Mercer v. United States Med. Center for Fed. Pris., 18256-1.
Decision Date | 19 May 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 18256-1.,18256-1. |
Parties | Norman C. MERCER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES MEDICAL CENTER FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Norman C. Mercer, pro se.
Bert C. Hurn, U. S. Atty., Frederick O. Griffin, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for respondents.
On April 22, 1970 this Court ordered the petitioner to file an appropriate supplementary pleading in which he should state and allege under oath the specific factual circumstances supporting the conclusory allegations made in his petition for habeas corpus relief filed April 7, 1970. On May 6, 1970, the petitioner filed an "Answer to Court's Order" which, like the initial petition, was quite obviously prepared by another inmate, one Larry V. Cooper, whose now voluminous Civil Action No. 17943-1 currently pends before this Court. Like Mr. Cooper, this petitioner has failed to comply with the Court's order that his pleading be under oath.
The petitioner's principal complaint involves his allegation that despite repeated requests to various prison officials, he has been denied transfer to another federal penal institution.
Section 4082(a) of Title 18, United States Code provides:
A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confinement where the sentence shall be served.
It is clear from the decided cases interpreting this section that, in the absence of highly exceptional circumstances (which are neither alleged nor apparent in the case at bar), the designation of the institution in which a lawfully imposed federal sentence shall be served is vested in the Attorney General of the United States, acting through the Bureau of Prisons. See Lawrence v. Willingham, 373 F.2d 731 (10th Cir., 1967); Hogue v. United States, 287 F.2d 99 (5th Cir., 1961); cert. den. 368 U.S. 932, 82 S.Ct. 369, 7 L.Ed.2d 195, reh. den. 368 U.S. 972, 82 S.Ct. 441, 7 L.Ed.2d 402; Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329, 338 (W.D.Mo.1968).
The same principles apply to the petitioner's allegation that he has wrongfully been denied an assignment to a Community Treatment Center. Discretion to make such an assignment under appropriate circumstances is vested in the Attorney General. See Title 18, United States Code, § 4082(c) and (f).
The petitioner further alleges that he and all other inmates at the Springfield Prison Camp are wrongfully denied (1) cash payments of $100 at the time of their release from custody; (2) work shoes and work clothing (of a type deemed appropriate by the petitioner) at the time of their release from custody; (3) cash loans at the time of their release from custody; (4) opportunity to earn money by working in prison industry; (5) vocational training programs; and (6) work release privileges.
With respect to the first three of these allegations, Sections 4281 and 4284 provide:
The petitioner does not allege that he is at the present time eligible for benefits under either of these sections and that such benefits have nevertheless been denied to him. (The petitioner's sentence data record indicates that he became eligible for parole on October 21, 1969 and that, allowing for full good time credit, his sentence will expire on October 27, 1971.) Instead, in response to the Court's order calling for specific factual particularization the petitioner has stated only his own speculation about the manner in which the Attorney General may, at the time of petitioner's release on some unascertained date in the future, exercise the discretion vested in him by the quoted statutory sections.
Under the circumstances, it would be improper for this Court by way of mandamus to order the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in a particular manner at some future date when wholly new and different factual circumstances may be in existence. On the permissible scope of mandamus relief, see the extensive discussion in Rural Electrification Administration v. Northern States Power Company, 373 F.2d 686, at pp. 694-695 (Footnote 14) (8th Cir., 1967), cert. denied 387 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 2079, 18 L.Ed.2d 1332, where the Court noted:
Traditionally mandamus is used to compel the performance of a ministerial duty or to compel the exercise of discretion when such is required, but never to influence that discretion. Emphasis supplied.
The petitioner's further allegations that he and "all other camp prisoners" are denied opportunity to earn money by working in prison industry...
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