Merritt Parkway Conservancy v. Mineta

Decision Date31 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 3:05CV860(MRK).,3:05CV860(MRK).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesMERRITT PARKWAY CONSERVANCY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Norman MINETA, et al., Defendants.

Andrea C. Ferster, Andrea C. Ferster, Washington, DC, Philip Nelson Walker, Becker & Walker, LLC, Canton, CT, Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., Day, Berry & Howard, Stamford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

John B. Hughes, Lauren M. Nash, U.S. Attorney's Office, New Haven, CT, Charles Henry Walsh, III, Eileen M. Meskill, Nancy E. Arnold, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

KRAVITZ, District Judge.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Merritt Parkway Conservancy, National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States, Connecticut Trust for Historic Preservation, Norwalk Land Trust, Norwalk River Watershed Association, Norwalk Preservation Trust, and the Sierra Club challenge the decision of Defendants Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") to approve a highway construction project (the "Interchange Project") that was designed and will be managed by Defendant Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Transportation ("ConnDOT"). The Interchange Project, which is expected to be completed in two phases over the next several years, will reconstruct and substantially enlarge the interchange between U.S. Route 7, Main Avenue, and the Merritt Parkway (U.S. Rt. 15) in Norwalk, Connecticut.

The Merritt Parkway is a scenic road familiar to all citizens of Connecticut. The Parkway, which was designed and built in the 1930s, is listed in the National Register of Historic Places and has been designated a National Scenic Byway and State Scenic Road. According to a ConnDOT Policy Statement issued by then-Commissioner Emil F. Frankel in June 1994:

The Merritt Parkway is a distinct type of roadway having an important aesthetic value, in addition to its vital transportation function. It is the Department's responsibility to maintain this crucial transportation artery as a safe and efficient roadway while also preserving and enhancing it as an important State scenic, cultural and historic resource.

It is clear that the Interchange Project, as currently designed, will have a significant impact on many of the aesthetic and historic features of the Merritt Parkway, including its historic bridges, ramps, ornamental parapets, and piers, as well as its park-like landscape and vistas. But it is equally clear that changes to the Merritt Parkway / Rt. 7 interchange to make it fully directional and to ease the significant traffic congestion in the Main Avenue area are needed. The difficulty is in reconciling the public interest in safety and convenience with the public interest in preservation of an important historic resource.

Congress undoubtedly thought it had provided an answer to this recurrent problem when it enacted Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1966), recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1983), and reproduced at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1966). Section 4(f) "declare[s it] to be the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty" of certain protected resources, such as "the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 23 U.S.C. § 138(a). To that end, Section 4(f) states that the Secretary of Transportation "shall not approve any program or project ... which requires use [of a protected resource] ... unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such [protected resource]." Id.

In enacting Section 4(f), Congress required FHWA to engage in planning and substantive analysis before FHWA approves a project so as to lessen the likelihood of disruption once a project is approved. Plaintiffs maintain that FHWA has failed to comply with this congressional mandate and, despite repeated encouragement from the Court, the parties have been unwilling or unable to reach a negotiated settlement of their differences. The Court is therefore confronted with a truly regrettable situation. The Interchange Project has already been approved by FHWA and, in reliance on that approval, ConnDOT has awarded costly bids for the project and has even begun preliminary construction. If the Interchange Project proceeds, Plaintiffs assert that irreparable harm to historic and natural resources will occur; if it does not proceed, taxpayers will foot the bill for increased costs in completing a highway project that is undoubtedly long overdue and important to the State of Connecticut. Either way, the citizenry is disserved. Moreover, as a result of the parties' intransigence, this Court is required to intervene in a complex dispute involving the public interest in an area in which the Court has absolutely no expertise or training—exactly the sort of matter that should be resolved by public officials and those whom they are charged with representing. Of course, the Court cannot know, and certainly should not decide, whether the current design for the Interchange Project is wise or unwise. That is for the public officials to determine consistent with the requirements of law. The Court's role is properly limited to assuring itself and the public, by means of what the Supreme Court has termed a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the administrative record, Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), that the Interchange Project was designed and approved by FHWA in accordance with Congress's substantive instruction that the FHWA engage in "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the Merritt Parkway.

Unfortunately, the administrative record, which this Court has reviewed in depth, does not adequately demonstrate that FHWA satisfied the requirements of Section 4(f)(2). The Court emphasizes that this conclusion does not mean that the current Interchange Project design fails to minimize harm to the Merritt Parkway. All it means is that the administrative record before this Court does not demonstrate that FHWA made such a finding or upon what reasoned basis it did so. With commendable candor, FHWA conceded as much at a hearing on Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction. But FHWA is not the only party at fault in this case. For their part, Plaintiffs appear to have been asleep at the switch as the designs for the Interchange Project made their way through the approval process in 2000 and 2001. Had Plaintiffs pressed their objections sooner, it is possible that disruption of the Interchange Project might have been avoided. ConnDOT is not blameless either. It has been well aware of Plaintiffs' concerns since at least 2004. Yet according to the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Mr. Carl Bard, ConnDOT consciously chose to proceed without making changes to the Interchange Project, knowing full well that litigation would likely ensue and that the project might be delayed as a result. As Deputy Commissioner Bard explained, litigation was a risk that ConnDOT knowingly assumed when it proceeded with the Interchange Project despite Plaintiffs' concerns.

Because the administrative record is inadequate to show that FHWA satisfied the stringent substantive mandate of Section 4(f), the Court concludes that the matter must be remanded to FHWA to cure the defects in its compliance with Section 4(f). The Court acknowledges that the public will not be well served by a substantial delay of the Interchange Project, regardless of the reason. However, the Court notes that the parties have it in their power to reduce the inconvenience to the public by expediting whatever further proceedings are necessary to achieve compliance with Section 4(f). In view of the voluntary moratorium of construction activity that has been and, at this time, remains in place, the Court will defer entry of an order on injunctive relief for one week, pending input from the parties on whether continuation of the voluntary moratorium is possible (which is the Court's preference), or if not, the appropriate scope and duration of carefully tailored injunctive relief.

I. Procedural History

In this action, commenced on May 31, 2005, Plaintiffs claim that in designing and approving the Interchange Project, Defendants failed to abide by the requirements of Section 4(f)(2) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303, as well as the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and (E), and the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 470. Specifically, Count I alleges that the FHWA's approval of the Interchange Project was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the requirements of Section 4(f). Counts II and III claim that the determination that the Interchange Project would not have a significant impact on the environment was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to NEPA. Finally, Count IV asserts that the failure to consider alternative designs to reduce or minimize harm to the Merritt Parkway and other historic and natural resources violated NHPA and a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") executed between FHWA, the State Historic Preservation Officer, and ConnDOT.

Each count alleges that Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed unless the Court enjoins Defendants from proceeding with the Interchange Project until such time as FHWA cures the alleged violations of the federal statutes and the MOA. Accordingly, on June 20, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction [doc. # 6]. The Court immediately convened an on-the-record telephonic status conference with all the parties to clarify the imminence of the alleged irreparable harm and to exhort the parties to work on a solution that would avoid judicial intervention. After receiving assurances from the...

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