Merrimac Anthracite Coal Corp. v. Showalter

• Decision Date: 24 March 1932
• Citation: 163 S.E. 73
• Parties: MERRIMAC ANTHRACITE COAL CORPORATION et al. v. SHOWALTER et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

163 S.E. 73

MERRIMAC ANTHRACITE COAL CORPORATION et al.

v.SHOWALTER et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 24, 1932.

Error to Industrial Commission.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Robert Hutcheson, employee, opposed by the Merrimac Anthracite Coal Corporation, employer, and the American Mine Owners' Casualty Company, insurer, wherein, after an order dismissing the claim, A. M. Showalter and others sought allowances for medical services and hospitalization. To review that part of the award in favor of claimants for medical services and hospitalization, the employer and insurer bring error.

Reversed, and judgment dismissing the claims entered.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, and CHINN, JJ.

H. M. Bandy, of Norton, for appellants.

Sowder, Roop & Spiers, of East Radford, for appellees.

EPES, J.

This is a writ of error to an order of the Industrial Commission of Virginia making awards to Drs. A. M. Showalter and J. G. Davis and to New Altamont Hospital for medical services and hospitalization furnished to Robert Hutcheson, who was injured while in the employment of Merrimac Anthracite Coal Corporation, of which American Mine Owners' Casualty Company was the insurer.

On April 7, 1930, Hutcheson was injured while in the course of his employment. A claim was duly made by him against his employer and its insurer for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Virginia. The case was heard before Commissioner Kizer, acting in pursuance of section 59 of the act; and on August 12, 1930, the commission entered its order dismissing the claim "on the ground that the injury sustained was the result of wilful misconduct on the part of the injured employee." Section 14, Workmen's Compensation Act.

No application was made for a review of this order by the full commission as provided in section 60 of the act.; and, therefore, after the expiration of seven days from August 12, 1930, the order of the commission dismissing the claim became final and nonappealable. Section 61 of the act (as amended by Acts 1928, c. 227).

On February 6, 1931, Drs. A. M. Showalter and J. G. Davis filed their claim with the Industrial Commission asking that the commission make an award to them against the employer of Hutcheson and its insurer for $322.50 for medical services rendered Hutcheson in and about the treatment of him for the injuries for which he had been denied compensation by the commission. On the same day (February 6, 1931), New Altamont Hospital also filed its claim before the commission asking that the commission make an award to it against the employer and its insurer for $412.15 for charges for hospitalization and services rendered Hutcheson in the treatment of him for these injuries.

The employer and the insurer defended these claims. Their ground of defense and the assignment of error, which I think conclusive of this matter, make the point that, where an employee is denied compensation on the ground that the injury was the result of his willful misconduct, neither he, nor the physician who treated him for his injuries, nor the hospital in which he was so treated, is entitled to recover by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Act for medical services and for hospitalization furnished to him. and, therefore, the Industrial Commission was without power or authority to make the awards asked by these claimants.

These two claims were heard before Commissioner Kizer, who on April 2, 1931, ren-dered an opinion sustaining the contention of the employer and its insurer, and on April 27, 1931, the commission entered its order dismissing both claims. In the opinion of April 2, Commissioner Kizer says:

"The Commission has uniformly held that compensation is composed of the monetary payments, medical and hospital services, and that if the claimant is entitled to one, it follows that he is entitled to the others. In this case, it was found that, due to his own wilful acts, he could not recover under the compensation statute, and this Commissioner feels that, where compensation is denied on account of a specific violation of the provisions of the Act, medical and hospital bills cannot be allowed."

The two claimants thereupon requested a review of the decision by the full commission. Upon the hearing before the full commission, the commission entered its order on June 23, 1931, reversing its order of April 27, 1931, and made awards to. these two claimants against the employer and its insurer of the several sums claimed by them for medical attention and hospital services, to which order a writ of error has been awarded the employer and its insurer.

The opinion of the commission upon which the order of June 23 was entered was also written by Commissioner Kizer, who sets forth the reasons upon which the commission based its last order as follows:

"A close study of this case convinces the full Commission that sections 26 and 65 of the Act, give the Commission the right to award expenses incident to the treatment given. Certain it is that the interested parties had no knowledge of the defenses that the insurance carrier was relying upon. He was taken to them by the insurance carrier's direction for immediate and imperative treatment, which treatment was given in good faith and for which this Commission feels that the defendant is liable. * * *

"In view of the fact that there was a contractual relation existing between the defendant and the physicians and hospital mentioned, it comes with poor grace for the insurance carrier to attempt to repudiate a just obligation because the Commission was forced, under the evidence, to disallow compensation to Hutcheson."

From an analysis of the reasoning of the commission it would appear that the commission has advanced two theories in support of its final decision: (1) That section 26 of the act (as amended by Acts 1920, c. 176), requires an employer to furnish medical attention and hospitalization, even though the employee is by the act specifically debarred from receiving compensation; and (2) that, if an employer contracts with a physician or hospital to render services to an injured...