Merker v. Miami-Dade County Fla.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-21652CIV.,06-21652CIV.
• Citation: 485 F.Supp.2d 1349
• Parties: Manuel MERKER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Muriel Merker, deceased, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of Decedent's lawful survivor, to wit; Manuel Merker, surviving husband, Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY FLORIDA, a Political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

485 F.Supp.2d 1349

Manuel MERKER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Muriel Merker, deceased, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of Decedent's lawful survivor, to wit; Manuel Merker, surviving husband, Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY FLORIDA, a Political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant.

No. 06-21652CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

April 27, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Erica S. Zaron, Craig E. Leen, and Eric K. Gressman, of record for Miami-Dade County.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S ADA CLAIM AND REMANDING STATE WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM TO STATE COURT

SEITZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment [DE-24] and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DE-22]. Plaintiff Manuel Merker ("Plaintiff') initially filed this case in the state circuit court against Defendant Miami-Dade County ("Defendant" or "County") after his wife was thrown from her wheelchair while riding aboard a County bus. She subsequently died. The case originated as a one-count wrongful death action. Plaintiffs wife was not wearing a lap belt or shoulder harness to keep her in the wheelchair and Plaintiff alleged that the County was negligent in not equipping the bus with proper restraints. The case was tried to a jury verdict in Plaintiff's favor in state court. On remand after the appellate court affirmed the trial court's post-trial rulings granting a new trial on certain damages, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add a claim for compensatory damages and attorneys fee under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Defendant thereafter removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction.

Defendant now moves for judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs ADA claim on three distinct grounds. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs wife is not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because the specific allegation of discrimination — the failure to provide a proper seat belt or shoulder harness — arises from her obesity, not the fact that she was confined to a wheelchair. Any discrimination for failing to provide proper restraints in this case does not arise from a qualified disability because the courts have uniformly held that obesity, absent some physiological cause, does not qualify as a disability under the ADA. Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs ADA cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Third, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has no evidence that any discrimination on the County's part was intentional, as required to recover compensatory damages under the ADA. Based upon the Court's review of the record and the pertinent legal authorities, there are no material factual disputes with respect to the first two grounds raised by Defendants and the undisputed record shows that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these grounds. Accordingly, judgment in Defendant's favor on Plaintiffs ADA claim will be entered.

Having dismissed the ADA claim — which is the only federal claim at issue in the case and the sole basis for the Court's jurisdiction — and given the unique issues of state law involved in the wrongful death claim and related defenses, as well as the fact that the case was already tried once in state court, the Court declines to exercise any supplemental jurisdiction over the state cause of action and therefore remands it to the state circuit court for further proceedings.¹

I. Factual Background

In the words of the Florida Third District Court of Appeal:

The instant case arose from an accident involving a County transit bus upon which Ms. Merker was riding. Ms. Merker was wheelchair bound and rode the County transit bus to get to and from her job. The evidence reflects that on the day in question Ms. Merker's wheelchair was latched to the bus but that she was not wearing a bus lap belt. Instead, Ms. Merker was secured only by her wheelchair belt strap. The trial testimony reflects that a vehicle cut the transit bus off, forcing the bus driver to utilize the emergency brake. As a result of the sudden stop, Ms. Merker was thrown from her wheelchair, and sustained multiple fractures to her lower extremities. Ms. Merker was immediately taken to the hospital, and remained there for several months with additional medical conditions. Ultimately, Ms. Merker expired.

Mr. Merker brought a Wrongful Death action against the County, claiming that the County's negligence, in failing to assure that Ms. Merker was strapped by the bus lap belt, was the legal cause of Ms. Merker's death. At trial, evidence was presented that the bus was cut-off by another, unknown driver, forcing the bus to make the sudden stop which caused Ms. Merker to be ejected from her seat. Additionally, conflicting evidence was presented on the issue relating to the lap belt, i.e., whether Ms. Merker declined to wear the County bus lap belt or whether the County bus lap belt did not fit and the County was aware that the bus driver previously requested a lap belt extension. The jury heard conflicting testimony from several experts regarding the cause of Ms. Merker's death. Most agreed, however, that the major contributing factor to Ms. Merker's cause of death was respiratory failure. The jury returned a verdict against the County, finding the County 100 percent negligent and specifically finding that neither Ms. Merker nor the second driver contributed to the negligence.

Miami-Dade County v. Merker, 907 So.2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).²

II. Legal Standards

Judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scott v. Taylor, 405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005). In ruling on such a motion, the Court must accept the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. As such, a motion for judgment on the pleadings operates much like a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Karedes v. Ackerley Group, Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir.2005) ("The test for evaluating a [motion for judgment on the pleadings] is the same as that applicable to a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).") (citation and quotation omitted); see also 5C Wright & Miler, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.3d § 1368 (2007).

Summary judgment, under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of showing the Court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the initial burden is met, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Indeed, a mere "scintilla" of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; instead, there must be a sufficient showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990).

In assessing whether the parties have met their respective burdens, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in the non-movant's favor. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir.2001). However, "[i]f the nonmoving party fails to `make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] bears the burden of proof,' then the court must enter summary judgment for the moving party." Id. at 1181 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

III. Discussion

A. Disability

As part of her prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that his wife was a qualified individual with a disability and that she was discriminated against in the receipt of public services on the basis of that disability. Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir.2001). Defendant argues that judgment in its favor is warranted because Plaintiff's discrimination claim is founded on his wife's obesity, which is not a qualifying disability. Because obesity is generally not a qualifying disability, except in the rare case where such condition is shown to be the result of a physiological disorder (and there is no evidence in the record to bring her claim within the exception), any discrimination against Plaintiffs wife due to the lack of a large enough safety belt cannot form the basis of an actionable ADA claim.

"Disability" is defined under the ADA as a "physiological or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a). Courts have uniformly held that obesity is not a qualifying impairment, or disability, unless it is shown to be the result of a physiological disorder. See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d...