Merritt F. Rudd v. Charles H. Darling

• Decision Date: 01 February 1892
• Citation: 25 A. 479,64 Vt. 456
• Parties: MERRITT F. RUDD v. CHARLES H. DARLING
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

25 A. 479

64 Vt. 456

MERRITT F. RUDD v. CHARLES H. DARLING

Supreme Court of Vermont

February 1, 1892

FEBRUARY TERM, 1892

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

Sheldon & Cushman, for the plaintiff.

OPINION

THOMPSON

To the defendant's second plea, the plaintiff interposes a general demurrer. If this plea, which is to the whole declaration, sets forth in substance a full answer to the grievances alleged, it is sufficient, no matter how defective it may be in form, as matters of form are not reached by a general demurrer. To take advantage of them, the pleader must demur specially.

The Municipal Court of Bennington had jurisdiction of the subject matter, the person, and the original process, in the case of State v. Hill, referred to in this plea. In that case, the plaintiff was produced and sworn as a witness, and refused to answer certain questions pertinent to the issue, put to him, and after being admonished by the court that if he persisted in his refusal to answer, he would be adjudged to be in contempt of court he still "wilfully and contumaciously refused" to answer the questions. This was contempt in facie curiae, and the defendant as judge of the court, had the authority to commit for it; indeed he would have been derelict in his duty had he not done so. In Rapalje on Contempts, sec. 66, it is said: "It may safely be laid down as a general rule, that the refusal of a witness to testify at all, or to answer particular questions pertinent to the issue, put to him either in a proceeding before the court itself or before a subordinate officer duly empowered by the court to take his deposition or conduct his examination, is contempt of such court, provided always the court have jurisdiction of the controversy or proceeding in which the witness is required to give his evidence. If the witness be competent, and the question pertinent to the issue, he should be compelled to answer. If he perseveres in his silence, when questioned, he may be committed for contempt, and confined until he does answer. Such refusal is a contempt no matter how respectfully and deferentially it may be made." This is a correct and comprehensive statement of the law on this subject. "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute, but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the exercise of all other powers." In re Jesse Cooper, 32 Vt. 253.

It has been held that this power is inherent in his justices' courts as well as in the higher courts of this State. In re Cooper, supra. The Municipal Court of Bennington is declared to be a court of record by the public act creating it, and of which this court is bound to take judicial cognizance. St. 1884, No. 226 ss. 48, 74. Winooski v Gokey, 49 Vt. 282. It also has this power to punish for contempt.

A judicial officer acting within his jurisdiction and in his judicial capacity is not liable in a private action for his judicial acts. Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203; S C. 23 A. 585; and cases there cited. On the allegations in this plea with reference to defendant's adjudging the plaintiff to be in contempt of court and ordering his commitment, which are admitted by the demurrer to be true, this immunity accorded to judicial officers, is a...