Merrill v. Jansma

• Decision Date: 18 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-205.,02-205.
• Citation: Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, 86 P.3d 270 (Wyo. 2004)
• Parties: Sue A. MERRILL, Appellant (Defendant), v. Alvina JANSMA, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

86 P.3d 270

2004 WY 26

Sue A. MERRILL, Appellant (Defendant), v.Alvina JANSMA, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 02-205.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 18, 2004.

Representing Appellant: Colin M. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, Cody, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Jeffrey J. Gonda and Michael C. Steel of Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1]Sue A. Merrill appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her claims for personal injury resulting from a fall on rental property belonging to Alvina Jansma.She claims the district court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Ms. Jansma owed no duty to Ms. Merrill under the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1202(LexisNexis 2001) and no genuine issue of material fact existed under the common law as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 326(1965).We reverse and hold the Residential Rental Property Act imposes a duty on landlords to maintain leased premises in a fit and habitable condition.We further hold that this duty establishes the standard of care applicable generally to personal injuries occurring on leased premises—a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.Finally, we hold that the statutory duty and the standard arising from it replace the common law rule of landlord immunity and its exceptions.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Ms. Merrill states the issues as follows:

I.The District Court erred when it held, as a matter of law, that the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201(LexisNexis 2001), et seq., imposed no duty on Appellee in favor of Appellant under the facts of this case.

II.Material questions of fact existed as to whether § 362, Restatement 2d Torts(1965) applied and imposed a duty on Appellee in favor of Appellant.

[¶ 3] Ms. Jansma restates the issues as follows:

I.Does the Residential Rental Property Act, W.S. § 1-21-1201, et seq., reverse the Wyoming common law doctrine of landlord immunity by imposing a legal duty upon a landlord that subjects her to negligence liability in the event that her tenant's invitee suffers injury on the leased premises?

II.Did the district court correctly determine that there is no material fact in dispute that, if proven by Appellant, would bring this case under one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule of landlord immunity?

FACTS

[¶ 4] The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion, are that on February 19, 2000, Ms. Merrill injured her right shoulder when she fell as she was ascending the front steps leading to the porch and front door of the mobile home her daughter, Sherri Pritchard, rented from Ms. Jansma.The step became loose during the time Ms. Pritchard rented the home.Prior to the fall, Ms. Pritchard attempted to repair the step by securing it with nails.When that failed, she informed the manager of the property that the step was loose.The manager suggested Ms. Pritchard try using screws to secure the step.Ms. Pritchard told the manager she did not have a screw gun.The manager had one and said she would screw the step into place.Subsequently, and without Ms. Pritchard's knowledge, the manager attempted to repair the step.Apparently, that effort was unsuccessful and Ms. Merrill fell when the step separated from the porch as she stepped on it.

[¶ 5] Ms. Merrill filed a negligence claim against Ms. Jansma as the owner of the property alleging she knew or reasonably should have known the step was dangerous and failed to exercise reasonable care to alleviate the danger.She further alleged Ms. Jansma owed a duty of care to her as a visitor to the rental property.She sought damages for the injuries she sustained in the fall from the step, including medical expenses, lost earnings and damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering.Ms. Jansma answered the complaint and then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming she owed no legal duty to Ms. Merrill.The district court granted Ms. Jansma's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, she had no legal duty to Ms. Merrill under either the Residential Rental Property Act or the common law as set forth in § 362 of the Restatement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6] In reviewing summary judgment orders, we have the same duty, review the same materials, and follow the same standards as the district court.Hoblyn v. Johnson,2002 WY 152, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1219, ¶ 11(Wyo.2002).The propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Id.A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow,2003 WY 40, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 720, ¶ 17(Wyo.2003).

[¶ 7]We view the record from the standpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to that party all favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.Id.We will uphold summary judgment on the basis of any proper legal theory appearing in the record.Id.We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling.Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch Association,2002 WY 94, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 1072, ¶ 12(Wyo.2002).Summary judgment is not favored in negligence cases.Roitz v. Kidman,913 P.2d 431, 432(Wyo.1996).We, therefore, scrutinize orders granting summary judgment more carefully in such cases.Id.

DISCUSSION

1.Residential Rental Property Act

[¶ 8] In its summary judgment order, the district court held Ms. Jansma owed no duty to Ms. Merrill under the Residential Rental Property Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-1201, et seq.(LexisNexis 2001) because Ms. Merrill failed to give Ms. Jansma written notice of the loose step as required by the act.Ms. Merrill contends this holding is incorrect in two respects.First, she cites § 1-21-1202(a) of the act, which states: "[e]ach owner and his agent renting or leasing a residential rental unit shall maintain that unit in a safe and sanitary condition fit for human habitation."Ms. Merrill asserts that, by the enactment of this provision, the legislature abrogated the common law rule of landlord immunity and imposed a broad affirmative duty upon landlords and their agents to maintain rental properties in a reasonably safe condition.She claims Ms. Jansma breached this duty by failing to maintain, or have her manager maintain, the steps leading up to Ms. Pritchard's home.Ms. Merrill also contends the district court erred in holding that her failure to give written notice under § 1-21-1206 precludes her claim.She asserts the notice provision applies only when a landlord disputes a tenant's request for repair, which did not occur here.

[¶ 9] Citing the rule that legislative abrogation or modification of the common law will not be presumed absent explicit, unambiguous language demonstrating that intent, Ms. Jansma argues the Residential Rental Property Act does not abrogate the common law rule of landlord immunity.Ms. Jansma asserts the act does not explicitly repeal the common law and, when read as a whole, does not support the conclusion that the legislature intended to impose a general duty requiring a landlord to maintain rental premises, including steps, on a single-dwelling unit.Rather, she contends, it is clear the legislature intended only to set out minimum health and safety requirements—operational electricity, heating, plumbing and hot and cold water—and procedural mechanisms for enforcing them.In the event we find the legislature intended to abrogate the common law rule of immunity, Ms. Jansma argues alternatively that Ms. Pritchard did not comply with the notice requirements of the Residential Rental Property Act and Ms. Merrill's claim is precluded for that reason.We consider first the question of whether the act imposes a duty on landlords supplanting the common law rule of immunity.In addressing that issue, we find it helpful to review the development of landlord-tenant law from a historical perspective.

a. Historical Development

[¶ 10] For centuries, landlord immunity was the rule in landlord-tenant law.

Since 16th century feudal England a lease has been considered a conveyance of an interest in land, carrying with it the doctrine of caveat emptor.

The lessor impliedly covenanted that he had the legal right to transfer possession and that he would leave the tenant in "quiet enjoyment of the leasehold," but he did not impliedly warrant as to the habitability or fitness of the premises for any particular use.

As a lessee of real property a 16th century tenant in England was expected to inspect the premises prior to the "sale," and in the absence of express covenants to the contrary, he took possession with whatever defects existed at the time of the lease.Nor did the landlord have an implied responsibility to maintain the leasehold in a reasonable state of repair during the term of the lease....

It was in this setting that the principle of tort immunity for the landlord developed... as part and parcel of the concept that a lease is primarily a conveyance of real estate.The landlord was not liable to the tenant or third persons for personal injury or personal property damage caused by a defect present at the transfer of possession or by defects arising during the term of the leasehold.

Old Town Development Company v. Langford,349 N.E.2d 744, 753-54(Ind.App.1976)(footnotes omitted).

[¶ 11] With the transition from a mostly rural to a more urban society, however, the rule of landlord immunity gave way slightly to some judicially recognized exceptions.

During and following the

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