Mersmann v. Continental Airlines

Decision Date20 September 2004
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 03-5995 (JAG).
Citation335 F.Supp.2d 544
PartiesMelissa MERSMANN, Plaintiff, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Herbert Tan, Newark, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Robert H. Bernstein, Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., Newark, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

GREENAWAY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff Melissa Mersmann ("Plaintiff") to remand this action to New Jersey Superior Court and the Motion of Defendant Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Continental") to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). On April 16, 2004, United States Magistrate Judge G. Donald Haneke issued a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) and L. CIV. R. 72.1(a)(2), wherein he recommended that this Court: (1) deny Plaintiff's Motion to Remand; and (2) convert Defendant's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, and grant the motion in favor of Defendant. This Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be granted for the reasons set forth in this Opinion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, was previously employed as a flight attendant by Defendant, a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas. (Notice of Removal dated December 16, 2003 ("Notice of Removal"), at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was over 40 years old when she was terminated from her employment with Defendant on or about March 5, 2002. (Amended Complaint dated February 12, 2004 ("Am.Compl."), at ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff initially filed a six-count Complaint against Defendant Continental Airlines in New Jersey Superior Court on or around August 15, 2003.1 According to the Notice of Removal, Continental was served with the Complaint on or about November 21, 2003, and timely removed the action on December 16, 2003, on the grounds that this Court had diversity and federal question jurisdiction. On February 6, 2004, Defendant served its motion to dismiss, and on February 13, 2004, Plaintiff amended her Complaint to add two additional defendants, David Lucas ("Lucas") and Christine Scott ("Scott"), both of whom are alleged to be Continental employees and New Jersey residents.2

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on or about February 17, 2002, as she was working on a flight from Aruba to Newark, she was accused by younger and less senior flight attendants, including Lucas, of "various dereliction of duties." (Am.Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff further alleges that Scott was charged with investigating the accusations and "performed no investigation in regards to Plaintiff's responses or defenses." (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) Therefore, she claims: (1) her termination resulted from age discrimination, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), Continental's personnel policies, and the public policy of New Jersey (Count I); (2) her termination resulted from unlawful gender discrimination, in violation of LAD (Count II); (3) Lucas and Scott "aided and abetted" the discriminatory conduct of Continental, in violation of the LAD (Count III); (4) "Defendants' policies and procedures amounted to an agreement of employment," which Defendants breached, and defendants breached "the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing" (Count IV); (5) negligent, reckless, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V); and (6) violations of Article I, ¶¶ 5, 6, 18, and 19 of the New Jersey Constitution (Count VI).3

Continental asserts that this action was properly removed and should not be remanded. Specifically, Continental asserts that Lucas and Scott were joined for the purposes of destroying diversity jurisdiction, which existed at the time of removal. Continental further claims that its removal of this action, on the additional grounds set forth in § 1331 and § 13374, was proper because the Complaint arises in part from allegations concerning the employment contract between the parties — a dispute which was arbitrated in favor of Defendant, pursuant to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement with its employees. Continental argues that because the resolution of disputes, pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, is governed by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), this action arises under federal law.

Defendant also contends that the Complaint should be dismissed, because: (1) the discrimination claims are "minor" disputes within the meaning of the RLA, which places exclusive jurisdiction over such grievances in an arbitral forum, not in any state or federal court; (2) an arbitral forum already has decided that Plaintiff was terminated for "just cause" based on misconduct, including a positive alcohol test; (3) Plaintiff has not stated a prima facie case for discrimination under the LAD; and (4) LAD claims preempt any other common law remedies.

The R & R concluded that this Court has diversity and federal question jurisdiction over this action. Although the R & R did not recommend the dismissal of the individual defendants, it found that Plaintiff had been dilatory in adding Lucas and Scott, and had joined them for the improper purpose of defeating the Court's jurisdiction over the action. The R & R further found that this Court has federal question jurisdiction, on the basis that, even without diversity jurisdiction, the RLA completely preempted Plaintiff's state law claims. In reaching this conclusion, the R & R relied on Capraro v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 993 F.2d 328 (3d Cir.1993).5

Objections, of a sort, were filed in response to the R & R. Plaintiff filed a "Letter Brief in Response to Proposed Findings and Recommendations" with the Court on May 11, 2004, but the letter, in substance, appears to oppose a motion for summary judgment.6 By letter dated May 24, 2004, Defendant opposed the Court's consideration of Plaintiff's May 11, 2004 letter brief as untimely and substantively deficient.

This Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's objections to the R & R should not be considered. First, Plaintiff's objections do not appear to have been timely filed with the Court. Plaintiff did not file objections to Magistrate Judge Haneke's April 16, 2004 R & R until May 11, 2004. Under the local rules in this district, parties are required to file objections to an R & R within 10 days of receipt. See L. CIV. R. 72.1(c)(2). Second, there is no explanation for the delay. Third, Plaintiff's objections do not comply with the substantive requirements of Rule 72.1(c)(2). Under this rule, an objecting party must "specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis of such objection." Plaintiff's letter brief wholly fails to comply with this requirement.

Before turning to the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss, this Court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Upon review, this Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter; as a result, this action is remanded to state court.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review

A Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition of a dispositive motion is subject to de novo review. See In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir.1998); Temptations, Inc. v. Wager, 26 F.Supp.2d 740, 743 (D.N.J.1998); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).

B. Removal and Subsequent Joinder of Non-Diverse Parties

The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court ... where such action is pending."

28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) provides that if "after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court."

Whether remand should be permitted upon the joinder of non-diverse parties depends on several factors, including: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat jurisdiction; (2) whether plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for amendment; (3) whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not allowed; and (4) any other factors bearing on the equities. Massaro v. Bard Access Sys., 209 F.R.D. 363, 369 (E.D.Pa.2002) (citing Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.1987)).

The removing party bears a "heavy burden of persuasion" towards showing that a non-diverse party was fraudulently joined. Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir.1992). If there is "even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court." Id. Joinder is fraudulent when there is "no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against defendants or seek a joint judgment." Id.

C. Removal and Preemption

The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the original and removal jurisdiction of district courts. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vac. Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that a federal question be presented on the face of a plaintiff's complaint to establish jurisdiction. A corollary to this rule is that, even if a federal question is not apparent on the face of the complaint, jurisdiction still may exist "if the Congress has completely preempted a particular area" by federal statute such that the civil complaint states claims that are "necessarily federal in...

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