Meriwether v. Publishers: George Knapp & Co.

Decision Date05 June 1906
Citation120 Mo. App. 354,97 S.W. 257
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
PartiesMERIWETHER v. PUBLISHERS: GEORGE KNAPP & CO.

After defendant had published a libelous article charging plaintiff with being a political co-worker with B., plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant, purporting to contain a truthful statement of his political activities, and an argument that he was not guilty of the charge made in the publications. The letter contained a statement that plaintiff had refused to consent to the placing of the names of Democratic nominees for the Supreme Court on the Public Ownership ticket, because they had declared the Constitution itself unconstitutional in order to nail up the ballot boxes, and thus cover evidence of frauds in the municipal election." Held, that the falsity of such charge did not render the entire letter false as a matter of law, under the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," the question whether the letter or the libel spoke the truth in regard to the matters in controversy being for the jury.

4. SAME—DEFENSE—TRUTH IN JUSTIFICATION.

In an action for libel proof of the truth of a part only of the charge will not constitute a complete defense.

5. SAME—INSTRUCTIONS.

A libel published concerning plaintiff branded him as a liar, a trickster, and an ally politically of B. The court charged that if plaintiff recovered, the jury should assess such damages as would fully compensate plaintiff for the injury, if any, sustained by reason of the publication, considering the publication of the libel, its probable effect on plaintiff's reputation, if any, considering his standing and repute in the community, the mortification, if any, to plaintiff's feelings, the distress of mind, etc. The jury had been previously charged that it was not sufficient for defendant to prove the truth of merely a portion of the statements, and that if they found that defendant failed to prove the truth of any statement in the publication complained of which was false and a libel, plaintiff was entitled to recover. Held, that the instruction on the issue of damages was not objectionable as authorizing the jury to find damages for the publication of the libel as a whole, though defendant might have established justification as to a part thereof.

6. SAME—VERDICT—EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

Plaintiff in an action for libel sued for $5,000 actual and $5,000 exemplary damages. The court submitted two forms of verdict in favor of plaintiff—one providing for recovery of actual damages alone, and the other for the recovery of both actual and punitive damages, separately stated. The jury returned a verdict using the form for actual damages, only finding for plaintiff for actual damages, and assessing his recovery at $5,000. Held, that such verdict could not be considered as containing any punitive damages.

7. SAME—INSTRUCTIONS—MODIFICATION.

In an action for libel, involving plaintiff's political transactions, defendant requested an instruction that, if plaintiff while a candidate for mayor, representing the Public Ownership Party, received financial contributions in aid of his campaign from Republicans who were supporting a candidate of their own party, and who were contributing to plaintiff's campaign fund because they believed that his candidacy was in its effect detrimental to that of the Democratic nominee, and plaintiff did not publicly acknowledge such contributions and relations with the Republicans, defendant had a right to characterize him as a "trickster in politics." The court struck out the words "characterize him as a trickster in politics," and inserted in lieu thereof "criticise plaintiff therefor," and, as thus modified, gave the instruction. The report of the receiving of the campaign contribution was misleading, but it was not shown that plaintiff made the report. Held, that the modification of the instruction was justified.

8. SAME.

Where a libel charged plaintiff with being presently associated with B., an instruction that if prior to the publication of the libel plaintiff has been associated politically with B., and had accepted his aid and co-operation in the attainment of his political purpose, then defendant was entitled to criticise plaintiff as B.'s ally and associate, was properly modified by adding a proviso, "if defendant in good faith believed that such association continued and existed at the time the criticism was made."

9. SAME.

In an action for libel, an instruction authorizing a verdict for plaintiff if the jury found any portion of the publication to be both untrue and libelous was proper.

10. SAME—DAMAGES—EXCESSIVENESS.

Where defendant charged plaintiff in a newspaper publication with being a political trickster and an associate of B., who had been previously denounced as a man of vile and criminal character, a verdict awarding plaintiff $5,000 damages was not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice.

11. TRIAL—JURY—ACTS OF THIRD PERSONS.

Pending trial of an action for libel, plaintiff's mother, in the hearing of a juror, asked plaintiff if he thought that the jury would decide the case that day. Plaintiff checked her, telling her that the gentleman was a juror, and went into the courthouse. The mother testified that she did not know the juryman, and had no idea that he was a juryman, and another witness, who was a juror, testified that she asked him how he thought the case would go, to which he replied that he was on the jury, and that justice would be done. He testified that the conversation made no impression on his mind, and had nothing to do with the verdict. Held, that such misconduct was insufficient to vitiate a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lincoln County; James D. Barnett, Judge.

Action by Lee Meriwether against Publishers: George Knapp & Co. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Omitting caption, the petition is as follows: "Plaintiff says that defendant did on January 20, 1902, February 1, 1902, February 3, 1902, March 15, 1902, May 19, 1902, September 24, 1902, and on divers other dates between January 1, 1902, and September 28, 1902, publish in its said newspaper, the St. Louis Republic, in its issues of said dates, numerous articles strongly denunciatory of one Edward Butler, a prominent St. Louis politician, whom it persistently and continuously held up to the public in said articles as a criminal, a perverter of the young, a villain twice indicted by the grand jury for attempted bribery, a criminal without shame, so covered with moral slime as to contaminate any man associated with him. And having thus persistently advertised the said Butler as the synonym of all that is vile, dishonest, corrupt, and criminal, defendant did on February 17, 1902 September 25, 1902, and on divers other dates in the year 1902 prior to September 27, 1902, publish in its said newspaper of said dates articles declaring that plaintff was a friend, associate, co-worker, and ally of said Butler, and that plaintiff was working under the management of said Butler. In order, partly, at least, to undo the great damage done to him by defendant's said publications, coupling plaintiff with a man advertised by defendant throughout the city of St. Louis and the state of Missouri as a man of vile and criminal character, plaintiff sent defendant a letter setting forth the true facts, and showing the falsity of defendant's statement that plaintiff was working with the said Edward Butler. Plaintiff's letter, which the court's ruling heretofore made on defendant's motion requires to be stated in this petition, was in words and figures as follows, to wit: `St. Louis, Mo. September 25th. Editor Republic—Sir: Your paper to-day states editorally, as well as in its news columns, that Col. Edward Butler visited me at my office yesterday "in connection with a scheme to split the Democrats." It is true that Col. Butler called on me, but the purpose of his call, so far from being to split the Democrats, was, if possible, to induce me to assent to a plan that would add to the Democratic chances of success next November. Col. Butler stated that he came direct from Mr. Rothwell, state chairman of the Democratic Party, and that he was commissioned to inquire if some arrangement could not be affected whereby the Democratic supreme judge nominees could be placed on the Public Ownership ticket. I informed Col. Butler that, according to our view, the Democratic Supreme Court, in declaring the Constitution itself unconstitutional, in order to nail up the ballot boxes, and thus cover all evidence of the frauds perpetrated at the last municipal election, had forfeited the right to claim support from any true Democrat; consequently that under no circumstances could I bring myself to advocate the election of the supreme judge nominees. Thereupon Col. Butler went away, returning again later with the statement that he had held another conference with Chairman Rothwell and also with Hon. J. M. Seibert, and this...

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