Mercy Medical v. Gray

Decision Date30 August 2002
PartiesMERCY MEDICAL, a corporation v. Virginia Lock GRAY.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Robert E. Gibney, Mobile, for appellant.

Eaton G. Barnard, Mobile, for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1020573.

CRAWLEY, Judge.

On December 29, 1997, while employed by Mercy Medical as a recreational therapy assistant, Virginia Lock Gray suffered an on-the-job injury for which she was awarded workers' compensation benefits. On April 15, 1998, Gray received a letter from Mercy Medical stating that her time away from work had extended beyond that allowed by the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("the FMLA"), and that she was being terminated "[d]ue to the uncertainty of [her] return date and the importance of patient care coverage." That letter further stated that Gray was eligible to be rehired upon her completing an employment application, if an opening became available. Gray received an employment application, but whether she filed it with Mercy Medical is disputed. However, she did not contact Mercy Medical about employment after receiving the employment application. Gray remained under the care of a physician for her on-the-job injury until July 31, 1998.

On September 6, 1998, Gray filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Department of Industrial Relations. In that claim she stated that absenteeism was the cause of her discharge. On September 17, 1998, Jolene Nessman, an assistant administrator in Mercy Medical's department of human resources, responded to Gray's claim, stating that "Ms. Gray was out on medical leave and it was unknown for the return date. Her last day worked was 1/23/98 and after exhausting all her leave time under [the] FMLA[,] was taken from payment system on 4/15/98." Gray's unemployment-compensation claim was denied on September 28, 1998; she appealed that decision at an October 15, 1998, hearing conducted by an appeals referee. No representative of Mercy Medical participated in that hearing.1 In its findings, the referee stated that Mercy Medical had terminated Gray's employment for exhausting her family medical leave. The referee concluded that Gray was entitled to unemployment compensation because she had not voluntarily quit her employment with Mercy Medical.

On March 14, 2000, Gray sued Mercy Medical alleging that it had terminated her employment in retaliation for her filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of § 25-5-11.1, Ala.Code 1975. On June 12, 2001, Gray filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. On June 13, 2001, Mercy Medical filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a summary judgment. The trial court denied Gray's and Mercy Medical's motions on June 13, 2001. On that same day, trial commenced on Gray's retaliatory-discharge claim. At the close of Gray's case, the trial court reserved the presentation of all motions. At the close of all evidence, Mercy Medical filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law; the trial court denied the motion. On June 14, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Gray awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $8,840 and punitive damages in the amount of $91,160, for a total amount of $100,000. The trial court entered a judgment on that verdict that same day. On July 12, 2001, Mercy Medical filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law with alternative motions for a new trial and remittitur relief. The trial court denied those motions on September 7, 2001. On October 18, 2001, Mercy Medical filed a notice of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. On November 28, 2001, this case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

On appeal, Mercy Medical argues (1) that the trial court erred by denying its pretrial motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a summary judgment because, it says, Gray's retaliatory-discharge claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (2) that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence because, it says, Gray failed to provide substantial evidence to support her claim and by denying its postjudgment motions because, it says, there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict; and (3) that the trial court erred by denying its postjudgment motion for a remittitur because, it argues, the jury's punitive-damages award was not supported by substantial or clear and convincing evidence and is constitutionally excessive.

I. Collateral Estoppel

Mercy Medical first argues that Gray's retaliatory-discharge claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, relying upon Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So.2d 442 (Ala.1999). In Wal-Mart Stores, our supreme court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to bar a plaintiff's retaliatory-discharge claim when the basis for the plaintiff's discharge from employment had been determined in an unemployment-compensation hearing before an appeals referee. The supreme court stated:

"In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to an issue raised in an administrative proceeding, the following elements must be present:
"`"`(1) there is identity of the parties or their privies; (2) there is identity of issues; (3) the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issues in the administrative proceeding; (4) the issues to be estopped were actually litigated and determined in the administrative proceeding; and (5) the findings on the issues to be estopped were necessary to the administrative decision.'"'
"Ex parte Smith, 683 So.2d 431, 433 (Ala.1996)

(quoting Ex parte Shelby Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So.2d 63, 68 (Ala.1990)(quoting Pantex Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir.1985)))."

743 So.2d at 445. It is undisputed that there is identity of the parties; thus, we must determine whether the remaining elements exist.

In its brief to this court, Mercy Medical states that because Gray did not raise any issue of retaliatory discharge in the unemployment-compensation hearing she could not assert such a claim in this litigation. Thus, it concedes that the appeals referee did not consider the retaliatory-discharge issue. Further, our review of the appeal referee's order shows that the determinative issue as to whether Gray was due to receive unemployment benefits was whether she was discharged or whether she voluntarily left her employment, a potential disqualification for unemployment benefits under § 25-4-78(2), Ala.Code 1975. The cause for her discharge was not the determinative issue, which distinguishes this case from Wal-Mart Stores. In that case, the issue determined by the appeals referee was whether the plaintiff "`was discharged from [her] most recent bona fide work for misconduct connected with [her] work,'" under § 25-4-78(3)c, Ala. Code 1975. 743 So.2d at 444. Accordingly, because the issue presented to the appeals referee and the issue presented in this case are not identical, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar Gray's retaliatory-discharge claim.

II. Substantial Evidence of Retaliatory Discharge

Mercy Medical next argues that Gray failed to present substantial evidence of the elements of a retaliatory-discharge cause of action and that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. It asserts that the trial court therefore erred in denying its motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence and its postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law.

"`The standard of review applicable to a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict [now referred to as preverdict and postverdict motions for a judgment as a matter of law] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying the motions initially. Thus, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on either motion, we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to produce a conflict warranting jury consideration. And, like the trial court, we must view any evidence most favorably to the non-movant.'"
Glenlakes Realty Co. v. Norwood, 721 So.2d 174, 177 (Ala.1998) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 863 (Ala.1988)) (citations omitted in Glenlakes Realty).

In Bailey v. R.E. Garrison Trucking Co., 834 So.2d 122 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), this court stated:

"In Alabama, an employee may lawfully be discharged from his employment, with or without cause or justification, for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So.2d 1120 (Ala.1992). Section 25-5-11.1, Ala.Code 1975, states an exception to this rule:
"`No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits....'
"In regard to actions brought under § 25-5-11.1, the Alabama Supreme Court has held:
"`[A]n employee may establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge by proving that he was "terminated" because he sought to recover worker's compensation benefits, which would be an impermissible reason. The burden would then shift to the defendant employer to come forward with evidence that the employee was terminated for a legitimate reason, whereupon the [employee] must prove that the reason [given by the employer] was not true but a pretext for an otherwise impermissible termination.'
"Twilley v. Daubert Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So.2d 1364, 1369 (Ala.1988)

."

834 So.2d at 123-24. The elements establishing a prima facie case of a retaliatory discharge have also been identified as "(1) an employment relationship; (2) an on-thejob injury; (3) notice to the employer of the on-the-job injury; and (4) subsequent termination of employment." Dunn v. Comcast...

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