Merritt v. State
| Decision Date | 15 June 1964 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 40744-40746,No. 2,s. 40744-40746,2 |
| Citation | 137 S.E.2d 917,110 Ga.App. 150 |
| Parties | J. Wesley MARRITT v. The STATE (three cases) |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The defense of entrapment is not successful when the conduct of investigating officers toward the accused would not likely have enticed into crime an unwary innocent who would otherwise have struggled with himself and resisted ordinary temptations, but would be likely to induce only those ready and willing to commit a crime.
The defendant was tried on three indictments for separate offenses of illegal sales and possession of nontax-paid liquor. The jury found a verdict of guilty on each indictment, and the defendant assigns error on the overruling of his amended motion for new trial.
Stow & Andrews, Robert E. Andrews, Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
Jeff C. Wayne, Sol. Gen., Frank Strickland, Jr., Gainesville, for defendant in error.
There was evidence that in October and November 1963 the Georgia Revenue Department was conducting an investigation of the illegal sale and possession of whiskey in the area of Gainesville and the officer in charge of the investigation had received several reports and complaints of violations existing at the Holiday Motel. Revenue Agent Garrett was sent to Gainesville and checked in at the Holiday Motel for the specific purpose of getting someone there to sell him some whiskey. At that time he did not know the defendant and did not know who was the bell boy at the motel. The defendant accompanied Agent Garrett to his room assisting with his luggage. Agent Garrett testified that when they reached the room he asked the defendant if he could get him some whiskey; the defendant replied that he could get some at a price of $5.00, but he would have to go to the club after it. The agent gave the defendant the price and a $1.00 tip and the defendant went out and returned in about ten minutes with a bottle of whiskey. Officer Garrett checked in at the motel on two subsequent occasions and after some conversation with the defendant purchased whiskey in similar transactions, and gave the defendant 50 cents or 75 cents as a tip. On the second occasion other officers had the motel under surveillance and they did not see the defendant leave the premises between the time he left Agent Garrett's room and the time he returned there with the whiskey.
The defendant contends that the verdicts were not authorized because the evidence proved his defense of entrapment as a matter of law. The Georgia cases are in accord with the general view that the defense of entrapment is not successful when the conduct of the investigating officers toward the accused would not likely have 'enticed into crime an unwary innocent who would otherwise have struggled within himself and resisted ordinary temptations,' but would be likely to induce only those ready and willing to commit a crime. Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1958); Bienert v. State, 85 Ga.App. 451, 454, 69 S.E.2d 300; Cherry v. State, 98 Ga.App. 107, 109, 104 S.E.2d 694; Sutton v. State, 59 Ga.App. 198, 200 S.E. 225; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 45(1), p. 137; Anno. 55 A.L.R.2d 1322. When the officer has simply made a request to purchase liquor and the accused evidences a ready complaisance the defense in unavailable. Jordan v. United States, 2 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1924); Park v. United States, 283 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1960); 55 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1348.
We must concede that the evidence in this case authorized a finding that the officer's conduct, considered with all the facts and circumstances, did not as a matter of law violate the standard approved by the authorities cited. See Accardi v. United States, supra, 257 F.2d 173. The evidence does not show that the money given the defendant by the officer on the occasions when liquor was purchased was an unconscionably tempting inducement, but indicates that it was no more than a customary voluntary tip.
The rule that officers 'may not induce persons, who would not otherwise have committed crime, to violate the laws and then prosecute for it' is dictated by a 'sound public policy and a decent fairness.' United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429, 430 (5th Cir. 1925); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848; Osborne v. State, 92 Ga.App. 518, 88 S.E.2d 862. However, deceptive methods for the detection of offenders are important and necessary to suppress many criminal activities, notably the sale of narcotics. See 15 Am.Jur. § 335 (Supp.1963); Anno. 33 A.L.R.2d 883. Accardi v. United States, supra 257 F.2d 172.
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Bradham v. State
...Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 5 Cir., 471 F.2d 894. See Womack v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 131 Ga.App. 63, 205 S.E.2d 72; Merritt v. State, 110 Ga.App. 150, 153, 137 S.E.2d 917. Appellant at the conclusion of the charge refused to specify any part of the charge that was deemed to be inaccurate ......
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Rowles v. State, 54276
...is sufficiently clear to be understood by jurors of ordinary capacity and understanding is all that is required. Merritt v. State, 110 Ga.App. 150, 153, 137 S.E.2d 917 (1964). Even though not every phrase and portion of the Code section be applicable, it is generally held that a new trial w......
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Milstead v. State
...charge on identification was this single exhumed portion prejudicial as amounting to a comment on the evidence. See Merritt v. State, 110 Ga.App. 150, 153, 137 S.E.2d 917. Rather we conclude that the comment was the recognition of a proper statement of law and did no more than state a self-......
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Rucker v. State, 50589
...as a whole as given was a correct statement of the applicable law. Sutton v. State, 59 Ga.App. 198, 199, 200 S.E. 225; Merritt v. State, 110 Ga.App. 150, 137 S.E.2d 917. That portion of the charge to which exception is made has been lifted from its context and is incomplete. Where an except......