Messenger v. Peter
| Decision Date | 10 December 1901 |
| Citation | 129 Mich. 93,88 N.W. 209 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | MESSENGER v. PETER. [1] |
Appeal from circuit court, Montcalm county, in chancery; Frank D. M Davis, Judge.
Suit by Helen Messenger against James B. Peter. From a decree in favor of complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
George W. Davis, for appellant.
N. O Griswold, for appellee.
To a bill filed to quiet title, containing the requisite allegations of title in the complainant, and that defendant was claiming title under several void tax deeds and was not in possession, the defendant filed an answer in the nature of a cross bill which, after denial of the complainant's title, and claim of title by the defendant under several tax deeds, alleged title in the defendant under a deed from the owner of the government title, for which he paid a valuable consideration, and that he took said deed without notice or knowledge that said owner had previously conveyed the premises. The answer prayed that the defendant be decreed to be the owner in fee, and, in the alternative, that his tax titles set up in complainant's bill might be decreed liens upon the premises, and that they might be foreclosed in this cause. No answer was filed to this cross petition or bill as provided by subdivision 'c' of chancery rule 11, and an order taking it as confessed was entered, as may be done in a proper case. See Coach v. Circuit Judge, 97 Mich. 563, 56 N.W. 937; 2 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 1553; 1 Hoff. Ch. Prac. 353; Jenn. Ch. Prac. 394; White v. Buloid, 2 Paige, 164.
The defendant claims that complainant's default required that the court accept as true the new facts set up in the cross bill, viz. that the defendant obtained a deed of the premises from the original owner, that he paid a valuable consideration therefor, and that he took it without notice or knowledge of a former conveyance of the same. The rule is that such allegations of fact must be taken as true, upon an order pro confesso, and the complainant cannot, therefore, question upon this record the allegations that defendant took a deed from the person who at one time held original title for value, and without notice of his previous conveyance.
To complete his chain of title, the complainant produced the record of a deed from John D. Fargo to one Meadows. The deed appears to have been dated on August 13, 1890, and executed upon that day before a notary public in South Dakota, who appended a certificate of acknowledgment under his notarial seal. There was no record of a certificate authenticating this acknowledgment, and at the time of the execution of the deed such was necessary to entitle it to record. The deed was recorded on November 29, 1893. At that time it was entitled to record, unless the statute (Comp. Laws, � 8964) which was passed in 1891 (see Pub. Acts 1891, p. 131) should be applied to such unrecorded deeds only as were executed after its passage. The deed was valid between the parties when executed, under our decisions. Had it been recorded at once, though before the act took effect, such record would now be evidence, under the express provisions of the law. The act clearly evinces a legislative intent to make the record evidence, although the deed may have been executed and recorded before the law was passed; and we see no reason for believing that it was the design to cure a record already made, but to refuse record to a pre-existing deed, valid between the parties, and having the statutory requisites. The record was admissible, and complainant's title was established prima facie.
The tax deed for the tax of 1886 is attacked upon several grounds, among which is the claim that the equalization by the board of supervisors was invalid. The record of the board of supervisors shows the following: Following the foregoing was a table under headings as shown below,--the amounts being placed opposite the names of the towns,--in which appeared the township of Home and the city of Greenville, among others, thus:
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Acres. Real as as as Added From Equalized. Aggregate.
to
Assessed. Assessed. Assessed. Real. Real.
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Greenville }
First W.... 216,267 46,700 }
Greenville, }
Second W... 276,716 182,920 } 1,021,209 191,209 530,800 830,000
Greenville, }
Third W.... 229,026 69,580 }
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Home....... 23,028 382,505 83,335 465,840 59,160 441,665 525.000
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Totals carried out
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(Report signed by the committee.)
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The points relied upon to invalidate the equalization are: First, that the record does not clearly show what was adopted as the report of the committee; second, the grouping of the three wards of Greenville for the purpose of equalization, it being contended that these wards should have been mentioned separately in the respective columns.
The statute (Comp. Laws, � 3857) requires the board of supervisors 'to examine the assessment rolls of the several townships, wards and cities, and ascertain whether the relative valuation of the real property in the respective townships, wards and cities has been uniformly estimated.' See Act No. 153, Laws 1885, � 100. If they deem it unequal, they proceed to equalize it in the manner thereinafter pointed out, for the purpose of apportioning the state and county taxes; and their action must be certified to upon each roll, which shall thereafter be delivered to the supervisor of the proper township, ward, or city. It is apparent from the foregoing that the assessing district was intended to be the unit for equalization, and an equalization that deducts an aggregate sum from the total valuation of three wards cannot be helped by a presumption that the wards have been compared separately with each other and with other townships. It might as well be said that an aggregate deduction from the total assessed valuation of real estate in the county would show that a comparison had been made, and that, while assessments had been excessive, they were uniformly so, and therefore that an aggregate deduction should be made from all at a rate to be ascertained by ratio and proportion. It is contended that it is not shown that the tax was made excessive by this attempt at equalization, and therefore the tax cannot be held invalid. The same might be said had no attempt at equalization been made. It may be that the taxes upon...
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Wood v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange
...Cogswell v. Kells, 293 Mich. 541, 292 N.W. 483 (1940); Lesisko v. Stafford, 293 Mich. 479, 292 N.W. 376 (1940); Messenger v. Peter, 129 Mich. 93, 88 N.W. 209 (1901). It also appears that a defaulting party has a right to participate if further proceedings are necessary to determine the amou......