Meriden Record Co. v. Browning

• Decision Date: 30 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 633,294 A.2d 646
• Court: Connecticut Circuit Court
• Parties: The MERIDEN RECORD COMPANY v. Mildred O. BROWNING, Town Clerk and Registrar of Vital Statistics of the Town of Wallingford. 7-7112-18907.

Page 646

294 A.2d 646

6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 633

The MERIDEN RECORD COMPANY v. Mildred O. BROWNING, Town Clerk and Registrar of Vital

Statistics of the Town of Wallingford.

No. CV 7-7112-18907.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Seventh Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1971.

Joseph M. Delaney, Wallingford, for plaintiff.

Peter E. Greene, Waterbury, for defendant.

JACOBS, Judge.

This is an appeal from the denial to the plaintiff, pursuant to § 1-20 of the General Statutes, ¹ of an order directing the defendant to issue to the plaintiff a certified copy of the death record of Norman J. LaFreniere. ² The defendant denied access to the death record 'because the death record and certificate is a medical file and is not a public record under § 1-19 of the General Statutes.' The commissioner of health construes the pertinent portion of § 1-19 to mean that disclosure of medical files as a death record 'would constitute an invasion of personal privacy . . . (and they are not) deemed public records.' ³ The commissioner further states that (a)mong the causes of death sometimes mentioned are references to syphilis, miscarriages, cancer, tuberculosis, alcoholism and other matters which at least some people would feel constitute an invasion of privacy,' and that '(f)or these reasons we have always made a practice not to consider the diagnosis of cause of death a public record which is open for public inspection.'

Our first inquiry is whether a newspaper has an interest sufficient to create a right of inspection. 'It has been held that the editor and publisher of a newspaper has such a special interest, one sufficient to create a right to inspect . . . and one sufficient to enable him to maintain suit in his own name where that need exists.' Cross, The People's Right to Know, p. 56. ⁴ It goes without saying that 'the inspection must be for a purpose that is not improper.' Ibid. The court concludes that the statutory language used in § 1-19, 'every resident of the state,' is sufficiently broad in its scope to include the appellant newspaper. See Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 118 Or. 105, 244 P. 868. Also, it should be pointed out that the defendant, as the town clerk and registrar of vital statistics, does not claim, as indeed she cannot, that she stands in the decedent's shoes and asserts in his behalf an invasion of his right of privacy.

The right of a citizen to inspect public writings has its origin in the common law. In State ex rel. Holloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490, 497, 67 P.2d 838, 841, the rule was stated in this way: 'At common law every person was entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, including legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest therein such as to enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the documents or records sought could furnish evidence or necessary information.' See 76 C.J.S. Records § 35; 45 Am.Jur., Records and Recording Laws, §§ 14, 15, 16, 17. The common-law right to inspect public records has been incorporated into Connecticut's 'right to know' law. General Statutes § 1-19.

Apart from the statutory exceptions to public inspections of public records and documents created by § 1-19, there are exceptions which, by their very nature, are not absolute but are subject to an implied rule of reason. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this opinion to attempt to list or catalogue the situations in which harm to the public interest would justify refusal to permit inspection. It is a subject which must be left to case-by-case decision. In short, there may be '(r)evelations . . . so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency.' Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 806, 809.

' The resolution of the question as to whether issuing the death certificate to the petitioning newspapers is (for) a . . . ('just and proper cause') under the statute (§ 1-20) must depend here, as in each case, upon its own peculiar circumstances. In balancing the community's right to be informed by the news media with the discretionary power of public officials to refuse to release public records, certain criteria may be formulated. It appears to this court that the public's right to know should be subject to only those matters which have a news value or are of public interest of a legitimate kind. . . . Even the ordinary citizen may be newsworthy under certain circumstances. Whether the event be a calamity or an honor, it may be one in which his neighbors have a legitimate interest.' Matter of Rome Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt, 43 Misc.2d 598, 599, 252 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (death certificate ordered disclosed to newspaper). "It is the job of the Press to provide news, but not to poke and pry into things a person can rightfully and decently wish to keep to himself." Neill, 'The Protection of Privacy,' 25 Modern L.Rev. 393, 401.

Reverting once again to the New York Supreme Court case, Matter of Rome Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt, supra, the petitioning newspapers claimed that they were entitled to the death certificate of George L. Heim 'since the circumstances of death were newsworthy and they allege that the concealment of the facts concerning the cause of death gave rise in the community to false rumors as to the circumstances of death.' On the other hand, the defendants claimed that 'refusal to issue the death certificate was not arbitrary or capricious, but, within their discretionary power, and that their determination that the request by the petitioners was not for a proper purpose should not be disturbed by the courts.' This court, as in State v. Mayo, 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 511, 236 A.2d 342, does not construe the protective language of our statutes 'as granting a public body a carte blanche right . . . without showing that such a protection of the records being shielded from scrutiny . . . (is) vital to public security.' Bzozowski v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 107 N.J.Super. 467, 473, 259 A.2d 231 (citing ...