Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Co.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1896
• Citation: 75 F. 813
• Parties: MERRITT et al. v. AMERICAN STEEL-BARGE CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

75 F. 813

MERRITT et al. v. AMERICAN STEEL-BARGE CO.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 15, 1896

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION-- JUDGMENT OF SISTER STATE.

An issue as to whether due force and effect has been given to a judgment or decree of another state does not involve the construction or application of Const. U.S. art. 4, Sec. 1 requiring 'full faith and credit' to be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state, but rather involves the interpretation of Acts Cong. May 26, 1790, and March 27, 1804, declaring, in substance, that the 'full faith and credit' mentioned in the constitution should consist in giving to a foreign judgment such faith and credit as it had in the courts of the state from which it was taken; and hence the circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction.

Frank B. Kellogg and James H. Hoyt (C. K. Davis and C. A. Severance were with them on the brief), for the motion.

A. A Harris and Henry E. Harris, opposed.

Before CALDWELL and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

THAYER Circuit Judge.

This is a motion to dismiss the writ of error upon the alleged ground that the determination of the case 'involves the construction or application of the constitution of the United States,' and that the case is not within the appellate jurisdiction of this court. The question presented by the motion is novel and important. It arises in this wise: The suit was brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, by Alfred Merritt and Leonidas Merritt, the plaintiffs in error, against the American Steel-Barge Company, the defendant in error, to recover damages in the sum of $500,000, for the alleged wrongful conversion by the defendant company of 11,331 shares of stock in the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, which is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey. The defendant company pleaded in bar to said action a judgment or decree said to have been rendered by the supreme court of the city and county of New York, on October 1, 1894 in a certain suit wherein the said American Steel-Barge Company was the plaintiff, and the said Alfred and Leonidas Merritt were the defendants. The plea alleged, in substance, that the American Steel-Barge Company had held the aforesaid 11,331 shares of stock in the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines in pledge to secure the payment of certain notes that had been executed and delivered by the said Alfred Merritt and Leonidas Merritt; that the aforesaid suit was brought by the barge company in said supreme court of New York for the purpose of foreclosing its alleged lien upon said stock, and securing a sale thereof to liquidate the amount due on the notes, for which the stock was held in pledge; that the shares of stock in question were within and subject to the jurisdiction of said supreme court of New York when said suit was instituted, and while the same was pending; that due notice was given to said Alfred and Leonidas Merritt of the pendency of said suit; that, after due proceedings had therein, a decree was lawfully rendered, foreclosing the barge company's lien upon said stock, and directing a sale thereof for the satisfaction and payment of the aforesaid notes; and that the judgment or decree so as aforesaid rendered was a full and complete bar to the alleged cause of action stated in the plaintiffs' complaint. On the trial below, the circuit court found and adjudged that 'the proceedings and judgment of the supreme court of the city, county, and state of New York state facts which constitute a complete bar to this action, which facts were not replied to or denied by the plaintiffs'; whereupon it was ordered that a judgment be entered in favor of the defendant, the American Steel-Barge Company, and against the plaintiffs. The case was brought to this court by the plaintiffs below, to obtain a reversal of that judgment.

It is insisted in behalf of the barge company that, inasmuch as the sole question to be determined on the present appeal is whether the circuit court gave such force and effect to the judgment of the supreme court of New York as it was its duty to give, the controversy is one which involves the construction or application of section 1, art. 4, of the federal constitution, and that this court is without power to deal with it. The point so made is doubtless well taken if it be true, as contended, that the decision of the case does in fact involve an interpretation or application of any clause of the constitution. We have several times held, in accordance with the plain language of the statute creating this court, that its jurisdiction does not extend to the decision of a controlling constitutional question which is fairly embodied in the record of a case, and is urged in good faith. Railway Co. v. Evans, 19 U.S.App. 233, 7 C.C.A. 290, and 58 F. 433; Hastings v. Ames, 15 C.C.A. 628, 68 F. 726, and cases there cited; 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, Sec. 5. But the important inquiry in the case now in hand is whether it involves the construction of the constitution, or whether it merely requires us to construe and apply the act of congress passed on May 26, 1790, as amended by the act of March 27, 1804 (1 Stat. 122, c. 11; 2 Stat. 299, c. 56, Sec. 2, now Rev. St. Sec. 905), which was passed in pursuance of the power conferred by the last clause of section 1, art. 4, of the constitution. This court clearly has jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies which involve the construction of acts of congress. Therefore, if, upon a true view of the present controversy, we are only called upon to interpret and apply the aforesaid act of congress, the case at bar falls within our jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss the writ of error should be denied.

Turning, then, to a consideration of the question last suggested, it is to be observed that section 1, art. 4, of the constitution does not, in terms, prescribe the effect that shall be given to a judgment rendered in one state by the courts of another state. The language of the constitution is as follows:

'Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.'

Following the adoption of the constitution, the congress of the United States passed the acts of May 26, 1790, and March 27, 1804, supra, whereby it provided that:

'The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state or territory * * * shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken.'

It would seem, therefore, that the effect to be given to a foreign judgment is defined and declared by the act of congress aforesaid, as the framers of the constitution contemplated that it should be, and that, whenever the question arises whether due force and effect has been given to a foreign judgment or decree, the decision of the case does not involve a constitutional question, but depends, rather, upon the proper interpretation of an act of congress. If the congress had not seen fit to legislate concerning the effect to be given in the several states to the judgments of sister states, it would doubtless, be...