Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox

Decision Date01 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 29A02-8809-CV-327,29A02-8809-CV-327
Citation541 N.E.2d 959
PartiesMERIDIAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. David M. COX, Bryan Keith Johnson, Dorothy M. Stout, Forrest Stout, Janet B. Shostrand, and William Brummett, Executor of the Estate of Thelma Brummett, Deceased, Appellees (Defendants), Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, Intervenor.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Robert L. Hartley, Jr., Martin Wade Hartley & Hollingsworth, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Lawrence McTurnan, McTurnan Meyer & Cadwell, R. Stephen Hansell, Beech Bank, Indianapolis, for appellees.

BUCHANAN, Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. (Meridian) appeals from the entry of summary judgment against it, claiming the trial court erred when it determined David M. Cox (Cox) was not excluded from coverage by its insurance policy.

We affirm.

FACTS

The facts most favorable to the non-moving party reveal that on June 1, 1986, Cox took his parents' automobile without permission and later had an accident, injuring several other people and killing one.

At that time, Cox's parents were covered by an insurance policy issued by Meridian. The policy contained the following provision:

"As used in this section only, "insured person " or "insured persons " mean:

1. You or a family member.

2. A person using your insured auto.

3. Any other person or organization with respect only to legal liability for acts or omissions of:

a. a person covered under this section while using your insured auto; or

b. you or a family member covered under this section while using an auto or utility trailer other than your insured auto if the auto or utility trailer is not owned or hired by that person or organization.

However, no person shall be considered an insured person if the person uses an auto without a reasonable belief of having permission to use the auto."

Record at 15-16. This emphasis appears in the original policy issued to Cox's parents.

On December 1, 1986, Meridian filed suit seeking declaratory relief that Cox was not covered by the insurance policy pursuant to above mentioned policy provision. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. (Shelter) interevened, and Meridian moved for summary judgment on May 6, 1987, asserting it was not liable under the policy. Shelter filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on October 29, 1987. After a hearing on December 15, 1987, the trial court entered summary judgment against Meridian.

ISSUE

The following issue is presented for our review:

Whether the trial court erred when it determined Cox was not excluded by the policy provision?

DECISION

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Meridian asserts that the word "person" is unambiguous, and because Cox is a person, the policy provision clearly excludes coverage for the damage caused by the unauthorized use of the car. Shelter responds that the provision is ambiguous because it distinguishes between "persons" and "family members" and can reasonably be interpreted as excluding only non-family members.

CONCLUSION--The trial court properly interpreted the policy provision.

The trial court did not err when it determined Cox was covered by Meridian's insurance policy. In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we will apply the same standard that the trial court applies; summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Warrum (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 1207.

The provisions of an insurance contract are subject to the same rules of interpretation and construction as are other contract terms, and summary judgment based upon the construction of a contract is a determination, as a matter of law, that the contract is not so ambiguous that resort must be made to extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the contract's meaning. Sharp v. Indiana Union Mut. Ins. Co. (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 237, trans. denied.

If an insurance contract is found to be ambiguous, it will be strictly construed against the insurer who drafted the contract. Comprehensive Health Ins. Ass'n v. Dye (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 505. An insurance contract will be ambiguous only if reasonable persons upon reading the contract would differ as to the meaning of its terms, and an ambiguity is not established simply because controversy exists, and one party's interpretation of the contract is contrary to that asserted by the opposing party. Sharp, supra.

Shelter contends that the use of "family member" and "person" in the contract provision in question creates an ambiguity. Shelter reads the provision as distinguishing between "family members" and "persons" so that the exclusion portion of the provision applies only to persons other than family members....

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27 cases
  • Hartford Ins Co. of the Midwest v. Halt
    • United States
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    ...though he might be a person using the automobile without a reasonable belief that he was entitled to do so (see, Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 541 N.E.2d 959 [Ind.App.]; Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kubik, 142 Ill.App.3d 906 , 492 N.E.2d 504). The terms of the policy are at least ambiguous, ......
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    ...1351, 1353, trans. denied. Insurance contracts found to be ambiguous are strictly construed against the insurer. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox (1989), Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 959, trans. denied. Here, while the contract contains specific provisions for recovery by the mortgagee under the stand......
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    ...found ambiguity in their policies' creation of two distinct classes, "family members" and "any person." See Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 541 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (holding that "any person" exclusion did not preclude coverage of a family member, insureds' son, who took vehicle......
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    ...the insurer and liberally construed in favor of the insured. Miller v. Dilts (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 257; Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cox (1989), Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 959. Thus we must examine the policy and rider in question for ambiguity. The following provisions are Policy Provisio......
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