Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC

• Decision Date: 02 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 04-5504.
• Citation: 515 F.Supp.2d 509
• Parties: MERISANT COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. McNEIL NUTRITIONALS, LLC, and McNeil-PPC, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Page 509

515 F.Supp.2d 509

MERISANT COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. McNEIL NUTRITIONALS, LLC, and McNeil-PPC, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 04-5504.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

March 2, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Abraham C. Reich, Gregory B. Williams, Beth Lillian Domenick, Fox Rothschild O'Brien & Frankel LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Gregg F. Locascio, Jeffrey G. Landis, Jonathan Daniel Brightbill, Karen M. Robinson, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, Thomas M. Monagan, III, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Alfred W. Putnam, Jr., David J. Kessler, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Brian N. Lasky, Clay J. Pierce, Jeffrey D. Rotenberg, Jennifer L. Higgins, Steven A. Zalesin, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

Memorandum and Order

GENE E.K. PRATTER, District Judge.

Merisant Company, Inc. ("Merisant") alleges that McNeil Nutritionals, LLC and McNeil-PPC, Inc. engaged in false and misleading advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and in violation of the Pennsylvania common law of unfair competition. The parties have engaged in extensive discovery activities, leading to their submission of various summary judgment motions as well as dueling Daubert motions. Specifically, the McNeil parties have filed a motion for summary judgment, and Merisant moves for partial summary judgment seeking to preclude McNeil from presenting an affirmative defense of "unclean hands." In addition, Merisant and McNeil have each filed a motion alleging that testimony from one or more of the opposing party's expert witnesses is inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny. McNeil filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. James Fisher, and Merisant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Steven Munger.¹ For the reasons detailed below, the Merisant motion concerning the unclean hands defense will be granted; the remainder of these specific motions will be denied.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following factual background appears in the parties' respective, very thorough Statements of Facts presented in their Motions.

Merisant is a privately held company that manufactures premium brands of artificial sweeteners, including Equal,² Nutra-Sweet and Canderel. Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 1, 5. The sweetening ingredient in Equal is aspartame. Id. ¶¶ 2, 13; McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 3. The other ingredients in Equal are dextrose and maltodextrin. Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶ 13.

McNeil Nutritionals, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania. Compl. ¶ 7. McNeil-PPC, Inc. is a New Jersey corporation with a principal place of business in Skillman, New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 8. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC and McNeil-PPC, Inc. (collectively, "McNeil") market and distribute an artificial sweetener under the brand name Splenda. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 4. The sweetening ingredient in Splenda is sucralose. Id. Sucralose is an artificial sweetening ingredient that is made through a process that begins with sucrose, i.e., sugar, and then replaces three of eight hydroxyl groupings on the sucrose molecule with three chlorine atoms. Id. ¶ 5. The other ingredients in Splenda are maltodextrin and dextrose. Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶ 17. Unaltered sugar/sucrose is not an ingredient in Splenda. Id. Conversely, Splenda does not contain unaltered sugar/sucrose. Id.

The artificial sweetener industry has long considered concerns from consumers regarding the taste and health safety of artificial sweeteners. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 12-14; Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶ 36. In response to these concerns, manufacturers of artificial sweeteners have attempted to avoid using certain language, such as the term "artificial," that may convey negative taste or health safety concerns. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 15. Instead, companies in the industry, including Merisant and McNeil, employ the term "no-calorie sweetener" to describe their various artificial sweetener products. Some manufacturers seek to position their products as "like" sugar, for example, by using imagery and language evocative of sugar in their advertising and marketing materials. Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 36-38; McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 16-21. Artificial sweetener companies use the phrase "tastes like sugar" to advertise and market their artificial sweeteners. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 21. Indeed, advertisements for artificial sweetener products often associate artificial sweeteners or their ingredients with items that occur in nature such as fruit, meat, grains or vegetables. Id. ¶¶ 22-30.

The Food and Drug Administration first approved sucralose for use as a food additive in 1998; and, in 1999, the approval was expanded to permit the use of sucralose as a general purpose sweetener. Id. ¶ 32. McNeil first introduced Splenda products for sale on a limited basis in April 1999, and, in September 2000, McNeil launched Splenda in retail stores throughout the United States. Id. ¶ 33.

McNeil has devoted substantial time, money and resources — approximately $235 million in advertising and promotional materials from 2000 to 2006 — in an effort to create and develop a "unique brand identity" for Splenda. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. McNeil "has worked to establish a brand identity for Splenda that capitalized upon the unique sugar origins and sugar-like taste of the product." Id. ¶ 47. The exterior product packaging for all Splenda products sold in the United States since September 2000 have included a logo stating that Splenda is: "MADE FROM SUGAR, TASTES LIKE SUGAR." Id. ¶ 49. Similarly, all Splenda No Calorie Sweetener individual serving packets in the United States include the phrase that Splenda is "MADE FROM SUGAR SO IT TASTES LIKE SUGAR." Id. ¶ 50. Since September 2000, all television commercials and print advertisements for Splenda has included the tagline "made from sugar so it tastes like sugar" or "Splenda tastes like sugar because it's made from sugar." Id. ¶¶ 51-52. Splenda is now the leading no-calorie sweetener, based on dollar sales, in the United States. Id. ¶ 44.

Merisant was aware of Splenda's "made from sugar, tastes like sugar" tagline on or around the September 2000 launch of Splenda. Id. ¶ 62. Merisant admits to being aware of Splenda's tagline in 2000. Merisant's Response ¶¶ 62-64. Merisant contends that as of that time, it had not conducted any research to determine whether Splenda's "made from sugar, tastes like sugar" tagline was misleading to consumers. Id. Instead, Merisant concluded that the "reasonable course was to raise the concerns with McNeil informally and attempt to resolve them outside the courtroom." Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶ 151.

In April 2002, Arnold Donald, Merisant's then-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, sent a letter to Colin Watts, McNeil's then-President, expressing Merisant's concerns regarding Splenda's marketing campaign. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 64; Merisant's Response ¶¶ 62-64. Mr. Donald wrote that in his view the Splenda tagline is "inherently false" because there was not a "causal relationship between the original sugar molecule and the resulting sugar-like taste of the sucralose molecule." McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 65. Mr. Donald wrote further that "stating that Splenda is made from sugar implied to consumers that Splenda is more natural and less artificial than competitive sugar substitutes." Id. ¶ 66. Merisant claims that, at the time of the letter, Mr. Donald did not have any data to support his personal beliefs about Splenda's claims. Merisant's Response ¶¶ 62-64.

In May 2002, Mr. Watts responded to Mr. Donald to express his disagreement with Merisant's suggestion that McNeil was promoting Splenda in a false or misleading manner. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 70. In his letter to Mr. Donald, Mr. Watts wrote that the claim "SPLENDA no calorie sweetener is made from sugar so it tastes like sugar" does not "falsely imply that SPLENDA is more natural than competitive sugar substitutes." 2d K. Clark Decl. Ex 105 at 1-2. In particular, Mr. Watts wrote:

SPLENDA never has been promoted as "natural." It is identified as a "no calorie sweetener" in all advertising and promotional materials that mention its sugar origin. This generic discriptor clearly indicates to the consumer that the product is in the category of artificial sweeteners. Moreover, the claim is not comparative, so there is no reason to believe that consumers will perceive an implied claim that SPLENDA is more natural than other sugar substitutes.

Id. at 2. The parties exchanged further correspondence in late 2003 relating to Merisant's concerns over Splenda's marketing and brand positioning. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 72-73.

Slightly more than four years after Splenda's launch in the United States, Merisant concluded in the fall of 2004 that there was a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding Splenda's advertising. Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶ 189. On October 22, 2004, Merisant sent a letter to the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (the "NAD") challenging McNeil's advertising for Splenda. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 75; Merisant's Statement of Facts ¶¶ 189. McNeil did notrespond directly to Merisant's NAD challenge. Rather, on November 18, 2004, McNeil filed a complaint against Merisant in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking a declaratory judgment that McNeil's advertising and marketing for Splenda was not false or misleading. McNeil's Statement of Facts ¶ 76.

One week later, Merisant filed its Complaint in this action. McNeil subsequently consented to the dismissal of its complaint in the Puerto Rico action. Id. ¶...