Meredith v. State
Decision Date | 31 August 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 1-182A23,1-182A23 |
Citation | 439 N.E.2d 204 |
Parties | Ernest MEREDITH, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Halbert W. Kunz, Kunz & Kunz, Indianapolis, Sidney R. Lindsey, Rockport, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Stephan E. Wolter, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant Ernest Meredith appeals from his conviction of five counts of operating a motor vehicle for hire without authority from the Public Service Commission of Indiana, in violation of Indiana Code Section 8-2-7-31. 1
We reverse and remand.
Meredith was issued five traffic tickets between May 5, 1980, and April 28, 1981, each charging him with a violation of Indiana Code Section 8-2-7-31. The five causes were tried together on June 18, 1981, on the following stipulated facts. 2 Meredith stated that if he were to put on his evidence it would show that he is a coal truck driver engaged in hauling coal owned by B & M Coal Corporation. This coal is either mined by B & M on tracts it leases or purchased at other mine sites in Pike, Warrick, and Spencer counties in Indiana. The coal is transported by truck on state highways of Indiana directly to B & M's coal dock on the Ohio River at Rockport, Spencer County, Indiana. There the coal is weighed and is either stockpiled or dumped by the truck directly into a barge at the Ohio River shoreline. None of the coal is sold to anyone in Indiana; rather, it is transported by barges to power plants in Kentucky or Tennessee or is later shipped overseas. The state and Meredith agreed that the coal trucks are not leased to B & M and the operators are not employed by B & M. Instead, the coal haulers, including Meredith, are independent operators for hire, some of whom own their own trucks, and they are paid by the ton for moving the coal.
The Spencer Circuit Court found that Meredith's operations are within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of Indiana and involve intrastate commerce, and that he should have obtained operating authority from the PSC but failed to do so. Judgment of conviction was entered on September 23, 1981, on each of the five counts, and Meredith was fined $1.00 on each count and was assessed court costs in the amount of $34.00.
Meredith presents the following issues for our review:
Meredith was found guilty of five counts of violating Indiana Code Section 8-2-7-31, which constitutes Class C infractions, Ind.Code Sec. 8-2-7-41(c) (1979), and which, at the times of their alleged commission, were punishable under Indiana Code Section 35-50-4-4 (1977) 3 by a fine of not more than $500 per infraction. It is firmly established that "every conviction must be supported by evidence upon each material element of the crime charged, and that evidence must support the essential conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt." Rosell v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 173, 174, 352 N.E.2d 750, 751. Accord Padgett v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 380 N.E.2d 96, 97. Because infractions, at the time of Meredith's alleged violations and subsequent trial, were punishable under our criminal code, Title 35 of the Indiana Code, the reasonable doubt standard was applicable to Meredith's prosecution. 4
An essential element of the infraction defined in Indiana Code Section 8-2-7-31 is that the motor vehicle be operated "without first having obtained appropriate operating authority from the commission so to do, ...." In the course of our review of the briefs and record to resolve the issues raised by Meredith, we have observed that there was no stipulation or other evidence presented at trial which tends to show that Meredith, in fact, operated his truck without having secured the appropriate operating authority. The stipulated facts speak only to the nature of Meredith's relationship with B & M, the manner in which he transported the coal, and the sources and destinations of the coal. None of these facts gives rise even to an inference that Meredith operated his truck without the appropriate authority. Although Meredith's legal arguments to the effect that he needed no such authority from the PSC would appear to be based on the assumption that he had no such authority, legal arguments cannot be substituted for evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence where the criminal liability of a person is at stake and, consequently, where the state has the burden of proving each material element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Our observation as to this deficiency in probative evidence does no violence to the rule that we cannot weigh the evidence on appeal. Pinkston v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 306, 310; Biggerstaff v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 621, 623. What we have discovered is a total lack of evidence on a material element of the offense.
Meredith has not raised on appeal the matter of the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction. However, we recognize the principle that some errors are so fundamental as to permit us to review them although they have not been properly raised. As this court said in Winston v. State, (1975) 165 Ind.App. 369, 373-76, 332 N.E.2d 229, 231-33, trans. denied :
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