Merritt v. State

CourtSupreme Court of Indiana
Citation488 N.E.2d 340
Docket NumberNo. 584S182,584S182
PartiesKenneth T. MERRITT, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Decision Date03 February 1986

James L. Kiely, Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., and Joseph N. Stevenson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Justice.

Appellant Kenneth Merritt was convicted after trial by jury of robbery, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.), and burglary, a class B felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1985 Repl.), and was sentenced to two concurrent 14 year terms of imprisonment. He raises the following issues in this direct appeal:

1. Whether his constitutional rights were violated when the State used a peremptory challenge to eliminate the only black from the jury; and,

2. Whether the court erred in denying his motion to suppress admission of a knife taken from him when he was arrested.

I. Peremptory challenge

Appellant claims he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the only black on the jury venire was peremptorily excused without having been questioned. The excused venireman was approximately one hour late for the voir dire. When appellant objected to the peremptory challenge, the prosecutor responded that the venireman's tardiness contributed to his decision to use a peremptory challenge against him.

It is the settled view in Indiana that the peremptory challenge, which "has very old credentials", as Justice White put it, is exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control". Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. Its function is to eliminate extremes of partiality and to assure the parties that the jurors will decide the issues only on the evidence. Id.; Swope v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 148, 325 N.E.2d 193. Unlike challenges for cause, the peremptory is often exercised on "hunches" and impressions having to do, perhaps, with a prospective juror's habits, associations, or "bare looks". Swain, supra.

Naturally, however, discrimination on the sole basis of race is unlawful. Nonetheless, a prosecutor is afforded a presumption that his use of peremptories is legitimate. Id. Our view has been that the presumption is overcome only by a showing of systematic and deliberate exclusion from juries of members of a certain race over a period of time. Hobson v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 281; See also, Mays v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1161.

Appellant would have us adopt the California view that the presumption of legitimate use of peremptories may be rebutted in a single case by the showing that all black veniremen are excused peremptorily. People v. Hall (1983), 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854; People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. Such a showing in California could constitute a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination which may be rebutted by the State's explanation of legitimate reasons. The trial court is required to evaluate the reasons given and satisfy itself they are bona fide. Id. Appellant argues the exclusion of the only black venireman, without questions, makes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.

The facts of Merritt's case are not such that he is entitled to relief under either Indiana's or California's approach. Excusing one black, even the only black, in a single case, falls short of suspicion, absent the further showing required by Swain and its Indiana progeny that the peremptory was part of a systematic discrimination. Even in California, the peremptory challenge of only one black does not necessarily suggest a pattern. People v. Harvey (1985), 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 208 Cal.Rptr. 910.

As we noted earlier, after appellant objected to the State's use of a peremptory against the only black venireman, the prosecutor stated that his reason for the challenge was based on the fact that the venireman was late for voir dire. Appellant cites Weathersby v. Morris (1983), 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir.), for the proposition that once a prosecutor volunteers his reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge he is no longer "cloaked" with the presumption that his reasons are legitimate. That is, if the reasons offered clearly reflect unlawful discrimination or appear to simply mask discrimination, the trial court must not blind itself to the realities before it. We cannot find here, however, that the prosecutor's proffered reason for the challenge should have appeared to the trial court to be a sham. A party is given broad discretion in its exercise of peremptories and its reasons need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. Id. A party may legitimately draw negative conclusions about an unpunctual prospective juror.

II. Admission of Knife

Appellant next claims reversible error occurred when the trial court overruled his motion to suppress and allowed admission of a knife which was taken from appellant's person when he was arrested. The trial court ruled the seizure of the knife was legal as incident to a valid arrest. Appellant argues that the officers lacked probable cause to make an arrest.

The facts are...

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13 cases
  • Mftari v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • July 12, 1989
    ...suspect has committed the crime in question. Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327; Merritt v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 340. Accord People v. Fletcher (1978), 66 Ill.App.3d 502, 23 Ill.Dec. 258, 383 N.E.2d 1285. In the present case, the Illinois pol......
  • Koo v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • September 22, 1994
    ...on hunches and impressions perhaps having to do with a prospective juror's habits, associations, or bare looks. Merritt v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 340, 341. Simply because counsel may not be able to articulate reasons for a peremptory strike in the face of a Batson challenge does not......
  • Enamorado v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • March 2, 1989
    ...justified in conducting a limited search for the purpose of removing weapons or contraband within the arrestee's control. Merritt v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 340; Murrell v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 638. A search incidental to an arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest in......
  • Nettles v. State, 18S00-8905-CR-379
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 29, 1991
    ...be no doubt that these facts were ample to provide probable cause for the arrest of appellant in the instant case. See Merritt v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 340; Battle v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 70, 415 N.E.2d 39. In dealing with probable cause for making an arrest, a court deals with p......
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