Merrifield v. Clark

• Decision Date: 13 January 1925
• Docket Number: No. 36107.,36107.
• Citation: 201 N.W. 563,199 Iowa 171
• Parties: MERRIFIELD v. CLARK ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

199 Iowa 171

201 N.W. 563

MERRIFIELD

v.CLARK ET AL.

No. 36107.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 13, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; Robert H. Munger, Judge.

Action in equity to quiet title in plaintiff to 200 acres of land in Woodbury county, Iowa, alleged to have been given to him by the defendant under the terms of a parol gift. Decree for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Griffin, Griffin & Griffin, of Sioux City, for appellant.

Prichard & Prichard, of Onawa, and Pendleton & Browning, of Sioux City, for appellees.

DE GRAFF, J.

The plaintiff alleges that in 1912 he acquired title to the land in controversy by virtue of an oral gift to him from the defendant; that the plaintiff is a nephew of the defendant and has lived with him since early childhood and worked on the land described; that at the time of said alleged oral gift the said defendant told the plaintiff that it was his land and directed him to move upon and take possession of the land as soon as the then existing lease had expired, which would be in the spring of 1913; that plaintiff, pursuant to said oral gift, moved upon said land in accordance with the directions of the defendant and took possession thereof, placed valuable improvements thereon, used, occupied, and cultivated the land, and that he leased a part of said premises and collected the rent therefor, all with the knowledge, consent, and approval of the defendant; that ever since said oral gift the plaintiff has been in possession of the land, but that the defendant during the temporary absence of the plaintiff entered upon the premises and took forcible and unlawful possession thereof, ordered the tenants of the plaintiff to discontinue the cultivation of the land, and is now attempting to hold possession as against the right of the plaintiff; that the defendant claims some title to the premises by reason of the fact that no written conveyance has been recorded conveying the land to the plaintiff.

By way of answer and cross-petition the defendants deny the allegations of plaintiff's petition, except that they admit that plaintiff claims some interest in the land, and allege that the defendant Washington L. Clark is the absolute owner thereof; and defendants further allege that there has been an adjudication of the issues involved, and that plaintiff is estopped and barred by such former adjudication. By way of cross-petition, the defendant Washington L. Clark claims to be the absolute owner of said property and asks that the title in fee be quieted in him.

There was a trial on the issues, and decree was entered dismissing plaintiff's petition upon two grounds: (1) That the action was barred by the former adjudication, and (2) that plaintiff had failed to sustain the allegationsof his petition by preponderance of the evidence. The court further found and determined that the allegations of the cross-petition were true, and quieted the title in the defendant Clark, and entered judgment against the plaintiff for costs.

It will be seen, therefore, that the questions triable de novo in this court are two in number: First, is the former adjudication in the case of Merrifield v. Clark, 185 N. W. 594, decided by this court December 15, 1921, an adjudication of the issues involved in the case at bar to such an extent that the plaintiff in this suit is bound thereby; and, second, has the plaintiff produced evidence outweighing the evidence of the defendants, and sufficiently clear, cogent, and convincing to justify the court in holding that the oral gift was in fact made?

[1] The primary issue in the former case and in the case at bar is whether title should be quieted in the appellant Merrifield or the appellee Clark. It is true that in the former case title was sought to be quieted in appellant by virtue of a written instrument, to wit, a warranty deed, with certain restrictions. It was held that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the court in deciding the issue of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, mainly on the ground that the evidence did not establish that the deed had ever been delivered. We are now confronted with the question whether or not our holding in that case that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree quieting the title in him constitutes an adjudication of his rights now claimed under the instant petition. We have heretofore held that a party seeking to quiet title in a parcel of land alleged by him to belong to him must present all of his claims, and the bases thereof at one hearing, and if the adjudication is against him therein, it is res judicata, and constitutes a bar in a second trial to quiet title based on a different ground.

In Des Moines & Fort Dodge Ry. Co. v. Bullard, 89 Iowa, 749, 56 N. W. 498, we said:

“That was a trial of the title of the land, and we will dispose of much that is found in the record in this case by the single remark that the adjudication in the former action disposed of all claim of title which E. F. Bullard had in the land. He was the plaintiff in the action, and neither he, nor those claiming under him, had any right to commence an action upon one claim of title, and pursue it to the end of final adjudication, as that case was pursued, and then set up other causes of action in another suit, or by way of defense to an action brought by the defendant in the former action; in other words, it was incumbent on E. F. Bullard to assert all the claim he had to the land in the former action. This rule is fundamental, and we have neither the time nor inclination to elaborate it.”

[2] Upon the former trial of the instant action the right to have the title quieted was based on a written deed, but the evidence was not sufficient to show delivery. In this case plaintiff seeks to quiet title in himself by virtue of an alleged parol gift executed in 1912. By an amendment to his petition he alleges that the defendant stated at divers times from 1913 to 1918 that defendant did give the land to the plaintiff; that in the spring of 1918 the...