Mercy Hospital v. State

• Decision Date: 08 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 64,64
• Citation: 65 N.W.2d 838,340 Mich. 404
• Parties: MERCY HOSPITAL, a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF MICHIGAN and Michigan Crippied Children Commission, Defendants and Cross-Appellants. *
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 838

65 N.W.2d 838

340 Mich. 404

MERCY HOSPITAL, a Michigan Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.STATE OF MICHIGAN and Michigan Crippied Children CommissionDefendants and Cross-Appellants. ^*

No. 64.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 8, 1954.

W. M. Cunningham, Benton Harbor, Butzbaugh & Page, Benton Harbor, for plaintiff and appellant.

Frank G. Millard, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol.Gen., Lansing, Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Meredith H. Doyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

CARR, Justice.

Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Michigan, and for some years has been engaged in the operation of a general hospital in Benton Harbor, Michigan.As a result of arrangements with the Michigan crippled children commission it has rendered hospital services to afflicted children under the provisions of P.A.1939, No. 283, as amended, C.L.1948, § 722.301 et seq., as amended, Stat.Ann.1953 Cum.Supp. § 25.422(1) et seq.The statute invests said commission, a defendant herein, with authority to administer the act and to make agreements with hospitals for the furnishing of necessary care and treatment to afflicted children whose parents or guardians are unable to do so.It is conceded that plaintiff was duly approved by the commission for the care of afflicted children, that the services rendered were satisfactory, and that the charges made were reasonable.

Plaintiff received payment from time to time for the services rendered by it under its arrangement with the defendant commission, except for the period between April and November, 1950.Its billings for the period in question totalled $6,602.25.Of such amount payment of $1,338.90 was refused because of failure to comply with the provisions of section 8 of the statute, and rules of the crippled children commission adopted thereunder, with reference to the making of entrance and discharge reports.The balance of the claim was rejected on the same ground and for the further reason that plaintiff had not rendered bills therefor within 60 days after discharge of patients, as specified in section 14.Thereupon plaintiff instituted suit in the court of claims for the full amount of its claim.Following trial judgment was rendered in its favor in the sum of $1,338.90, recovery being denied as to the balance.It was the holding of the trial judge that the provisions of section 8 of the statute, relating to entrance and discharge reports, should be construed as directory, but that section 14, in prescribing the time within which bills should be rendered after discharge, was mandatory.From the judgment entered plaintiff has appealed, and defendants have taken a cross-appeal.

Insofar as material here section 8 of the statute, C.L.1948, § 722.308, Stat.Ann.1953 Cum.Supp. § 25.422(8), reads as follows:

'Hospital reports.Approved hospitals receiving patients under the provisions of this act shall promptly report to the commission on blanks to be provided by the commission for that purpose, the date and hour of admission to and discharge from such hospital, the name of the physician and/or the surgeon who is in attendance, and such other information as the commission may require.Notification of the admittance of an afflicted child shall be made to the commission by the superintendent of the hospital within 10 days.A discharge report, giving the date of the discharge, and such other information as the commission may require, must be filed within 1 week from date of discharge.No bill for the care of a child shall be approved unless an entrance and discharge report has been filed with the commission.'

Section 14, C.L.1948, § 722.314, Stat.Ann.1953 Cum.Supp. § 25.422(14), after setting forth provisions relating to the auditing and payment of bills rendered, contains the following:

'Payment shall be refused on any billing rendered 60 days or more after the discharge of the patient from the hospital.'

It is conceded that plaintiff did not make the entrance and discharge reports during the period in question here, that is, from April to November, 1950, within the time specified therefor in section 8; nor did it render its billings following the discharge of patients during said period within 60 days thereafter in accordance with section 14.Plaintiff contends that the statutory provisions in question should be construed as directory merely, and hence that it is entitled to recover the full amount of its billings.Defendants insist that the provisions of both sections quoted are mandatory, and that the failure on the part of plaintiff to comply therewith bars recovery.

The rights and obligations of the respective parties here depend on the statute.The primary purpose in the interpretation thereof is to give effect to the intention of the lawmaking body.In City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 189 N.W. 221, 222, it was said:

'If the language employed in a statute is plain, certain, and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices, and no interpretation is necessary.'

See also, MacQueen v. Port Huron City Com'n, 194 Mich. 328, 160 N.W. 627;Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, 260 N.W. 165, 98 A.L.R. 827;Gardner-White Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 296 Mich. 225, 295 N.W. 624;Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich. 460, 51 N.W.2d 906.Insofar as section 14 of the statute is concerned, there is no room for doubt as to the intention of the legislature.The language used is certain and definite.It is the duty of the courts to construe it as it reads, without reference to equitable consideration.Bankers Trust Company of Detroit v. Russell, 263 Mich. 677, 249 N.W.27.It was doubtless intended for the protection of the State by insuring that bills should be presented within the time specified in order to permit the making of such inquiry with reference thereto as might be deemed expedient.We think the rule recognized in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wood, 115 Mich. 444, 448, 449, 74 N.W. 656, 657, is applicable in the case at bar.It was there said:

'Usually, when negative words are used in a statute, it becomes imperative and mandatory.There...