Merritt v. Scott

• Decision Date: 30 June 1879
• Citation: 81 N.C. 385
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: DEBORAH MERRITT v. E. W. SCOTT and wife.

81 N.C. 385

DEBORAH MERRITT

v.E. W. SCOTT and wife.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1879.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

CIVIL ACTION to recover Land, tried at Spring Term, 1879, of JONES Superior Court, before Seymour, J.

The case states that it was conceded the plaintiff is entitled to recover the land, and the only question was whether defendant is entitled to the value of certain permanent improvements made upon the land by him; to ascertain which he offered to prove that while in possession of the locus in quo and under the belief that he had a good title, he had made such improvements, and to show their value. The evidence was excluded and defendant excepted. The facts appear in the opinion. Verdict for plaintiff, judgment, appeal by defendant.

Messrs. H. R. Bryan, A. G. Hubbard, W. E. Clarke and F. M. Simmons, for plaintiff :

Cited and remarked upon Henly v. Wilson, 77 N. C., 216; Thompson v. Blair, 3 Murp., 583; Gillespie v. Moore, 2 Johns. Ch., 585; Moore v. Vallentine, 77 N. C., 188; 2 Washb. on Real Property, 491; Acts 1871-'72, ch. 147. This case distinguishable from Pope v. Whitehead, 68 N. C., 191, and Daniel v. Crumpler, 75 N. C., 184.

Messrs. Green & Stevenson, for defendant :

The court erred in excluding the evidence. Pope v. Whitehead, 68 N. C., 191: Daniel v. Crumpler, 75 N. C., 184; Towles v. Fisher. 77 N. C., 437; Bat. Rev,, ch. 17, pp. 206, 262. See also Glick v. Gregg, 19 Ohio, 57; Willingham v. Long, 47 Ga., 540;........v. Ten Eyck, 40 Iowa, 213.

SMITH, C. J.

The tract of land described in the complaint was in 1842 conveyed by James Merritt, the owner, to his son John Merritt, in trust for another son Francis Merritt for life, remainder to his wife, Deborah, for life or widowhood, and with a further limitation over at her death or marriage, to the children of Francis then living. John Merritt, the trustee, died intestate, leaving children, who with the said Deborah are the plaintiffs in this action. The life-tenant, Francis, who is also dead, in his life-time conveyed his estate to one John Cox, and after his death his administrator, under proceedings in the probate court and with license therefor, sold and conveyed the land to the defendant, Edward Scott. The object of the suit is to recover the land for the use of said Deborah, and damages for its detention since the death of Francis Merritt.

No issue as to title is made and in the enquiry before the jury as to the damages, the defendant offered to show in support of the defence set up in his answer, that valuable improvements had been made on the lands both by himself and the preceding occupant, in the erection of useful buildings, and by ditching, fencing, and manuring, whereby the value of the land had been greatly enhanced. The evidence on objection from plaintiff was excluded, and the exception to this ruling of the court is the only point presented in the appeal.

Under instructions, the jury assessed the damages from August 18th, 1873, which we suppose to be the date of the determination of the first life estate, at the rate of one hundred dollars per annum. Whether these improvements or any of them were made during the years for which the defendant is charged for rent, does not appear.

We think it clear that improvements of any kind put upon land by a life tenant during his occupancy, constitute no charge upon the land when it passes to the remainderman. He is entitled to the property in its improved state, without deduction for its increased value by reason of good management, or the erection of buildings by the life tenant, for the obvious reason that the latter is improving his own property and for his own present benefit. This proposition is too plain to need the citation of authority.

For subsequent rents and uses he is entitled to have the amount reduced by those improvements. Suppose, while holding over, the defendant had by such improvements as in the answer are alleged to have been made, rendered the land more valuable, as it comes to the remainderman, would it not be reasonable he should pay a smaller rent than if nothing of the kind had been done? So if no repairs were made and the buildings had gone to decay, and by mismanagement and bad cultivation, the farm had been abused and its value impaired, a full and larger rent might justly be required of the tenant.

The evidence of such improvements as were made by the defendant, after his estate...