Mercy Hosp. of Williston v. Stillwell, 10683
Decision Date | 28 November 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 10683,10683 |
Citation | 358 N.W.2d 506 |
Parties | MERCY HOSPITAL OF WILLISTON, a non-profit domestic corporation, Petitioner, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Lester F. STILLWELL, Personal Representative of the Estate of Erling B. Manger, Deceased, and First Lutheran Church, Respondents, Bethel Lutheran Home for the Aged, Respondent, Appellant and Cross Appellee. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Richard A. McKennett [argued], of Rolfstad, Winkjer, McKennett, Kaiser, Stenehjem & Walters, Williston, for respondent, appellant and cross-appellee.
Terry P. Lorenz [argued], of McIntee & Whisenand, Williston, for petitioner, appellee and cross-appellant.
This is an appeal by Bethel Lutheran Home for the Aged, Inc., [Bethel], a residuary devisee under the will of Erling B. Manger, from a memorandum and order of the County Court of Williams County construing the will. The county court concluded that the residuary devise made to Good Samaritan Hospital Association [Good Samaritan] an entity no longer in existence, had lapsed. It ordered distribution among the three remaining devisees (First Lutheran Church, Mercy Hospital, and Bethel) in proportion to their interests in the residue, pursuant to Sec. 30.1-09-06(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. Mercy Hospital cross-appeals from the memorandum and order, contending that the devise to the nonexistent Good Samaritan facility should pass to Mercy Hospital alone rather than to the three remaining devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue. In the alternative, Mercy Hospital asks this court to affirm the lower court's distribution of the devise pursuant to Sec. 30.1-09-06(2), N.D.C.C. We reverse and remand.
Manger executed a will on November 8, 1968, which directed that his sister, Mildred, receive his personal property. The rest of Manger's estate was placed in trust for Mildred, with the net income therefrom payable to her. Manger's instructions were, upon Mildred's death, to terminate the trust fund and distribute the assets to certain charitable and religious organizations listed under ARTICLES IV and V of his will. According to Paragraph Seventh of ARTICLE V of Manger's will, the residue was to be apportioned as follows:
Manger's will did not provide for a "gift over" to another entity in the event that one of the four residuary devisees ceased to exist at the time of his death.
Good Samaritan was owned by some of the same Lutheran churches located in northwestern North Dakota which owned Bethel. Good Samaritan was an acute medical care facility which also provided some long term nursing care as an accommodation to Bethel. Mercy Hospital is strictly an acute medical care facility.
In the early 1970's, Good Samaritan was experiencing financial difficulty. This was due in part to the economic conditions at the time and also as a result of Mercy Hospital's receipt of a Certificate of Need from the State Health Council for replacing its building. It was inevitable that Good Samaritan would eventually merge with Bethel. An administrator was hired to jointly supervise Good Samaritan and Bethel. The administrator, Wayne Hanson, remains administrator of Bethel.
On June 1, 1972, a preliminary agreement was made between Good Samaritan and Mercy Hospital whereby Good Samaritan's acute care service was transferred to Mercy Hospital. A Memorandum of Agreement was executed which finalized the transfer to Mercy Hospital in April of 1973. Good Samaritan ceased operation as a medical care facility on July 1, 1973.
A plan of merger between Good Samaritan and Bethel was executed on March 11, 1974. The plan was incorporated into the articles of merger which were adopted on March 13, 1980. The plan to merge recited, in pertinent part, that:
Manger's sister, Mildred, moved into Bethel Home in 1974. Manger himself resided there from March of 1977 until his death on June 9, 1982. Lester Stillwell was appointed personal representative of the estate. Manger's will was admitted to formal probate on June 24, 1982, in the Williams County Court.
On July 28, 1983, Mercy Hospital petitioned the Williams County Court for a construction of Manger's will. Mercy Hospital contended that the court should have invoked the cy-pres doctrine and ordered that the residuary devise to Good Samaritan be distributed to Mercy Hospital, the only remaining hospital in the area providing acute medical care. In the alternative, Mercy Hospital asked the court to apply Sec. 30.1-09-06(2), N.D.C.C., thereby distributing the Good Samaritan's devise to the three remaining devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue.
Bethel contended that it was entitled to the devise by virtue of the merger between Bethel and Good Samaritan. The lower court held that Sec. 30.1-09-06(2), N.D.C.C., governed the disposition of the devise and ordered that it be divided in accord with the remaining devisees' proportionate interests in the residue. This appeal by Bethel followed.
The parties advance three possible solutions to the problem raised in this case:
1. Application of the anti-lapse statute, Sec. 30.1-09-06, N.D.C.C.
2. Application of the merger statute, Sec. 10-25-06, N.D.C.C.
3. Adoption of the cy-pres doctrine.
Mercy Hospital, in its cross-appeal, argues that the equitable cy-pres doctrine applies, asserting that Manger evidenced a general charitable intent in devising the residue of his estate in part to Good Samaritan, an acute medical care facility. Mercy Hospital contends that Manger's intent will be frustrated if the devise passes to Bethel, because Bethel provides different services and serves a different purpose than Good Samaritan did. In the alternative, Mercy Hospital asks the court to affirm the lower court's application of Sec. 30.1-09-06(2), N.D.C.C., in apportioning the devise among the three remaining devisees. Appellant Bethel contends that the statute on merger controls the disposition of the devise to Good Samaritan.
The dispositive question in this appeal is whether or not the residuary devise to Good Samaritan lapsed. Section 30.1-09-06(2), N.D.C.C., provides that if a gift fails for any reason, it passes to the other residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue:
The county court concluded that Manger's intent in devising 20 percent of his residuary estate to Good Samaritan could not be carried out because Good Samaritan no longer existed at the time of the testator's death. The court, therefore, applied Sec. 30.1-09-06(2) to save the devise by apportioning it among the remaining residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue. We do not agree with the county court's determination that a lapse has occurred.
The residuary devise to Good Samaritan is a charitable gift. A charitable gift is defined as a gift designed to accomplish an objective which is beneficial to the community. Rest...
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