statement of the factual background for Mercer's claims.

B. Factual Background

The court will discuss here only the nucleus of undisputed facts and such of the disputed facts as are necessary to provide a factual background for the legal analysis of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, rather than attempting to provide an exhaustive dissertation of the undisputed and disputed facts in this case. In its legal analysis, the court will address in greater detail, where necessary, Mercer's assertions of genuine issues of material fact that may preclude summary judgment in the defendants' favor.

Unfortunately, the parties agree on very few facts. They agree that Mercer was hired as a probationary police officer by the City on March 17, 1997, and that her probationary period was for one year. They also agree that Mercer was terminated on March 13, 1998, before the end of her...