Mershon v. Williams

• Decision Date: 06 March 1899
• Citation: 62 N.J.L. 779,42 A. 778
• Parties: MERSHON v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

42 A. 778

62 N.J.L. 779

MERSHON

v. WILLIAMS et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 6, 1899.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to supreme court.

Action by Harvey H. Mershon against John H. Williams and others. A judgment was rendered, from which plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

John S. Voorhees, for plaintiff in error.

Alan H. Strong, for defendants in error.

HENDRICKSON, J. The matter, in controversy here grows out of a trial at the Middlesex circuit of a claim for damages for the eviction of the plaintiff and the removal of his household goods by the defendants from the farm and premises which he occupied as tenant, located in Howell township, Monmouth county, N. J., about one mile from the village of Farmingdale. The farm had been occupied by the plaintiff for one year, which expired March 1, 1893; and, a dispute having arisen between the parties as to the further right of the plaintiff to occupy the farm, the defendant Williams, who was the landlord, treated the tenancy as having expired, and on April 29th following, taking his opportunity when the plaintiff and his family were away from home, forcibly entered and took possession of the house, and removed the goods therefrom to the highway in front of the premises. There are several exceptions which are relied upon by the plaintiff for a reversal of the judgment, which was in his favor.

The exception upon which the controversy chiefly turns is that which questions the legality of the trial judge's charge to the jury, to the effect that, under the evidence, the defendant, and those acting with him, had a right to take possession of the premises described in the lease, and to remove the goods therefrom, at the time they did, provided they did so without committing a breach of the peace. The importance of this question is manifest, because the charge, in this particular, placed a narrow limit upon the damages that could be assessed by the jury against the defendants. It is necessary to the solution of this question to look at the lease under which the demised premises were held, in the light of the facts, and see if the tenancy was at an end, so that the plaintiff was entitled to possession. The lease was made by the defendant John H. Williams to John T. Mershon, the father of the plaintiff; and the latter took possession and farmed the place, with the consent of his father. It was a lease upon shares. It bore date January 26, 1892, and the term of the letting was "for one year from March 1, 1892, with the privilege of four more years from March 1, 1893." Just prior to the termination of the first year of the letting, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant Williams the following notice: "Mr. John H. Williams-Dear Sir: I hereby notify you that I will remain on the farm for the year 1893, and shall work the same according to our lease. Dated February 20, 1893. [Signed] H. H. Mershon." The plaintiff inclosed this notice, with a personal letter of his own, to defendant Williams; saying that he sent the notice by direction of his counselor, so there could be no question to arise on the subject. The defendants insist that by giving this notice the plaintiff apprised the defendant landlord of his refusal to accept the option provided for in the lease, to continue as tenant thereunder for an additional term of four years, and that as a result the lease terminated on March 1, 1893. As I understand the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, he would not seriously dispute this contention, if the notice had been given by John T. Mershon, the lessee, or with his express direction or assent. It is, however, suggested by counsel that it would not be an unfair construction of the terms of this letting, if it were held to mean that the lessee had the right to extend the term, from year to year, for four additional years; arguing that the language is somewhat ambiguous, and therefore should be construed most strongly against the grantor. But it seems clear to me that there is nothing ambiguous in the language used to express the terms of the letting. The term is for one year from a specific date, with the privilege of four more years from the expiration of the first year. If the word "more" be eliminated from the language used, the effect would be to grant a term of one year, with an option to the lessee to continue the letting for an additional term of three years. This is the uniform construction that has been given to such language by the courts, and no case has been cited to the contrary. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 471, and cases cited. The meaning is so clear and explicit in this particular that a construction that would give the lessee the option to extend the term for but one year only, or for but one year at a time, could not be entertained without doing violence to the plain words of the contract. The use of the word "more" modifies the contract in only one particular; and that is, it gives the lessee the option of extending the term for four years additional, instead of three. If, then, the notice thus given by the plaintiff was binding upon the father, the original lessee, so far as the rights of the landlord were concerned, then we may justly say, I think, that the lease was terminated at the end of the one year. That the defendant landlord had the right to regard this notice as the notice of the lessee, or as binding upon him to the same extent as if it had been given by the lessee himself, also seems to me to be quite clear. It is agreed on both sides, in this case,...