Messenheimer v. The Fraternal Aid Union

• Decision Date: 12 October 1918
• Docket Number: 21,730
• Citation: 103 Kan. 552,175 P. 679
• Parties: WILLIAM MESSENHEIMER, Appellant, v. THE FRATERNAL AID UNION, Appellee
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

175 P. 679

103 Kan. 552

WILLIAM MESSENHEIMER, Appellant, v. THE FRATERNAL AID UNION, Appellee

No. 21,730

Supreme Court of Kansas

October 12, 1918

Decided July, 1918.

Appeal from Douglas district court; CHARLES A. SMART, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. FRATERNAL INSURANCE -- Provision in Certificate for Payments to Member on Reaching a Certain Age Void. An incorporated mutual benefit society which under its charter has no power to obligate itself to pay a certain sum to its members on their reaching seventy years of age, cannot accomplish the same result by the device of issuing a certificate promising to pay that amount to a member in case of his total disability, and adopting a by-law providing that members on reaching that age shall be considered totally disabled.

2. SAME--Power of Benefit Society to Change its By-laws. Where a certificate issued by a mutual benefit association includes a provision that it is liable to forfeiture if the member shall not comply with "such by-laws as are or may be adopted," and the application for membership includes an agreement that the certificate shall be void if the member shall fail to comply with the laws of the association then in force or thereafter adopted, the association has the same power to change its rules as is conferred by the ordinary agreement of the applicant to be bound by subsequently adopted regulations.

3. SAME--Statutory Provisions--Give No Authority to Make Payments on Member Reaching Certain Age. A statute empowering certain associations "to make insurance on the lives of individuals, and against personal injury, disablement or death resulting from injury," and forbidding them "to contract the payment of endowments, annuities, or anything of value to the member himself, except for injury or disablement," does not authorize them to undertake to make payments because of the insured having reached a certain age.

A. C Wilson, and F. B. Dodds, both of Lawrence, for the appellant.

S. D. Bishop, of Lawrence, for the appellee.

OPINION

MASON, J.:

On February 26, 1897, William Messenheimer became a member of the Fraternal Aid Association, a beneficiary society incorporated under the laws of Kansas, receiving a certificate which provided for the payment of $ 1,000 to his wife in the event of his death, and for the payment of one-half that amount to himself in case of his total and permanent disability. Among the by-laws of the association at that time was one reading:

"All members arriving at the age of seventy years, who are in good standing in the Beneficiary Department, shall be considered totally disabled."

A similar corporation, the Fraternal Aid Union, has since succeeded to the rights and obligations of the organization first mentioned. Having attained the age of seventy, Messenheimer brought an action against the present society asking for the payment to him of five hundred dollars. A demurrer to a petition alleging these facts was sustained, and he appeals.

1. The petition does not set out the purposes of the original corporation as stated in its charter. In an action against it which reached this court (Kirk v. Aid Association, 95 Kan. 707, 149 P. 400) the record contained a statement of them in these words:

"'1. To promote fraternal regard among all white persons of sound bodily health and good moral character, who are socially acceptable and between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five years. 2. To bestow substantial aid upon totally disabled members, and the widows, orphans, heirs and devisees of deceased members. 3. To care for sick and distressed members. 4. To provide for weekly indemnity for members disabled by accident and provide for substantial benefits for widows, orphans, heirs and devisees of members whose deaths result from accidental causes.'" (p. 709.)

We are probably justified in assuming that this statement is correct, inasmuch as that case has been discussed in the briefs and arguments in the present case, and no suggestion to the contrary has been made....