Merrill v. Maine
| Decision Date | 25 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-cv-00391-JDL,2:19-cv-00391-JDL |
| Parties | MARC L. MERRILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MAINE, a/k/a STATE POLICE OF THE STATE OF MAINE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Marc L. Merrill brings this case arising out of an allegedly flawed 2013 child pornography investigation and prosecution in Maine state court. Merrill, who is proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint with this Court against the Maine State Police (MSP); the Maine State Police Computer Crimes Unit (MCCU); and six MSP and MCCU officers and employees acting in their individual and official capacities: Robert Williams, Jason Bosco, David Armstrong, Glenn Lang, Jessica Langford,1 and John Moran (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2020), as well as Maine tort law (ECF No. 1). The Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of Merrill's claims (ECF No. 25). For the reasons that follow, I grant the motion.
When a defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction. Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209 (1st Cir. 1996). The moving party may use "affidavits and other matter to support the motion," while the plaintiff may establish the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction through materials outside the pleadings. 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (3d ed., Oct. 2020 Update); see also Aversa, 99 F.3d at 1210; Hawes v. Club Ecuestre el Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 699 (1st Cir. 1979) ().
In this case, the Defendants have appended a document to their motion, the Affidavit of Amy J. Oliver (ECF No. 25-2), in support of the proposition that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Merrill's state-law tort claims. I have taken that document into account for that purpose.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). This standard requires the pleading of "only enough facts tostate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Determining the plausibility of a claim "is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While "the plaintiff bears the burden of plausibly alleging a viable cause of action," Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016), the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a complaint does not state a legally cognizable claim for which relief can be granted, see 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed., Oct. 2020 Update).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2011). The First Circuit has instructed that a court addressing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "should begin by identifying and disregarding statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation and internal punctuation omitted). "Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible." Id. "If that factual content, so taken, allows the court to draw thereasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, the claim has facial plausibility." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Ordinarily, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment." Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). "There is, however, a narrow exception for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to [the plaintiff's] claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the Defendants have submitted three documents that are central to Merrill's claim and sufficiently referred to in the complaint to warrant consideration in the Rule 12(b)(6) context: (1) a redacted Affidavit and Request for Search Warrant, which incorporates an Affidavit by Defendant Bosco (ECF No. 25-1); (2) an Order on Defendant's Third Motion to Suppress, State v. Merrill, Docket No. CR-2013-234 , which is docketed in this case at ECF No. 25-3; and (3) an Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violations, State v. Merrill, Docket No. CR-2013-234 (Me. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2018), docketed at ECF No. 25-4. I have taken these documents into account as well.
Although a pro se plaintiff's complaint is subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the complaint may not consist entirely of "conclusory allegations that merely parrotthe relevant legal standard," Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) ().
Merrill brings a claim against all of the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (Count One); a claim against the MSP, the MCCU, Williams, and Lang under § 1983 for failure to adequately hire, staff, and supervise computer crimes staff (Count Two) and for failure to adequately train computer crimes staff (Count Three); a claim against all of the Defendants for false arrest and malicious prosecution under Maine law (Count Four); a claim against all of the Defendants for defamation (Count Five); a claim against all of the Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (Count Six); and a claim against all of the Defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) (Count Seven).2 The Complaint sets forth the following relevant factual allegations.3
The MSP is a political subdivision of the State of Maine and the chief law enforcement agency of the State of Maine. The MCCU is a department within theMSP that is responsible for the investigation of all state child pornography allegations within the State of Maine. Bosco is a law enforcement officer who was employed by the MSP or the MCCU at all relevant times and was the primary investigator in the criminal investigation involving Merrill. Armstrong, Langford, and Moran are law enforcement officers who were employed by the MSP and/or the MCCU at all relevant times. Lang is a law enforcement officer who was employed by the MSP or the MCCU at all relevant times and was the law enforcement officer in charge of Bosco, Armstrong, and the MCCU. At all relevant times, Williams was the Chief of the MSP and as such was responsible for the training, supervision, and discipline of subordinate officers as well as the implementation of MSP and MCCU practices. Williams, Lang, the MSP, and the MCCU were responsible for the training, supervision, and hiring of employees such as Bosco, Armstrong, Langford, and Moran and the customs, policies, and practices of the MCCU and its employees during the relevant period.
The MCCU relies on federal funding from the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force designation. The requirements for a state ICAC Task Force to receive federal grant money are detailed in a memorandum of understanding between the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the Attorney General of the United States. The ICAC Task Force must strictly adhere to training and operational standards, with acknowledgement of liability if those standards are not met. The more arrests an ICAC Task Force makes, the more federal funding it receives.
The MCCU uses a database clearing house (Data Base One, or DB1) that collects and collates Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from a specialized law enforcement program called RoundUp eMule ("RoundUp"). RoundUp is re-engineered software from a popular freeware peer-to-peer file sharing program called eMule or eDonkey. RoundUp was developed by entities and individuals including the University of Massachusetts Department of Computer Science, the Georgetown University Department of Computer Science, and former Pennsylvania State Police Computer Crimes supervisor Robert Erdely, among others. It is used by law enforcement to surveil and record...
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