Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1985
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 702 P.2d 601 Wesley G. MESLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRAGG MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 31996.

Page 443

216 Cal.Rptr. 443

39 Cal.3d 290, 702 P.2d 601

Wesley G. MESLER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRAGG MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

L.A. 31996.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 1, 1985.

John C. Adams, III, Law Offices of Wylie A. Aitken, Santa Ana, for plaintiff and appellant.

Jay H. Picking, Law Offices of Pray, Price, Williams & Russell, Long Beach, for defendant and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

We consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a tort action against a parent corporation on the theory that it is the alter ego of its subsidiary, the alleged tortfeasor, after entering into a settlement and release agreement with the subsidiary. At issue is the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 877, ¹ which abrogates the common law rule that settlement with one alleged tortfeasor bars action against any others claimed liable for the same injury. We conclude that the statute does apply, and thus release of an alleged tortfeasor under these circumstances does not preclude suit against its claimed alter ego.

The relevant facts, as alleged by plaintiff, are as follows. One night in the summer of 1979, plaintiff was operating a Caterpillar D-9 Dozer atop a 30-foot coke pile. Because he had some difficulty raising the front blade of the dozer, he exited the cab to inspect the vehicle but left the engine running. While moving along the tread of the dozer he stumbled in the darkness. As he slipped, his right arm was thrust into the dozer's engine fan, and approximately one-third of the arm was amputated.

Plaintiff filed a claim for personal injuries against Crescent Cranes, Inc. dba Crescent Coke Handlers, Inc. (hereafter Crescent Coke), plaintiff's employer at the time of the accident; ² Mobil Oil Corporation, on whose premises the accident occurred; Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, owner of the coke pile; M.P. McCaffrey's, Inc., a corporation that had sold the used dozer to Crescent Coke; Caterpillar Tractor Company, manufacturer of the dozer; Bragg Crane Services, Inc. (hereafter Bragg Crane), a company that had owned the dozer before Crescent Coke; and Does. Plaintiff alleged strict products liability and negligence in design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, installation, inspection, purchase, maintenance, and handling of the dozer by Crescent Coke, McCaffrey, Caterpillar, Bragg Crane, and Does. Plaintiff further claimed that Mobil, Great Lakes Carbon, Crescent Coke, Bragg Crane and Does were negligent in the maintenance of the workplace. The complaint included a paragraph reciting that "each of the defendants was the agent and employee of each of the remaining defendants and was at all times herein mentioned acting within the scope of said agency and employment."

Defendants filed various cross-complaints and motions for summary judgment. Relevant to the present action was a motion for summary judgment by Bragg Crane. It claimed to have no connection with the workplace or with plaintiff, and alleged it had had no contact with the dozer since it sold the machine to Crescent Coke in 1976. Plaintiff opposed the motion by asserting inter alia that Crescent Coke and Bragg Crane were alter egos, and thus Bragg Crane could be held responsible for Crescent Coke's negligence. The motion for summary judgment was denied.

Over two years after plaintiff filed his complaint, following discovery that revealed both Crescent Coke and Bragg Crane to be wholly owned subsidiaries of another entity, Bragg Management Co. (hereafter sometimes called defendant), plaintiff substituted the latter as Doe I. Bragg Management moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had no connection whatever with the dozer, the workplace, or plaintiff. The trial court stated that plaintiff appeared to rely on an alter ego theory to hold Bragg Management liable, and that although much discovery had been conducted on the issue an alter ego theory had not been pleaded. Despite plaintiff's request to amend the pleadings, the court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered on this ruling.

Plaintiff contends there were triable issues of fact as to both alter ego and agency theories, that it is not necessary to specifically plead alter ego, and that the determination whether an alter ego relationship exists is for the trier of fact. Defendant responds that there were no triable issues of fact. Further, it argues that the point is moot because during the pendency of the appeal, plaintiff settled with Bragg Crane. Defendant claims that by dismissing with prejudice his suit against Bragg Crane plaintiff removed the basis of his action against Bragg Crane's alter ego. Plaintiff replies that section 877 governs this situation, and thus settlement with one defendant does not release the other.

I.

We first address the question whether summary judgment was proper in light of the posture of the case at the time the court ruled--that is, before plaintiff's settlement with Bragg Crane. The judge's reason for granting the motion is apparent from the transcript of the hearing. He stated he would probably grant plaintiff's request to amend the pleadings to include an alter ego allegation, and deny the summary judgment motion. Counsel for the defense then reminded him that the trial date was only six weeks away. The judge, remarking that to permit the new allegation would "destroy the plaintiff's time of trial" then declared he would not allow plaintiff to amend. Plaintiff's counsel urged that plaintiff would rather include Bragg Management and have trial postponed than retain the trial date as set, and that trial would be postponed in any event because an important party would be missing. These pleas fell on deaf ears, however, and the summary judgment motion was granted.

Section 473 provides that "in furtherance of justice" a court may allow a party to amend its pleadings. When a request to amend has been denied, an appellate court is confronted by two conflicting policies. On the one hand, the trial court's discretion should not be disturbed unless it has been clearly abused; on the other, there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments. This conflict "is often resolved in favor of the privilege of amending, and reversals are common where the appellant makes a reasonable showing of prejudice from the ruling." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, § 1042, pp. 2620-2621.) Unfair surprise to the opposing party is also to be considered. (Id., § 1048, p. 2623.) ³

In the case at bar the court should have permitted plaintiff to plead the alter ego issue. It apparently based its ruling on its reluctance to "destroy the plaintiff's time of trial," yet it was plaintiff who desired to amend regardless of any resulting postponement. Additionally, defendant could hardly have been surprised by plaintiff's reliance on the alter ego theory. As the court stated, there had been much discovery on the issue before defendant's and Bragg Crane's motions for summary judgment. Agency, a related concept, had been alleged in plaintiff's original complaint, to which defendant had been substituted as a Doe. And plaintiff had argued the alter ego theory in its opposition to defendant's motion. Finally, plaintiff was clearly prejudiced by this ruling, since his entire theory opposing summary judgment revolved around the relationship between defendant, Bragg Crane and Crescent Coke.

II.

We turn to the key question whether plaintiff's settlement with Bragg Crane operated to release its alter ego, Bragg Management. For this purpose we examine the history and policies underlying section 877.

At common law if a plaintiff sued two or more tortfeasors and settled with one, the others were released. The rationale for this rule was that the plaintiff had suffered only one injury, for which there could be only one satisfaction. As each tortfeasor was jointly and severally liable for the entire injury, a settlement with any of them fully compensated the plaintiff. To permit the plaintiff to proceed against the others would sanction double recovery. (Lamoreux v. San Diego etc. Ry. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 617, 624, 311 P.2d 1; Chetwood v. California National Bank (1896) 113 Cal. 414, 426, 45 P. 704; Thaxter, Joint Tortfeasors: Legislative Changes in the Rules Regarding Releases and Contribution (1958) 9 Hastings L.J. 180, 182.)

The rule was thus based on the misconception, as Dean Prosser suggested, that a "satisfaction" is the equivalent of a "release." (Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability (1937) 25 Cal.L.Rev. 413, 423.) However, while "[a] satisfaction is an acceptance of full compensation for the injury; a release is a surrender of the cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate consideration." (Ibid.) Even if it could be said that any sum the plaintiff received in settlement was a compensation for the joint wrong (Lamoreux, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 624, 311 P.2d 1), the rule produced unfair results. For example, a plaintiff who settled with a defendant of modest resources for an amount below the value of his damages did not have his claim fully satisfied; nevertheless, under the common law rule he could not seek further compensation from other defendants.

In order to avoid this harsh rule, the covenant not to sue was developed. These covenants were not releases, but rather promises not to prosecute a lawsuit against the covenantee. Since the "language is of covenant and indemnity, not of release" (Kincheloe v. Retail Credit Co., Inc. (1935) 4 Cal.2d 21, 23, 46 P.2d 971), it would not preclude suit against other tortfeasors. (Ibid.) The problem then became whether an instrument should be interpreted as a release or a covenant not to sue. As this court recognized, "the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is entirely artificial. As between the parties to the agreement, the final result is the same in both cases, namely, that there is...