Merriman v. Caton, 51342
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 395 S.W.2d 106 |
| Parties | Jack D. MERRIMAN, Respondent, v. Frank CATON, Appellant, and J. B. DILLINGHAM, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 51342,51342,2 |
| Decision Date | 08 November 1965 |
Page 106
v.
Frank CATON, Appellant,
and
J. B. DILLINGHAM, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
Page 107
Pettijohn & Eiser, Oregon, for respondent and third-party respondent.
Louis Kranitz, Theodore M. Kranitz, St. Joseph, for appellant.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
This is an appeal by defendant Frank Caton from a summary judgment entered on plaintiff's petition for money due and owing, and on Caton's counterclaim and cross-claim in quantum meruit for labor performed.
For ten years beginning in 1952 Caton was the tenant of Jack D. Merriman and J. B. Dillingham under an oral agreement that he should pay as rental one half of the crops produced on the land. This tenancy was terminated by Merriman and Dillingham effective March 1, 1962. In June of that year Merriman brought suit against Caton to recover the sum of $2,400, the balance due on an amount alleged to have been loaned to Caton for the purchase of farm equipment. After Caton filed his answer he brought Dillingham in as a third-party defendant, and then by his counterclaim against Merriman and cross-claim against Dillingham he sought $24,000 in quantum meruit for work and labor. The allegation
Page 108
was as follows: 'That [Merriman] and [Dillingham] were co-partners in the ownership of certain farm property known and described as * * *; that * * * since August 1952 and for many years thereafter [Caton] was continuously a tenant of [Merriman] and [Dillingham] on said premises under an oral agreement which provided, inter alia, that [Caton] should pay as rental one half of the crops produced upon said land; that at the special instance and request of [Merriman] and [Dillingham] * * * Caton, in addition, worked and labored in the clearing of timber, refuse, and waste materials from the surface of said land continuously during all of the years of said tenancy from August 1952 to March 1962; that [Caton] complied with all the terms of said agreement by him to be met but that [Merriman] and [Dillingham] nevertheless terminated the tenancy of [Caton] effective the first day of March 1962, and otherwise breached the terms of said oral agreement between the parties with respect to payment to * * * Caton for clearing certain land to the great damage to [Caton] in these, to-wit: * * *.' It was then alleged that Caton had cleared 800 acres of land, and that the reasonable value of such work to Merriman and Dillingham was $30 per acre or $24,000.Merriman and Dillingham did not seek to have the above pleading made more definite and certain, and...
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Sofka v. Thal, 64696
...definiteness or uncertainty in the allegations or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. E.g. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.1965); In re Estate of Williamson, 380 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.1964); Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo.1963); Myers v. City of......
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Bracey v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 73301
...dismissed for mere lack of definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 In the petition it is alleged that in 1986, appellants leased approximately 500 acres of farm land in New Madrid and Pemiscot Counties......
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Lick Creek Sewer Systems, Inc. v. Bank of Bourbon, s. 15204
...merely because it lacks definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.1965); Stanfield v. Nat. Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 588 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Mo.App.1979). See also Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Mo......
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Ritterbusch v. Holt, 71979
...dismissed for mere lack of definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 The scope of the common law tort of abuse of process and its components have been fixed in the case law for many years. In 1979, this ......
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Sofka v. Thal, 64696
...definiteness or uncertainty in the allegations or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. E.g. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.1965); In re Estate of Williamson, 380 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.1964); Mathews v. Pratt, 367 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo.1963); Myers v. City of......
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Bracey v. Monsanto Co., Inc., 73301
...dismissed for mere lack of definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 In the petition it is alleged that in 1986, appellants leased approximately 500 acres of farm land in New Madrid and Pemiscot Counties......
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Lick Creek Sewer Systems, Inc. v. Bank of Bourbon, s. 15204
...merely because it lacks definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.1965); Stanfield v. Nat. Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 588 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Mo.App.1979). See also Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Mo......
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Ritterbusch v. Holt, 71979
...dismissed for mere lack of definiteness or certainty or because of informality in the statement of an essential fact. Merriman v. Caton, 395 S.W.2d 106, 109 The scope of the common law tort of abuse of process and its components have been fixed in the case law for many years. In 1979, this ......