Merritt v. Farrell

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
• Docket Number: 3:24-CV-01542 (GTS/ML)
• Decision Date: 09 April 2025
• Citation: Merritt v. Farrell, 3:24-CV-01542 (GTS/ML) (N.D. N.Y. Apr 09, 2025)
• Parties: KATIE MERRITT Plaintiff, v. DR. MICHAEL FARRELL; GUTHRIE LOURDES HOSPITAL; CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CPS TIOGA; CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CPS; BROOME COUNTY NY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; HONORABLE JUDGE ADAM SCHUMACHER; CHILDREN'S HOME WYOMING CONFERENCE FOSTERCARE; CHILDREN'S HOME BINGHAMTON, NY; and BINGHAMTON, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.

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KATIE MERRITT Plaintiff, v. DR. MICHAEL FARRELL; GUTHRIE LOURDES HOSPITAL; CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CPS TIOGA; CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CPS; BROOME COUNTY NY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; HONORABLE JUDGE ADAM SCHUMACHER; CHILDREN'S HOME WYOMING CONFERENCE FOSTERCARE; CHILDREN'S HOME BINGHAMTON, NY; and BINGHAMTON, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.

No. 3:24-CV-01542 (GTS/ML)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

April 9, 2025

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

KATIE MERRITT Plaintiff, Pro Se

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Clerk has sent a pro se complaint in the above captioned action together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis and motion to file electronically filed by Katie Merritt (“Plaintiff”), to this Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5.) For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2.), (2) deny Plaintiff's motion to file electronically in ECF (Dkt No. 3.), and (3) recommend that her Complaint be dismissed with partial leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

Construed as liberally^[1] as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants Dr. Michael Farrell and Guthrie Lourdes Hospital committed medical malpractice during and after the birth of Plaintiff's son; falsified medical records; provided false information that led to the unlawful removal of her newborn son from her custody by Child Protective Services (“CPS”); and failed to adequately respond to Plaintiff's complaints about her mistreatment and faulty medical care. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, 15.)

Applying that same liberal construction, Plaintiff's constitutional claims, including alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, address two separate governmental actions: (1) the “emergency” removal of Plaintiff's newborn son from her custody on October 1, 2024 “without lawful justification or due process,” by CPS and the Broome County Department of Social Services and (2) the entry of a formal child custody order by Tioga County Family Court Judge Adam Schumacher on October 2, 2024 and its subsequent implementation by a foster agency that interfered with Plaintiff's ability to visit and care for her son. (Id. at 3-5, ¶¶ 11, 12, 17-19, 21.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Binghamton Police Department^[2] violated her rights when she was “filmed by an officer while in my hospital room,” who then failed to take her reports of misconduct and discrimination seriously. (Id. at 5, ¶ 22.)

II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Plaintiff seeks “compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000” along with punitive damages, “injunctive relief against CPS to prevent further violations,” and recovery of attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 1-5.)

When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed IFP status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).^[3] After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP application, this Court finds that she meets this standard. (Dkt. No. 2.) Therefore, Plaintiffs' application to proceed IFP is granted.^[4] (Id.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, No. 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc., 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.").

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his or her pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.

A. Barriers to Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Child Custody Determinations

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

“A court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Associates, 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes that, except for the Supreme Court, federal courts are not authorized to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2007). Recognizing that many courts have applied Rooker-Feldman in a manner which effectively expands its boundaries well beyond those envisioned in the two seminal decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized the narrow limits of the rule in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., observing that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." 544 U.S. 280, 283-284 (2005).

“Where constitutional claims are not raised in the state court proceeding, there is no federal court subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment.” McKithen, 481 F.3d at 96 (citing Dist. of Colombia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 420 U.S. 462, 483 (1983)). In the Second Circuit, there are four requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment, and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. McKithen, 491 F.3d at 97. “A plaintiff may not overcome the doctrine and seek a reversal of a state court judgment >simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.'” Rabinowitz v. New York, 329 F.Supp.2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993)). “[A] federal suit complains of injury from a state-court judgment, even if it appears to complain only of a third party's actions, when the third party's actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” McKithen, 481 F.3d at 97 (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Co. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Here it is not readily apparent on the face of the Complaint that Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction in this case, despite Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief. Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on December 19, 2024, challenges actions leading up to and resulting from an October 2, 2024 order from Tioga County Family Court Judge Adam Schumacher. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3, ¶ 13.) Subsequent correspondence filed by Plaintiff...