Mergl v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 30 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-1335 |
| Parties | RYAN A. MERGL, ESQ. Plaintiff, v. THE HONORABLE DANIEL WALLACE; THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
This case centers on allegations that Defendants Daniel Wallace President Judge of the Mercer County (PA) Court of Common Pleas, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C § 794 in regard to Judge Wallace's judicial dealings with Plaintiff.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 10). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED, but without prejudice. Consistent with Third Circuit precedent, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint.
Plaintiff Ryan A. Mergl is an attorney licensed to practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1, at 1.) Defendants are the Honorable Daniel Wallace (“Wallace”), a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which is responsible for the administration of the Judicial Branch of the Commonwealth's government. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff says that he suffers from two ailments that form the basis of his discrimination claim against Defendants: diabetes mellitus and the aftereffects of a concussion that he suffered in July 2020. (Id. at 1-2.)
Plaintiff is a lawyer. That said, the definition of the claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert is not crisply clear. In the Court's estimation, Plaintiff has seemingly pled that five distinct incidents involving him and Wallace constitute discrimination or retaliation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, or both. The first three incidents are asserted to relate to Plaintiff's diabetes, and the second two incidents appear to relate primarily to Plaintiff's concussion. (See ECF No. 1, at 4-10.)
First, on February 11, 2020, Plaintiff “had a conflict in his calendar” because he reports that he was scheduled to be in three places at once: in the Courtroom of Judge Ronald D. Amrhein, also of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County; in the Courtroom of Wallace; and also in Magisterial District Court 3-52-01. (ECF No. 1, at 4.) On February 8, 2020, Plaintiff had contacted the chambers of Judge Amrhein and explained the conflict; Judge Amrhein then granted Plaintiff permission to appear late to his courtroom. (Id.) “Plaintiff inquired whether he should contact [] Wallace[] or if Judge Amrhein's chamber would contact [Wallace] . . . Judge Amrhein's assistant stated that she would notify [] Wallace.” (Id.)
After conducting his business in the other two courtrooms on February 11, 2020, Plaintiff then proceeded to Wallace's courtroom, where the scheduled judicial proceedings apparently took place as usual. (See id. at 5.) Wallace then “informed Plaintiff that he was not free to leave until Wallace addressed another matter with [him].” (Id.) Wallace then reprimanded Plaintiff for being late and directed him that-in the future-Plaintiff would need to request permission to be late from Wallace directly, in writing, at least 24 hours in advance. (Id.) Plaintiff then explained to Wallace that he suffers from diabetes mellitus, and “sometimes due to his disability he requires additional time to prepare in the mornings, and that he cannot plan for or control when he has complications from his disability.” (Id.) Plaintiff also told Wallace that “it would be a reasonable accommodation on those occasions that Plaintiff appear slightly late.” (Id.) Wallace responded that “a contempt hearing would still be scheduled,” and Plaintiff would be required to “prove” his disability to Wallace with “strong evidence.” (Id. at 6)
Second, a month later on March 11, 2020, Plaintiff had a similar conflict among courtrooms on his calendar. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a motion to continue[2] the proceeding he was to have in front of Wallace, which Wallace denied. (Id.) Plaintiff then arranged to have another qualified attorney represent his client at the hearing in front of Wallace. (Id.) Wallace then entered a Rule to Show Cause against Plaintiff, requiring Plaintiff to show cause why he (Plaintiff) should not be held in contempt for failure to personally appear. (Id.) Though Wallace held a hearing on June 22, 2020, he ultimately dismissed the Rule to Show Cause. (Id. at 7.) At that proceeding, Wallace indicated that he “was only taking these actions against Plaintiff to get Plaintiff to act like every other member of the Mercer County Bar.” (Id.)
The third incident took place after Plaintiff was struck by a car on July 9, 2020. (Id.) After the accident, Plaintiff suffered from blurred vision, headaches, memory problems, and other ailments, and as a result was advised to limit himself to a maximum of three hours of cognitive activity per day. (Id.) On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff participated in a status conference in front of Wallace. (Id. at 8.) At the end of the conference, Wallace stated that he had received a “disturbing email” that Plaintiff had requested a continuance of a hearing that was located over two hours away. (Id.) Wallace suggested that Plaintiff had acted inappropriately because he “appeared fine” to Wallace and stated that Plaintiff should be held in contempt for requesting a continuance due to his disability. (Id.) When Plaintiff attempted to explain his disability to Wallace, Wallace said, “I don't care” and left the courtroom. (Id.) Plaintiff then provided “all of the documentation of his disability” to Wallace via email. (Id.)
Fourth, on August 10, 2020, Plaintiff appeared before Wallace for a pretrial conference, where Wallace stated the Plaintiff must begin a two or three day trial, with approximately ten witnesses, the next day. (Id.) Plaintiff requested that the trial be continued thirty days to accommodate his disability. Wallace initially denied the request, stating that “Plaintiff did not have a disability.” (Id.) Plaintiff and Wallace then got into an unpleasant verbal exchange, in which Wallace questioned the documentation that Plaintiff had previously provided. (See id.) In that exchange, Wallace also allegedly made several comments such as that Plaintiff “would milk the disability for all it was worth;” that Plaintiff was “out of line” for requesting an accommodation; and that Plaintiff's client “should get his money back.” (See id. at 9.) Though Wallace stated that he would not accommodate Plaintiff until he provided satisfactory documentation of his disability (id. at 10), Plaintiff does not contest the Commonwealth's assertion that Wallace in fact granted the requested continuance. (See ECF No. 12 at 3, ECF No. 12-1, ECF No. 21)
Plaintiff's fifth and final allegation stems from a complaint that Plaintiff filed with the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). On August 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Wallace with DOJ asserting violations of Title II of the ADA. (ECF No. 1, at 10.) On September 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion with Wallace, requesting that Wallace recuse himself from all of Plaintiff's cases. (Id.) In response, Defendant Wallace took three actions that allegedly constitute retaliation: 1) he issued an Order of the Court without having a hearing, supposedly in violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Court; 2) he refused to recuse himself from all of Plaintiff's cases (thus requiring Plaintiff to continue to appear in front of him); and 3) he “subject[ed] Plaintiff to further discrimination.” (See id.) Wallace stated that he “would not recuse himself until [DOJ] ‘determine[s] it has authority to open an investigation'” and “provides written notice of the opening of the investigation.” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on September 21, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) The Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) and an accompanying Brief (ECF No. 12) on February 22, 2022. Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition (ECF No. 21) on March 28, 2022, and the time for Defendants to file a Reply expired on April 26, 2022 (see ECF No. 22). The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is therefore ripe for disposition.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all non-conclusory allegations in the complaint as true, and the non-moving party “must be given the benefit of every favorable inference.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992)). However, the Court “disregard[s] threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements.” Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp., 908 F.3d 872, 87879 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012)).
To state a plausible claim for relief, the non-moving party's factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and must do more than “plead[] facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting id. at 557). However, the nonmoving party “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Thompson v. Real Est. Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, ...
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