Merriam v. The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company
Decision Date | 25 May 1908 |
Citation | 111 S.W. 876,132 Mo.App. 247 |
Parties | JOHN F. MERRIAM et al., Respondents, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.--Hon. Chesley A. Mosman, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT.--"This is a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from laying a spur track in an unpaved alley twenty feet wide, running north and south through blocks 42 and 43 in Patee's addition to the city of St. Joseph. The relief is asked upon the grounds:
The ordinance omitting the title and ordaining clause, about which no question is made is as follows:
The court found that the ordinance had not been legally passed and was void; and that it contained no regulation at all of the use the defendant might make of its track and thereby left to the defendant to determine for itself what use it would so make of it. Section 2, of the Laws of 1903, p. 69 creating the present common council of the city of St. Joseph, provides that, "the legislative power of all cities of the second class shall be vested in a municipal assembly to be known as the common council of the city of , which shall consist of as many members as there are wards in the city, one to be elected from each ward by the qualified voters of the city at large for a term of four years, and until their successors are elected and qualified, and a president who shall also be elected in the same manner and for the same term of office."
Section 3, of the act, provides:
"The president so to be elected shall preside over all meetings of the common council, but shall not vote, except in cases of a tie, in which case he shall cast the deciding vote."
Section 5, provides that "no bill shall become an ordinance unless on its final passage a majority of all the members vote in its favor and the vote shall be taken by yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for and against the same shall be entered on the journal, and no bill not passed in conformity with the foregoing requirements shall be valid, but shall be absolutely void and of no legal effect whatever."
Judgment affirmed.
Brown & Dolman for appellant.
(1) The ordinance was passed in strict conformity to the statute and is a valid ordinance. (2) The president is therefore expressly constituted a member of the council, although with limited powers, as the following sections of the act demonstrate. State ex rel. v. Yates, 37 L. R. A. 205; Dreifus v. Lonergan, 73 Mo.App. 343; State v. Meier, 143 Mo. 439, 444; In re Brearton, 89 N.Y.S. 893; People v. Harshaw, 60 Mich. 200; Sedgwick, Stat. and Const. Law, 533; Cotton Mills v. Commissioners, 13 S.E. 273; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 183; Zeiler v. Railway, 84 Md. 304; Potter v. Safford, 50 Mich. 46; North Platte v. Water Co., 56 Neb. 403; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 256; quoting Hadley v. Perks, L. R. 1 Q. B. 457; In re Brearton, 89 N.Y.S. 893; United States v. Balin, 144 U.S. 9; Atty. Gen. v. Shepard, 62 N.H. 384; 23 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 592.
Kendall B. Randolph for respondents.
(1) In McQuillin, Municipal Ordinances, page 169, we find the following language: "But where the act must be done by a distinct proportion" of all...
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