Messenger v. Teagan

• Decision Date: 08 October 1895
• Citation: 64 N.W. 499,106 Mich. 654
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: MESSENGER v. TEAGAN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. ENGEL v. DONOVAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

64 N.W. 499

106 Mich. 654

MESSENGER v. TEAGAN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

ENGEL v. DONOVAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 8, 1895

Certiorari to circuit court, Wayne county; Joseph W. Donovan, Judge.

Applications for mandamus: One by Frank A. Messenger, Jr., against John B Teagan, justice of the peace; the other by Ernest E. Engel against Joseph W. Donovan, Wayne circuit judge,-the former proceeding being instituted in the court below, and the latter being an original proceeding in the supreme court. In the former case there was judgment for respondent therein and relator brings certiorari. Judgment reversed in former case. Writ denied in latter case.

Horace H. Rackham (George B. Yerkes, of counsel) for appellant.

Bowen, Douglas & Whiting, for appellee.

GRANT J.

The object of these suits is to test the constitutionality of an act "to establish and provide justice's courts in the city of Detroit, and to repeal Act No. 280 of the Local Acts of 1883, entitled 'An act relative to justice's courts in the city of Detroit,' approved April 25th, 1883, and all acts amendatory thereof."

1. The first objection is that it is repugnant to section 20, art. 4, of the constitution, which reads, "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The objection is not sound. The title is sufficiently comprehensive. The one general object, which is expressed in the title, is to establish and provide justices' courts in the city of Detroit. All provisions of the act are consistent with this general purpose, and germane to it. The title is not deceptive. It gives notice to the legislators and to the public that it will provide for the organization, the details, and the jurisdiction of the court, which is authorized by the constitution. It is sufficient, under the following authorities: People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495; Kurtz v. People, 33 Mich. 282; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State Treasurer, 31 Mich. 17; Hall v. Judge of Superior Court, 88 Mich. 440, 50 N.W. 289; Gravel-Road Co. v. Paas, 95 Mich. 372, 54 N.W. 907; Van Husan v. Heames, 96 Mich. 507, 56 N.W. 22.

2. The constitution (section 17, art. 6) provides that justices of the peace "shall hold their offices for four years and until their successors are elected and qualified." This act provides that the justices elected under it shall hold their offices for four years, saying nothing about holding over until their successors are duly qualified. It is urged that this act contravenes the above constitutional provision, in that it shortens the constitutional term of office. We think there is no force in this contention. The constitution and the law both provide for a term of four years; while the former provides that if, for any reason, a successor is not elected and qualified at the expiration of the four years, the incumbent shall hold over. If the law said nothing whatever about the term of office, but only provided when the term should commence, the law would be valid, for it would then be construed as having been enacted with reference to the constitutional period. The act provides for the election of successors, so that ordinarily there can be no interregnum in office. It was equally unnecessary to incorporate into the act the provision of the constitution in regard to holding over. The constitution controls, and the act, in neither letter nor spirit, is in conflict with it. While there is some conflict in the decisions, the better doctrine is that, where the law does not expressly or by necessary implication prohibit, officers hold over until their successors are duly elected and qualified. Some authorities make exceptions in judicial officers, but we see no reason in the distinction in this case. 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 662; Walker v. Ferrill, 58 Ga. 512.

3. It is urged that the act is in contravention of section 18, art 6, of the constitution: "In civil cases, justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to the amount of $100, and concurrent jurisdiction to the amount of $300, which may be increased to $500, with such exceptions and restrictions as may be provided by law. They shall also have such criminal jurisdiction, and perform such duties as shall be prescribed by the legislature." This act increases the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace in Detroit to $500, and limits the right of appeal to the circuit court to cases where the justice shall disallow any claim in favor of any plaintiff or defendant to the amount of $50, and where a judgment shall be rendered to the amount of $50, exclusive of costs. The precise objection is that the justices of the peace in...