Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Association of America
Decision Date | 11 June 1923 |
Citation | 252 S.W. 976,213 Mo.App. 688 |
Parties | MAUDE L. MEREDITH, Appellant, v. BUSINESS MEN'S ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Respondent |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Caldwell County.--Hon. Arch B Davis, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
Davis & Ashby for appellant.
Solon T. Gilmore for respondent.
This is an action to recover upon an accident insurance policy for the death of plaintiff's husband from external, violent and accidental means. The cause was tried to the court without the aid of a jury, upon agreed statement of facts, as follows:
The policy is set out in full in the abstract, but the only parts which we have to deal with in this review are as follows: Section 12, article 13, provides: "This policy does not cover any injury, fatal or otherwise, sustained by the insured while under the influence or suffering from the effects of any liquor or narcotic; nor any injury, fatal or otherwise, contributed to or effected by disease, bodily or mental infirmity, hernia, orchitis, fits, vertigo, sleep-walking, or medical or surgical treatment; nor any injury, fatal or otherwise, intentionally inflicted by the insured (sane or insane) or by any other person (sane or insane) except it be established that the assault was committed for the sole purpose of burglary or robbery; nor any injury, fatal or otherwise, sustained by the insured while participating in or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics, or while riding a motorcycle, or while violating any law."
And that part of section 10 of article 13, which reads:
The policy was issued August 29, 1913. The petition alleges that on the 27th day of September 1919, and during the life of said policy, while Oscar O. Meredith, the insured, "was riding, as a passenger for hire in a public conveyance, using gasoline or other substance as a motive power, to-wit, an airplane, at Breckenridge, Missouri, he was injured by reason of said airplane, upon which he was a passenger colliding with the ground; that said injury caused the death of said Oscar O. Meredith, and said death occurred almost immediately as a direct result of said collision and said injury and death was effected through external, violent and accidental means and independent of all other causes, to-wit, the collision of said airplane with the ground as aforesaid."
Plaintiff was the wife of Oscar O. Meredith and the beneficiary named in the policy. Defendant denied liability and this suit followed. The finding and judgment of the court were for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
The only point presented for our determination on this appeal is the intent and meaning of that clause in the policy quoted from section 12, article 13. It is urged that as a general rule, a policy of accident insurance is to be liberally construed as against the insured and strictly construed as against the insurer, in the event there is ambiguity in the contract. The correctness of this rule is not denied by defendant and we need not discuss it. The question for our solution is as to whether or not the language of the policy is ambiguous as used in the clause under discussion.
Plaintiff urges that the word "participate," as used in the policy, has a technical meaning, to-wit, sharing in any and all profits accruing to the company or class to which the participator belongs. In other words, that it means here, the business of sailing the air. It is also contended...
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